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U.S. Supreme Court Deals Final Blow to Corporate Human Rights Accountability

9 November 2026 at 19:29

For the past two decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has been slowly weakening the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), a key human rights law that allows foreign nationals to sue persons or entities in civil court for harms resulting from violations of international law. The court’s recent ruling in Cisco Systems, Inc. v. Doe I dealt the law a final blow, foreclosing—absent new legislation by Congress—any future ability by plaintiffs to use the law to hold technology companies accountable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses. EFF filed multiple amicus briefs in the case, including most recently in the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court Rejected New Causes of Action Under the ATS

The ATS was passed by the very first Congress in 1789 and in just a few words gives U.S. federal courts jurisdiction to hear civil claims brought by foreign nationals against defendants who violated “the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." There has been a longstanding question about what counts as a valid civil claim under “the law of nations.”

In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004), the Supreme Court had noted three historical international law claims that the First Congress likely had in mind: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy, collectively known as the Blackstone Three.

The Sosa court also held that federal courts may recognize other substantive causes of action under the ATS if they reflect international norms that are “specific, universal, and obligatory,” stating that this “door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms today.”

Thus, the Sosa court recognized that the ATS could be used to bring claims related to historical violations of international law as well as select newer claims reflecting modern concepts of human rights.

In Cisco, the Supreme Court overruled the second Sosa holding. The majority held that the current case, a technology company aiding and abetting torture and other human rights abuses, was beyond the scope of the original three ATS claims and it was not for the court to create new ways of enforcing international law. The court said:

[W]e close the door that Sosa cracked to judicially created ATS liability. We do not disturb Sosa’s holding that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute; nor do we revisit its assumption that causes of action are available for torts corresponding to the Blackstone three. We conclude only that Sosa was overly optimistic in its prediction that there might be a narrow class of cases in which courts may create ATS actions without infringing on the prerogatives of the political branches. In truth, this class is a null set.

What result for this case? Cisco argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that aiding-and-abetting liability exists under the ATS for the torts alleged by the plaintiffs. Cisco is correct. Courts cannot create new rights of action to remedy violations of international law, so there is necessarily no liability for aiding and abetting such violations. Plaintiffs’ ATS claims against Cisco must be dismissed.

Cisco is Off the Hook for Aiding and Abetting Horrific Human Rights Abuses

The Supreme Court’s ending of the plaintiffs’ case against Cisco is hugely disappointing given that the case has been going on since 2011 and the Ninth Circuit in 2023 allowed the case to move forward in an excellent and well-reasoned opinion. The Ninth Circuit held, in part:

We conclude that Plaintiffs’ allegations, accepted as true, are sufficient to state a plausible claim that Cisco provided essential technical assistance to the douzheng [violent struggle] of Falun Gong with awareness that the international law violations of torture, arbitrary detention, disappearance, and extrajudicial killing were substantially likely to take place. 

The plaintiffs sued Cisco for the company’s role in building and deploying the “Golden Shield,” also referred to as “The Great Firewall of China”—a vast surveillance system that Cisco began building in the late 1990s and that the company customized to enable the Chinese government to target disfavored minorities, including members of the Falun Gong religion.

The thirteen plaintiffs—Falun Gong practitioners—alleged arrest, detention, and torture, including of themselves and family members, at least one of whom died by beating while being detained. The allegations were horrific: the plaintiffs were placed in forced labor camps, beaten with steel rods, shocked with electric batons, and endured sleep deprivation and violent force-feeding.

Importantly, the plaintiffs also alleged that their private emails, text messages, and other information—intercepted by the Golden Shield—were shared with the torture sites, and shown to them and used as part of their torture and forced conversion sessions, which included threats to their family members and others who had communicated with them. 

And now, Cisco is off the hook for all of this.

Congress Must Act to Hold American Tech Companies Accountable for Aiding and Abetting Human Rights Abuses

As we argued in our amicus brief to the Supreme Court, a robust federal statute is necessary given that voluntary and informal mechanisms of corporate human rights accountability are inadequate.

The plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in 2011. The following year, in 2012, Cisco first published its Global Human Rights Policy. Since then, the company has never provided redress to the plaintiffs, despite its currently operative human rights policy stating:

Where we have identified that we have caused or contributed to an adverse human rights impact, we are committed to providing access to and cooperating in remediation for affected individuals, workers, and communities through legitimate processes.

What’s more, the Associated Press conducted an extensive 2025 investigation, which recently won the Pulitzer Prize, further mapping Cisco’s and other American tech companies’ involvement in creating China’s surveillance state over the past three decades. When questioned by the AP reporters, the companies dismissed any notion of human rights obligations and simply “said they adhere to relevant export controls, laws and regulations where they operate.”

In short, Cisco’s commitment to human rights is a fiction.

Given that the U.S. Supreme Court has effectively read the ATS into non-existence, Congress must now step up. While there might be other avenues for redress including under state law, there must also be a comprehensive federal human rights law allowing any plaintiff to hold American companies—especially technology companies—accountable for aiding and abetting human rights abuses, with knowledge or intent that those abuses would occur, and whether the victims suffered those abuses in the U.S. or in foreign countries.

The implications of this gap in U.S. human rights law are significant. As Prof. Harold Koh considered:

[T]he Justices should ask whether affording such immunity in Cisco would implicitly signal to U.S. companies that they could not be held liable for assisting the U.S. government in committing gross violations. Such violations could include constructing a mass surveillance system that may be used to surveil, persecute, retaliate against, and punish real and perceived opponents and constructing systems that autonomously commit war crimes.

American companies should not have a free pass to build out surveillance states (or other technologically sophisticated systems) that not only violate personal privacy or facilitate censorship, but that can also lead to real-world physical violence and even death.

Related Cases: 

Beyond Catching Up: What Rudi Supek Can Teach Ecosocialism Today

9 November 2026 at 18:06
By Mladen Domazet* In the series Degrowth and Ecosocialism: the global picture Recent electoral and popular movement successes of progressive and left-leaning forces, from Brazil to parts of South-Eastern Europe, have encouraged renewed reflection on the prospects for a really-existing post-growth politics and ecosocialism. If the political mood of the last decade was defined by climate… Continue reading Beyond Catching Up: What Rudi Supek Can Teach Ecosocialism Today

Preparing for Crisis: An Inaugural Gathering of the UK Degrowth Community

1 November 2026 at 12:32
by Ci Davis* with Mark Burton† Additionally, you can find here the summary of the discussions that took place during the workshops. We have also published the contributions by Mark Burton and Joe Herbert. A short video, featuring three attendees (Jack, Kriszti and Will) on what degrowth means for them, was made by Forest Hall.… Continue reading Preparing for Crisis: An Inaugural Gathering of the UK Degrowth Community

Using a survey to understand digital design tool usage across the University (as part of the Figma design component library project)

2 November 2026 at 08:24

This year, as part of the Figma component library project, we researched how colleagues across the University use digital design tools in their work. This post explores how we approached the research, from designing and distributing the survey through to analysing the responses and identifying emerging themes. 

In a previous blog post, intern Kaile Liu introduced the wider Figma project, and its aims and objectives: 

What I am working on as a Digital Developer Intern (Figma) 

Request access to the project brief for more details:

Figma project brief

We needed to understand how digital design work happens across the University 

To begin with, we needed to understand how staff across the University design, collaborate and deliver digital work. 

There are a wide range of tools, workflows and practices currently in use. Understanding these existing ways of working would help us explore where Figma fits within the wider digital landscape, rather than looking at Figma in isolation. It also supports the work we are doing to improve our Figma component design library.

To hear from colleagues across a wide range of roles and disciplines, we chose a survey as the main method for this research.

Five questions framed our research 

As well as understanding what tools people use, we wanted to find out how those tools support their work and where there may be opportunities to improve existing ways of working.  

Our research was underpinned by five key questions: 

  • What tools are people using day-to-day? 
  • How do those tools support their work? 
  • Where do people experience challenges or inefficiencies? 
  • How do teams collaborate when creating digital content and services? 
  • Where are there opportunities to provide better support, guidance and training? 

These questions helped us build a broader picture of digital working practices across the University. Additionally, working this way allowed us to look beyond any individual or singular tool.

Hearing from more than just traditional design roles was important 

Design work happens across many different roles at the University, including roles not traditionally associated with design or that do not have ‘design’ in the job title. For example, a communications officer creating digital content, a developer sketching a wireframe, a UX practitioner co-creating a prototype or a learning technologist building online resources may all be making design decisions as part of their work. 

This meant looking beyond traditional design roles and hearing from colleagues who use digital design tools in different ways.  

Initial conversations helped us shape the research 

Before designing the survey, we carried out an initial set of user interviews with staff from across the University. We also drew on existing University communities and communities of practice to understand the different roles involved in digital design work. These conversations gave us an early view of how colleagues use and collaborate through digital tools. They helped us identify the groups we wanted to hear from and shape the questions we wanted to ask in the survey.

Adapting our survey to broaden our understanding of ways of working

Based on these interviews, we recognised that a single set of questions would not capture the differences between roles particularly well. Instead, we adapted the survey so that respondents would answer shared questions and then be filtered to questions relevant to their role and ways of working.

This, in essence, would give us a more consistent set of responses while still allowing us to explore some of the differences between roles.

Role categories allowed us to tailor the survey 

We created a filter with seven options: 

  • Marketing and Communications 
  • UX and Human-centred Design 
  • Graphic and UI Design 
  • Developer 
  • Project or product manager 
  • Research 
  • Other (for participants who did not feel represented by the other groups) 

Participants selected the options that best reflected their work, determining which role-specific questions they were shown. They also provided their job title.

The survey combined common and role-specific questions 

The survey consisted of three main sections. The questions included a mixture of multiple-choice and open-ended responses. This allowed us to identify broader patterns while also giving colleagues opportunities to explain their experiences in more detail. 

The opening section included five common questions about participants’ roles, the types of digital design work they do and the tools they use, including tools for collaboration, diagramming and presentations. 

The middle section included around four to six role-specific questions, depending on the participant’s selected group. These explored aspects of digital working relevant to each group. For example, marketing and communications colleagues were asked about the tools they use when designing marketing materials, while developers were asked about the tools and approaches they use during the design phase of projects. 

The closing section included 15 common questions focused on colleagues’ experiences and expectations of digital design tools, including Figma. We asked which tools colleagues would be likely to use, whether they experienced challenges with their current tools and how their work might be affected if they lost access to Figma. 

We wanted the survey to reach as many colleagues as possible

We distributed the survey primarily through existing Teams channels and University communities, which helped us reach a wide range of roles. These included groups focused on marketing and communications, human-centred design and digital development, as well as distribution via heads of IT. 

The survey received 55 responses  

We heard from 55 staff across a range of roles. Based on the categories participants selected when completing the survey, these were as follows: 

  • Marketing and Communications: 20 
  • Developers: 10 
  • UX and Human-Centred Design: 6 
  • Graphic and UI Design: 3 
  • Project or product manager: 2 
  • Other: 14 

Although seven categories were available in the survey, no participants selected ‘Research’ as their primary category, so it is not shown in the breakdown. 

The ‘Other’ category included colleagues working in areas such as product and project management, learning technology and academic support. 

We refined the groups when analysing the responses 

The survey categories gave us a useful starting point, but participants did not always recognise themselves within the roles specified (even when their job title directly reflected one of the options). For example, a participant selected themselves as ‘Other’, but their job title indicated that their work was within graphic design.

In order to evaluate the responses effectively, we revisited participants’ selected categories alongside their job titles and descriptions of their work.

This helped us six create groups that gave us a more useful basis for comparing responses:

  • Developers and technical specialists 
  • UX practitioners 
  • UI and graphic designers 
  • Marketing and communications staff 
  • Product and project managers 
  • Learning technology and academic support staff 

Some of these groups needed to be created on the back of this, as we had not identified those specific roles. For example, Learning Technologist was not an option for participants to select, but emerged as a useful category based on the number of respondents who had this as their job title. 

After this assessment, we were in a better place to begin analysis, as these groups gave us a more useful basis for comparing responses while still reflecting the range of roles represented.

Analysing the survey results required two approaches 

The survey produced both quantitative and qualitative responses, and we used different approaches depending on the type of question and response. 

For the role-specific questions, we used FigJam (Figma’s whiteboard for online collaboration) to review and compare responses across the different groups. This included both quantitative and qualitative responses, allowing us to look at the detail within each role as well as compare responses across the wider dataset. We used Power BI, a data visualisation platform, to explore the common quantitative questions, which gave us a consistent set of responses across all participants. 

We used FigJam to explore the role-specific responses 

We created a large collaborative FigJam board to organise the responses. FigJam supported discussion within the project team, allowing us to work in tandem and analyse the data as a group (in person and asynchronously).

We read through responses from each group, compared them across different roles, and identified recurring patterns and themes. FigJam also allowed us to consider the quantitative responses alongside the more detailed qualitative answers, giving us a fuller picture of ways of working. 

Screenshot of three frames on FigJam full of stickies. There is a blue section, titled Developers, an orange section titled Marketing and Communications, and a green section titled Graphic visual and UI design.

Section of our analysis on the FigJam board

Power BI helped us explore the common quantitative responses 

Power BI allowed us to visualise responses across the opening and closing questions. We wanted to do this as they were common questions asked of all participants. Power BI allowed us to bring our data to life by presenting the data in a more visual way, highlighting the common patterns and themes more easily.

Screenshot of Power BI visualisations. There are seven individual bar graphs of different colours, alongside a larger bar graph with these seven combined. The large bar graph has a right skewed narrow tail. There are also two sets of pie charts, each consistening of seven smaller charts and one larger combined. The data itself is not visible.

Section of our Power BI visualisations for the project.

Grouping responses helped us identify recurring themes 

The open-ended questions in the role specific sections had more detailed responses. This required us to compare responses across the different role groups and group similar comments together to identify recurring themes. 

As we worked through the responses, we also noted areas where a follow-up conversation with a participant could provide more context.

We also captured key quotations that illustrated what participants were telling us in their own words. These will be useful for when we playback findings to colleagues and complete a written report. 

The research will inform the next stage of the project 

The research highlighted both the diversity of digital working practices across the University and common themes across different roles. 

The next stage will bring these findings together into a report. It will highlight where Figma currently supports existing workflows and where its integration will provide more consistent, unified delivery of digital practices across the University.

Lessons Learned From 'AdFection' and What To Do Next

Last week, researchers at Citizen Lab revealed a horrifying new malware campaign, dubbed “AdFection.” It used an ad network to distribute spyware to journalist’s devices to infect them without the target ever needing to click anything. This sort of attack on journalists is dangerous and incredibly concerning, especially since it’s built on the backbone of a technology we already object to: behavioral advertising. Although this type of attack has only been described targeting journalists, you can take a few steps we outline in the next section to mitigate the risk no matter who you are.

A few factors combined to make this attack a noteworthy first-of-its-kind. First, it utilized the surveillance ad-tech ecosystem to specially target the malicious code. Second, the spyware it delivered was so-called “zero-click,” meaning it required no interaction from the user to be infected: all that is required is for the ad to be delivered and code bundled along with it to be run, which happens automatically. Neither malvertising nor zero-click attacks are new on their own. What’s novel about the AdFection attack is combining them, creating a highly targeted, extremely dangerous attack which is difficult to defend against and even harder to detect.

Let’s take a deeper look from the perspective of one of the Windows devices supplied to the researchers from Al Jazeera. Here’s how the report describes the infection happening: 

  • Someone browsing the web or using an app on that machine is served an ad created by Discover-Tech, a company exposed in the report as “purporting to be a legitimate advertising company, [but] appears to be a front for large-scale ad espionage abuse.” 
  • The ad contains a small snippet of JavaScript code which is automatically executed when rendered in the app or website. 
  • This code reaches back out to a Discover-Tech server, referred to as their “NOAS server,” with detailed information about the machine rendering it: its cookie-set advertising ID, IP address, and more.

So far, nothing particularly unusual has happened. Ads that contain JavaScript code and reach back out to their servers with lots of information on your device—and by extension you—are commonplace. It’s all part of the data-driven advertising ecosystem. What happens next is more interesting:

  • The NOAS server uses this detailed information to determine it is an Al Jazeera machine requesting the ad. 
  • Instead of returning an empty response (as it does most of the time), it responds with a malicious, zero-click spyware payload. That payload was created by Discover-Tech’s partner Candiru/Integrity Labs, a company previously exposed for involvement in sophisticated malware attacks. 
  • The payload is then executed and infects the targeted machine.

Companies targeting zero-click malware attacks against journalists might seem like the plot of a blockbuster spy thriller. But this attack was enabled by the everyday practices of ad-tech companies, which unfortunately have extreme latitude in the collection of users’ data. By leveraging the tracking identifiers and data collected on devices for the purpose of delivering targeted ads to specific individuals, mercenary spyware companies can repurpose this data in order to fine-tune who they infect—and hide that they’re doing it from everyone else. 

Most ads are not delivered directly by the ad creators, but rather by intermediaries that facilitate Real-Time Bidding auctions. Nonetheless, winning bidders are given the ability to execute JavaScript code in the browser of the person who receives the targeted ad. This allows for interactive ads to be displayed, but also (as we’ve seen) for the compromise of a device just by delivery of malicious code.

While the different components in this attack chain are not novel on their own, the exposure of this combined attack is significant because it reveals a technique to hyper-target individuals and organizations for infection. Luckily, there are steps you can take to protect yourself from the myriad of dangers presented by the ad-tracking industry. Here’s how.

What You Can Do About It

As we work towards fundamental fixes to the ad ecosystem and banning online behavioral ads altogether, the onus is on all of us to protect ourselves. This is especially important for higher risk individuals or journalists working in states with heavy surveillance. Citizen Lab outlines several steps, depending on your threat model, to take to help protect yourself:

These steps can be very helpful in protecting yourself, but there is only so much you can do as an individual. Banning behavioral ads like this would be a good place to start. Behavioral ads aren’t just a privacy nightmare as designed. They are the perfect vehicle for malvertising and similar threats, just as we see here.

Degrowth against re-armament

24 October 2026 at 10:43
by Anna Gregoletto* Living in hyper-imperialist times The Tricontinental Institute for Social Research has diagnosed our conjuncture as one of hyper-imperialism, a new stage of imperialism that entails an aggressively decaying US empire attacking sovereign-seeking projects in the Global South and confronting China, with the European NATO members as its vassals (Tricontinental 2024). In Britain,… Continue reading Degrowth against re-armament

The Vulnerability Apocalypse and Why We Should Fund Open Source

23 October 2026 at 22:36

If you use the internet at all, you may have noticed that a large percentage of sites suddenly went down earlier this week—and all your nerdiest friends were talking about "The Vulnerability Apocalypse” and this thing called PHP that powers nearly 70% of the websites on the internet. You may find yourself wondering: what is PHP, what just happened, what is the vulnerability apocalypse, and what do I need to do?  

To find out what you can personally do read the first blog post in this series!  

What Is PHP?  

PHP is a programming language used mainly to create interactive websites. Facebook, Wordpress, Wikipedia, Etsy, and other major sites all use or were originally built on PHP. It is a long-established mainstay of web development. But because it is open-source, maintenance of these critical systems depends on a small number of volunteers working on this in their free time. The disaster scenario that happened this past week is the perfect example of why we need more money and people supporting open-source projects. Corporations should be contributing both. 

What Is the Vulnerability Apocalypse?  

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) are the way that security professionals file reports about vulnerabilities in software. The National Vulnerability Database (NVD), run by NIST, is the official national database of CVEs. In other words, CVE reports managed by NIST are the closest thing we have to a canonical database of security vulnerabilities in software. The NVD currently has around 400,000 CVEs that have been filed and accepted since 1988. In just the month of October, 13,000 new CVEs have been submitted. This means that 3% of critical software security bugs that have ever been officially logged were found in the last month alone. And it's likely that by the end of the year over a quarter of the software vulnerabilities that have ever been found will be from 2026.  

 

a graph showing the number of computer vulnerabilities by week since 1990, increasing exponentially in the last couple months.

Computer vulnerabilities reported are rising exponentially. Source: CVE Tracker

This research is being driven almost entirely by the cybersecurity capabilities of major AI models from companies like Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Historically it has been popularly assumed by cybersecurity experts that finding unknown (zero-day) exploits in any specific project and turning them into exploits was expensive. The knowledge to discover them was not widespread, and it was a hard task even for those initiated into the arcane ways of vulnerability hunting. Google even dedicated an entire team to it.  

But now thanks to major AI models, vulnerabilities are cheap, and anyone of moderate technical skill with a few dollars and access to a frontier AI model can find vulnerabilities in a few minutes. For example, recent vulnerabilities in PHP were found with a prompt to an AI model that literally said "find bad vulnerabilities in PHP."  

What Happened This Week? 

In 2024, a potentially severe vulnerability in PHP was discovered during an external security audit. PHP’s maintainers couldn’t agree on a solution, but more importantly, they couldn’t find a way to exploit the vulnerability. Because it didn’t seem like an active threat, they ended up deprioritizing a fix in favor of working on more urgent security issues. Then, in August 2026, security researchers working with the latest models from OpenAI and Anthropic independently discovered the vulnerability again, and another one—and now, with a way to exploit them.  

We now know that the vulnerabilities were so severe that they would have allowed even moderately inventive hackers to take over any website that uses PHP and then steal customer data, launch further malware attacks, spy on users, take websites offline, or launch a massive denial of service attack.[1] 

Because of the severity of these vulnerabilities, several of the involved researchers got together with the makers of PHP to patch the vulnerabilities and disclose them in a coordinated manner. The idea was that hopefully everyone would get a chance to quietly release and then apply fixes for the vulnerabilities before the whole world found out about it. 

But news already started to leak on October 20th. There was a post on a widely read forum “Hacker News” and other posts elsewhere. One of the researchers accidentally published a video early. Companies reported seeing active exploitation of the vulnerabilities going back as far as October 17th. On October 21st, six hours before the planned press embargo, one company, Chainguard, jumped the gun and released a patch early, essentially giving anyone instructions about exactly where to find the vulnerabilities and how to weaponize them. This sent system administrators everywhere scrambling to patch their systems before they were taken over by hackers. And it’s going to take a long time to patch all these systems. At the time of this writing over 33 million websites are still running on vulnerable versions of PHP.  

The internet is run largely on open-source software, mostly maintained by a small handful of skilled volunteers occasionally getting a small stipend, not by major corporations and highly paid engineers. These are projects you have perhaps never heard of, like PHP, OpenSSL, and SQLite, but these programs run on nearly every computer in the world and are maintained by teams as small as one person. When a vulnerability is found in these projects, it can be devastating.  

PHP isn’t the only critical open-source software with a high severity vulnerability this week either. Other widespread open-source projects like Node.js and GitLab also had severe security bugs reported.  

The small number of already overworked open-source maintainers are now facing a deluge of vulnerability reports, some of which are false, but many of which are very real. Burnout in open source has never been higher.  

We Need Stronger Support for Open Source Projects

Much of the foundation for the modern multibillion-dollar internet industry is built on open-source products that were created and still maintained—for free—by dedicated volunteers in their spare time. It’s an imperfect system, and it can lead to errors.  

One of those critical, under resourced open-source products is PHP. And while vulnerabilities in PHP were privately found years ago, they were left unfixed because they didn’t seem as impactful as other bugs at the time. These same vulnerabilities were recently rediscovered and proved to be trivially exploitable by security researchers using advanced AI models. While in the middle of the widespread, global effort to correct this mistake and deploy fixes, the problem was leaked by some of the security researchers who had gotten early access to the fixes. Unfortunately, this left millions of websites, ranging from personal blogs to government sites, vulnerable to hacking that could result in data theft, malware distribution, and worse.  

Open-source projects like PHP and others are the backbone of the entire internet. If they don’t get the resources they need, they and the internet they power, are at risk of falling apart. Corporations (whose products would not exist without these products) should be actively contributing to their maintenance. 

1. A technical analysis of the vulnerabilities is out of scope for this post and has already been written by the original researchers.

What are the Right-Wing press and think tanks up to this week?

The big themes of the week

1. Immigration and asylum: keeping the pressure on

The asylum debate remains a major focus, with coverage of proposed accommodation for asylum seekers near Piddington and Bicester, residents’ concerns and calls for tougher action. The Daily Express framed local objections around whether women were being listened to, while the wider debate has included proposals from Reform UK to suspend the asylum system for five years.

2. Tax, spending and the case for a smaller state

With the Chancellor’s Budget approaching on 28 October, arguments about taxation, welfare and business costs are intensifying. The Sun has attacked the prospect of further tax rises and argued for welfare cuts, while business groups have called for changes to employer National Insurance to encourage recruitment.

3. Andy Burnham under sustained political attack

The Sun‘s 15 October editorial attacked Burnham over sluggish economic growth, welfare reform, his dealings with Manchester City executives and the prospect of tourist taxes. The Daily Mail has also pursued questions about his relationship with the club’s ownership. They are so ratteld by Labour’s improvement in the polls they’re doing all they can to smear him.

4. Culture-war issues remain part of the agenda

On 16 October, the Daily Mail led with criticism of government proposals to improve pupils’ speaking skills.

Rather than welcoming the improvement, promoted by Lucy Powell, which aims to reform the national curriculum so that verbal fluency and communication skills are embedded alongside traditional academic subjects, the Mail is having a meltdown.

5. The future of the Telegraph and media ownership

On 16 October, Reuters reported that the UK government had cleared Axel Springer’s planned acquisition of Telegraph Media Group from a further competition investigation. This is a significant development for the ownership of one of Britain’s most influential right-leaning newspaper groups.

Why it matters: newspaper ownership affects the long-term institutional landscape in which political arguments are produced. The immediate question is what the change means for editorial independence, newsroom priorities and the paper’s future direction.

The blogs, campaign groups and think tanks behind the headlines

The newspaper stories are only one part of the picture. Campaign organisations and policy institutes help develop the arguments, statistics and proposals that can subsequently enter political debate and media coverage.

TaxPayers’ Alliance — welfare and the public finances

The organisation’s recent output includes a report arguing that Britain’s fiscal problems are worse than those of the 1970s, a critique of tax rises and constituency-level analysis of benefit spending. Its 12 October material claimed benefit costs had risen faster than median pay in 502 of 526 constituencies across England and Wales.

The argument to watch: welfare spending is becoming unaffordable and tax increases risk undermining growth.

The questions to ask: which benefits are included, how the figures are calculated, whether higher spending reflects inflation or increased need, and how the proposed alternatives would affect household incomes.

Read: TaxPayers’ Alliance blog  · Fiscal policy report 

Migration Watch UK — immigration and border control

Campaign and research organisation

Migration Watch’s recent commentary has returned to the question of whether the post-Brexit immigration system has delivered meaningful control over migration. Its September analysis, Ten Years Since Brexit, We Still Have Not Taken Back Control, questions the record on immigration numbers.

The argument to watch: governments have failed to deliver the immigration controls promised after Brexit.

The questions to ask: are the figures about net migration, work visas, asylum applications or settlement? These measure different things, and a claim about one should not automatically be treated as a claim about all the others.

Read: Migration Watch UK blogs 

Policy Exchange — the policy development pipeline

Policy institute · Public services and the economy

Policy Exchange’s recent publications include The Rural Penalty, examining how NHS funding formulas affect rural and coastal communities, and Legislating for Candour?, published on 14 October. Its broader programme addresses productivity, housing, healthcare and regulatory reform.

The argument to watch: how institutional reform, changes to public-service delivery and economic restructuring might improve outcomes.

The questions to ask: what evidence supports each proposed reform, who gains or loses from it, and whether the analysis adequately accounts for regional inequalities.

This newsletter is produced with the assistance AI

The post What are the Right-Wing press and think tanks up to this week? appeared first on Left Foot Forward: Leading the UK's progressive debate.

What did the Liberty Bell sound like? Science is on the case.

15 October 2026 at 19:10

The Liberty Bell, with its famous crack, hasn't been rung in 180 years, but that hasn't stopped scientists from pondering what the bell might have sounded like when tolling. In honor of the nation's 250th anniversary, researchers at Penn State University have modeled its acoustic properties, drawing on data collected from one of the bell's replicas. The work was first presented at a meeting of the Acoustical Society of America in Philadelphia earlier this year, followed by an article in Physics Today.

Historians aren't sure exactly when the Liberty Bell acquired its distinctive crack, just that it occurred sometime between 1817 and 1846. An 1846 account in the Public Ledger described the ringing of the bell on February 23 that year and mentioned that the bell had developed a crack, which someone had attempted to fix by filing the sides down. But it didn't work: The February 23 ringing extended the crack even more, so much so that "the old Independence Bell ... now hangs in the great steeple irreparably cracked and forever dumb." Nobody has heard it ring since.

This wasn't the first time the bell had cracked; the rim cracked shortly after it arrived in Philadelphia in 1752, the first time the clapper struck while testing the sound. It was recast by two local foundry workers, John Pass and John Stow, not once but twice, because the first recast produced a sound that one bystander likened to coal scuttles banging together.

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Analysis: How close was the Holborn and St Pancras by-election?

Following the victory of Labour’s Sagal Abdi-Wali in the Holborn and St Pancras by-election yesterday, the media’s focus is firmly on the Greens’ defeat.

“Why this is the beginning of the end for Zack Polanski,” reads the headline of a comment piece in the Independent, which goes on to outline how yesterday’s by-election was “a crushing defeat” for the Greens. Several outlets are reporting that the Green Party leader intends to stay on at its helm, as though he is on his way out the door. But just how close was the vote? 

​​To put the by-election into context, it is a Labour stronghold, which the party has held since 1983 when the seat was created. Before that, it was Holborn and St Pancras South, which Labour held since 1950, apart from a five-year period where it had a Conservative MP.

The likelihood that Labour would secure a win was therefore high. However, Labour’s vote share in the seat has fallen in the last three elections. In 2019, Keir Starmer’s vote share was shaved by 5.6%. At the 2024 election, it went down by a further 17.4%. This time around, Abdi-Wali won 45.2% of the vote, which is 3.7 points down on Labour’s vote compared to 2024.

Meanwhile, the Greens have steadily increased their vote share in the last two elections, with Polanski winning 33% of the vote yesterday. This is despite him and his party battling highly negative coverage after the Zionism is Racism motion passed at the party’s conference over the weekend. It is also despite Labour enjoying a ‘bounce’ in the polls after Andy Burnham took control of the party in July.

Labour won by 3,364 votes, but turnout was very low. Voter turnout dropped from 54.1% in the 2024 general election to 38.8% yesterday. 

The Greens vote share went up by 22.4 percentage points. Some of that increase was in part due Andrew Feinstein, who stood as an Independent candidate at the last election, deciding not to stand this time around.

As Professor of Political Science, Rob Ford, outlined on Sky News this morning, there is also evidence to suggest that some Green voters went back to Labour due to Burnham’s leftward shift on Gaza and his more radical proposals on housing and the cost-of-living.

“So it feels like the party has shifted wholesale in the direction of where the Greens were,” Ford said, adding that Labour is using the strategy to “close down” the Greens, who they were under threat from.

Despite some evidence of voters drifting back to Labour, to characterise yesterday’s by-election result as “a crushing defeat” for Polanski is to hone in on the loss without looking at the numbers. Labour held a seat where it was always the favourite to win, but on a reduced vote share and amid a low turnout.

The Greens, meanwhile, increased their share of the vote amid negative media coverage. For Polanski to now describe Holborn and St Pancras as “a marginal seat” might be a bit of a stretch, but it certainly isn’t the safe Labour seat it once was.

Olivia Barber is a reporter at Left Foot Forward

The post Analysis: How close was the Holborn and St Pancras by-election? appeared first on Left Foot Forward: Leading the UK's progressive debate.

Beyond Degrowth

10 October 2026 at 08:34
by Marga Mediavilla* In the series Degrowth and Ecosocialism: the global picture The young people who are protesting in the streets of Europe to demand housing, education and not to be used as cannon fodder don’t need us to tell them about Degrowth: they already know what it is. They are the first generation that… Continue reading Beyond Degrowth

Secure Messaging and AI Remain In Conflict Despite the Promise of TEEs

Secure messaging platforms, like Signal, WhatsApp, and recently, encrypted RCS, operate on a straightforward assumption: the content at each end of a conversation is private to the participants in the conversation. End-to-end encryption helps provide the mathematical guarantees that the companies who operate these messaging platforms cannot access the contents of messages. But there’s no way to guarantee what happens once the message arrives on a phone. As more devices and services introduce more artificial intelligence (AI) features into messaging apps, that line begins to blur. 

When AI features are computed entirely on device, it’s less concerning. Yet sometimes the computing requirements are heavy enough that the computation has to be done on a company server. Tech companies tell us they have a solution for this: trusted execution environments (TEEs). But do server-side TEEs really solve the problem?

TEEs exist to serve many different functions, ranging from digital rights management (DRM) content protections to securely storing information in your phone's mobile wallet, but for our purposes, we’ll be focusing on how tech companies use them for their AI tools. 

The basic idea is straightforward: most consumer devices aren’t powerful enough to handle the sorts of AI features companies want to offer, so sometimes they send data off your device to more powerful cloud servers to do the computing, then display the results on your device. Since your data is leaving your device, there’s a privacy compromise. For example, if you ask for a messaging app to summarize a conversation, it may offload that computing power to a cloud server, sending the entire contents of your messages to the cloud, then back to your phone.

TEEs supposedly offer a way to keep those requests private. There are several implementations out there, like Apple’s Private Cloud Compute, Google’s Private AI Compute, and WhatsApp’s Private Processing. It’s not just the big tech players, we’ve seen chatbots built with TEEs as well.

TEEs can provide more security and privacy than simply running in the clear, but they are fundamentally different from actual encryption or running locally. Despite the promises of some tech companies, they will never be able to match that level of security and privacy. Because of that, a user’s device should never automatically send data to a TEE. Let’s dig through the reasons why.

What Exactly Is a TEE, Anyway?

A TEE is a hardened section of the computer that runs software in a way that’s supposed to be secret even from other processes running on the machine. TEEs also let users check that the code being run is the code that they think is running, and not backdoored code instead, using a process called “attestation.” You may have also heard this referred to as a “secure enclave,” or heard the brand names SGX or TrustZone.

The intention of a cloud-based TEE is simple: a company can run a server in their data center, but still process data that you provide on your behalf without being able to see that information themselves.

Is a TEE Secure?

In practice, we've seen multiple cracks and hacks every year that show that it is possible to get at that data. That’s because while encryption relies on math, TEEs rely on engineering to provide their security. Standard encryption algorithms are created by years-long processes collaboratively produced by mathematicians around the world and are based on problems that have been studied for decades. The math is reliable, and there is no shortcut to breaking it that would not also upend fundamental understandings of mathematics as a field. 

The collective understanding of every mathematician in the world is that standard encryption algorithms are not breakable to the best of the world’s collective knowledge. No responsible engineer builds a system based on a new encryption method until after it’s been offered up for prodding.

Engineering, on the other hand, doesn’t work like that. Every individual system is the product of a group of engineers who put it out into the world, and each product will have its own quirks and bugs that have to be individually discovered and patched. These bugs are found after the system is built, not before. No one has yet built a system that is unbreakable. On the contrary, there is new research all the time that finds new ways to break into TEE systems. They’re patched as they come up, but they’re unlikely to ever become perfect, and certainly not any time soon. 

TEEs in particular are a hard engineering problem because the encryption key is physically right there on the device. Building a TEE means keeping a key fully separate and inaccessible while it’s on the same physical device as parts of the system that shouldn’t have access to the key.

Many attacks on TEEs involve “side channels.” In a side channel attack, the attacker measures the electrical impulses or other effects to figure out the timing of operations inside the TEE, then uses that to figure out the key being used. Once they have the key, they can read all the data. Compare that to end-to-end encryption, where the key is never on that machine in the first place, so an attacker would have to also run a similar attack on the user’s device.

Companies who turn to TEEs to protect data want to both have the key on the server and have it protected while still performing complex operations like running an LLM, which makes it much more difficult to protect those keys.

That being said, a TEE versus plaintext on a server is the difference between being able to easily read the data and having to do a bunch of specialized work to get at the data. That work often involves accessing the physical machine. This is most relevant for protecting against mass surveillance, and for many people, that might just be enough security.

But that's the core of the problem. “Secure enough for most cases” and “encrypted as in math” are not the same thing, and it’s important not to conflate the two. And services that currently offer “encryption as in math” have a real downgrade in security when they switch to security based on TEEs. 

If you want to dive into the myriad security issues and limitations of TEEs we’ve seen so far, they’re well documented here, here, here, and here.

What Does This Have To Do With LLMs and AI?

Sometimes organizations want to offer an LLM that can respond to queries in a private manner. On-device LLMs exist, but they’re limited in size. So, when organizations want to offer the ability to answer queries without being able to see the conversation, they turn to TEEs. That’s a useful way to run a chatbot that’s reasonably private. This is what Apple, Google, WhatsApp, and others are doing.

Why not turn to encryption? After all, LLM inference is just a bunch of math like any other things a computer does. It takes input to a (really big) function and gives an output. We have the math to do that computation in a way that hides the inputs and outputs from the one running the computation, it's just super expensive. It’s called homomorphic encryption, and no one’s figured out how to do it fast enough that it makes sense for this sort of computation.

Instead, the allure of a TEE is that it will run that computation for you inside of a special opaque section of a server. TEE manufacturers try to make it as hard as possible for the person running the TEE to peek inside. But you still have to trust the operator to not put a stethoscope to the box to try to figure out what's happening inside. 

In this case, it’s reasonable to consider these systems “privacy-preserving,” but not “encrypted.” That distinction is important, especially when we talk about how the TEEs interact with secure messaging. When someone using an end-to-end encrypted chat app asks an LLM to summarize, review, or store those messages, the content of those messages is leaving the device and going to an unencrypted third-party server somewhere. That’s a major threat to the privacy of secure chat apps, and one that’s increasingly hard for users to take control of.

How Does This Translate to Practical Advice?

The answer to this is going to vary based on an individual’s threat model, but a good rule of thumb is that a user’s device should never automatically send data to a TEE. When the person holding a phone can choose what information is sent, even if it’s a chunk of data like “unread messages,” they have the opportunity to pause and consider if that data might be too sensitive to risk sending.

In contrast, when data is sent automatically, the automatic sending becomes a feature of the system as a whole. If the system was previously end-to-end encrypted, adding automatic exfiltration makes the whole system no longer end-to-end encrypted.

Developers: don’t build systems that automatically send data off a device to a TEE, especially when it’s coming from an app that is otherwise end-to-end encrypted.

Users: if developers ignore us and build that system, turn off any automatic data sending features. Take a second to think about how much you’re willing to risk sending data when you choose to send it off the device.

So, What Should I Be Concerned About?

TEEs are useful for security in a number of circumstances. Your phone likely has a TEE where it keeps the key that encrypts your biometric unlock data and the base of the keychain where passwords are stored. It also enables certain backup systems, like how you can restore a phone with your passcode or restore WhatsApp or Signal backups.

But when we’re talking about cloud processing, it’s important to be clear this isn’t the same as end-to-end encryption and doesn’t offer the same level of privacy. 

Most of our private lives are on our phones and in our messages. We’ve worked for years to secure those messages, with major wins like encrypted RCS, and the continued user experience improvements of Signal and WhatsApp. We’ve even seen real improvements to backup security with features like Advanced Data Protection that bring end-to-end encryption for a variety of data outside of messaging, like notes and photos. 

But as companies roll out AI features that interact with these encrypted services, pulling data off devices and into a cloud-based TEE, they’re eroding the privacy protections of end-to-end encryption and risk causing serious confusion around what data is protected and what isn’t.

Ninth Circuit Ruling Will Force Online Platforms That Host User Speech to Fight Lengthy and Costly Lawsuits Before They Are Dismissed Under Section 230

18 August 2026 at 23:23

A federal appeals court just made it harder for online services, big and small, to get lawsuits over user speech dismissed early. In California v. Meta, a Ninth Circuit three-judge panel held that the lower court’s denial of Section 230 immunity to Meta is not immediately appealable. The misguided ruling has the potential to have widespread impact and to threaten the free speech of all internet users.

The ruling is bigger than a loss for Meta, which has the resources to defend itself against these lawsuits. The court’s ruling signals that all online services (and internet users) that host others’ speech—including those without Meta’s deep pockets—must bear the burden and expense of fighting lawsuits that Section 230 ultimately precludes. This will have real consequences, incentivizing online services to take down users’ speech in response to spurious legal threats, filter speech preemptively, or simply stop offering a place for people to speak online. So even though some may think that Meta is not a sympathetic company, the ruling should raise concerns for anyone who cares about an open and free internet.

Immunities from Suit Advance Important Public Interests

A little procedural background is necessary to understand the implications of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling.

Meta had moved to dismiss a group of social media addiction cases brought by state attorneys general, school districts, and local governments. Meta argued that Section 230(c)(1) immunity applies because the plaintiffs’ claims, framed as seeking to hold Meta liable for allegedly harmful platform features, really seek to hold the company liable for publishing decisions related to third-party content. Section 230 is one of the most important laws supporting online free speech, because its protections for online services enable them to distribute users’ speech at an unprecedented scale.

The district court ruled that Section 230 does not apply to certain features (and does apply to others) and so denied the motion to dismiss on the claims related to those features. Meta immediately appealed invoking appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, but the question before the Ninth Circuit was whether the appeal was legally appropriate.

Under Section 1291, U.S. circuit courts generally only have jurisdiction to hear appeals of “final decisions” from the district courts. Final decisions are trial court orders ending a case, or come after a trial on the merits. Section 230 appellate cases often arise from a district court’s grant of a defendant platform’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s case based on Section 230. Typically, a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion to dismiss is not a final order—it simply means that the case may continue to discovery and summary judgment or trial, after which time an appeal would be appropriate.

However, federal law allows for “interlocutory appeals,” which are appeals of orders that do not end a case but nonetheless are allowed because they involve important legal issues. For example, there is an exception to Section 1291 called the “collateral order doctrine”—at issue in this case—allowing for immediate appeal if, as the Ninth Circuit explained here, “holding a trial would imperil a substantial public interest.”

Inherent in the collateral order doctrine is the consideration of whether an immunity like Section 230 provides mere “immunity from liability” or a more robust “immunity from suit.”

An immunity from liability does not require an immediate appeal and so demands that Section 1291’s final order rule be followed. That’s because waiting until the end of a case before an appellate court can consider the trial court’s denial of immunity does not prejudice the defendant. The appellate court may overturn the trial court and grant the immunity, and thus the defendant’s right to be immune from liability would be vindicated on appeal.

Immunity from suit is different. It means that the public interest demands that a defendant be able to get out of a case as early as possible and avoid having to litigate the case to the end. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, for example, that qualified immunity is such an immunity, and that a district court’s denial of qualified immunity for a government official is immediately appealable under Section 1291, notwithstanding the lack of a final order. The idea is that the public interest is served when government officials are free to act without fear of consequences when established rights are not implicated, and so determining as soon as possible whether their acts are immune serves that public interest.

Here, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s denial of Section 230 immunity for Meta was not immediately appealable under Section 1291’s collateral order doctrine because the immunity is not from suit, but rather from ultimate liability. The panel’s absurd result contravenes the text of Section 230, the statute’s policy goals, and the court’s own prior rulings.

Treating Section 230 as an Immunity from Suit Protects Online Free Speech

Meta rightly argued that Section 230(e)(3) plainly states, “No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” The panel dismissed this argument, stating that this language likely amounts to “redundancy” reflecting only immunity from liability. The court failed to side with the more reasonable position that statutory language should generally not be interpreted as superfluous.

Meta also reminded the panel that the Ninth Circuit has many times over the past two decades framed Section 230 as both an immunity from liability and an immunity from suit. The panel also dismissed this argument, stating, “It is true that we have used the phrase ‘immunity’ somewhat loosely in our section 230 jurisprudence.”

But “loosely” is a gross mischaracterization—the panel did not discuss a seminal prior ruling, Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com (2008), in which the entire Ninth Circuit, not just a three-judge panel, explicitly ruled that Section 230 is also an immunity from suit. That court rightly explained that Section 230 “must be interpreted to protect websites not merely from ultimate liability, but from having to fight costly and protracted legal battles.”

Why is it important that social media platforms and other internet intermediaries (and their users) have immunity from suit for engaging in publishing activities related to third-party content—and thus a right to immediately appeal when Section 230 immunity is denied?

The Ninth Circuit panel here, using their own words, failed to “evaluate the interests that would be lost through rigorous application of a final judgment requirement” and failed to consider the “substantial public interest” served by treating Section 230 as an immunity from suit.

Section 230 immunity, contrary to what some argue, is not a gift to Big Tech—it applies to all internet intermediaries, big and small, from the large social media companies to smaller entities like community message boards and local ISPs. It even protects internet users who forward others’ emails or host comments on their blogs. In turn, the law supports the free speech of all internet users.

While it is helpful when an internet intermediary can ultimately benefit from Section 230 immunity, if a trial court’s early denial is not immediately appealable, that means the intermediary must bear the extended logistical and financial burdens of defending itself. Under the Ninth Circuit’s logic, anyone hosting others’ speech online would have to endure the pain and expense of discovery, summary judgment, or trial, before they ultimately can be protected by Section 230.

Congress crafted Section 230 to give internet intermediaries legal breathing room, so that they will be incentivized to facilitate online communication and commerce, allowing the rest of us to go online with minimal barriers to entry, without needing to have loads of money or to know how to code. Congress acknowledged in Section 230 itself, “Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”

Yet if platforms, especially smaller platforms, know that they will have to defend themselves for years in court before they can ultimately benefit from Section 230 immunity, this alone will create a perverse incentive, as we have explained, to censor user speech, in order to reduce the platforms’ legal exposure. And this incentive is only exacerbated at scale, where the sheer volume of user-generated content hosted by modern platforms makes legal risk astronomical.

Unfortunately, this opinion seems to be part of larger trend reflecting the Ninth Circuit’s increasing disdain for Section 230, and apparently for free speech rights more broadly. The court similarly held last year in Gopher Media v. Melone (2025)—overruling itself—that a trial court’s denial of a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion also is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. This is despite the fact that, similar to Section 230, California’s anti-SLAPP law is intended to allow defendants to get harassing lawsuits meant to silence them dismissed early, lest they be chilled from engaging in lawful speech on public issues due to the risk of being mired in litigation, even if they ultimately win a delayed appeal.

Developers: Beware of Ad Libraries that Betray Your Users’ Location Privacy

Across mobile platforms, advertising companies provide developers with software development kits (SDKs) that make it easy to monetize their apps. But those same SDKs can automatically feed users’ location data into ad systems that location data brokers use to track people. Many developers may not even be aware of this privacy violation, let alone the users who are directly affected.

When developers let advertising SDKs collect location data, they’re putting users at risk of more than just creepy ads. Location information sourced from the advertising industry has been used for ICE investigations, global spy tools, outing a gay priest, tracking union organizers, and tracking US military personnel.

Defaults matter, not just for users, but for app developers as well.

An EFF investigation has identified several advertising SDKs that publicly acknowledge collecting and sharing users’ location by default when embedded in Android apps granted location permissions. Defaults matter, not just for users, but for app developers as well. If app developers don’t pay close attention to the location-sharing settings of their advertising tools, they could inadvertently expose users’ location information.

This report explains how advertising SDKs can facilitate and encourage location data sharing through privacy-invasive defaults, financial incentives, and unclear documentation.

Contents:

Data Brokers Harvest Location Information From Advertising Systems

When an advertising SDK collects and shares location data, it becomes part of a larger ecosystem that can include advertisers, ad tech companies, and location data brokers. EFF began investigating the location-sharing practices of various advertising SDKs to better understand the pipeline from mobile apps to location data brokers.

Location data brokers sell information on the precise movements of billions of people without their knowledge or meaningful consent. This data is primarily sourced from apps on people’s phones. Some apps partner with data brokers directly, using data-broker-developed SDKs or server-to-server transfers to sell users’ location data. Other apps leak users’ location data through advertising SDKs serving behaviorally-targeted ads through “real-time bidding” (RTB). In the process of auctioning off ad space, ad tech companies can broadcast user data to thousands of potential advertisers. Location data brokers have participated in these auctions not just to bid on ad space, but to collect personal information contained in bid requests. 

Indiscriminate data sharing through RTB can lead app developers to unknowingly share their users’ location with data brokers. In 2025, a hack of location data broker Gravy Analytics revealed thousands of apps that may have been sources of its data. When journalists reached out to the app developers, many claimed they had no relationship with or knowledge of Gravy Analytics. To prevent location information from being shared with data brokers through RTB, developers must understand the location-sharing practices of their advertising SDKs.

How Advertising SDKs Leak Location Data

Developers don’t have to manually, or even intentionally, share location data for it to be broadcast through RTB auctions. Once a user grants an app permission to access their location, SDKs embedded in the app receive the same access—there are no SDK-specific location permissions. That means advertising SDKs can automatically collect users’ location data and share it in bid requests.

While apps and SDKs can estimate a users’ approximate location from their IP address without requesting any permissions, location permissions provide access to estimates that are more accurate and revealing. Precise location permissions give apps (and their embedded SDKs) access to location estimates within about 160 feet, but sometimes as accurate as 10 feet. Approximate location, a separate permissions level, gives apps access to a location estimate within about 1.2 square miles. 

Developers and advertising SDKs also have a financial incentive to share location data, since it can increase bid prices for an app’s ad space. While many advertising SDKs require developers to configure a setting before collecting and sharing users’ location data in ad requests, this is not always the case. EFF found several advertising SDKs who publicly acknowledge sharing users’ location data by default when embedded in apps granted location permissions. 

EFF Identified Advertising SDKs That Share Location Data by Default

EFF reviewed the public developer documentation of dozens of widely-used advertising SDKs to identify how they handle and communicate with developers about location data. In the following sections, we highlight four advertising SDKs who engage in a particularly egregious practice: collecting a user's location by default for ad targeting whenever a user has given an app location permissions. We reached out to each SDK company and the referenced app developers for comment. One company responded, and as detailed below, subsequently updated its documentation in response to our questions. Another company responded with clarifications to its developer documentation.

We chose to focus on SDKs with this privacy-invasive default because it increases the risk of developers leaking users’ location data without realizing it. Several studies have found that developers tend to stick to SDKs’ default settings. If an advertising SDK transmits location data by default, users' precise location can end up in advertising systems without the developer intentionally enabling location sharing. These SDKs have separate documentation pages that instruct developers to flag users covered by privacy laws like GDPR and COPPA for restricted data processing, but these modes are not the default. 

By analyzing how these four SDKs present their location sharing practices to developers, we hope to illustrate how the design and documentation of advertising SDKs can facilitate location data sharing at scale. Although the advertising SDKs we highlight are not the most prevalent SDKs used, they are embedded in thousands of apps and reach billions of users.

InMobi Encourages Keeping Location Sharing Enabled By Highlighting Financial Incentives

InMobi claims to reach “2B+ users across 150+ countries” and is the 10th most popular advertising SDK on Android (according to AppBrain and Appfigures at the time of publication). 

InMobi’s “Getting Started with Android SDK Integration” suggests that location sharing is enabled by default, stating “The InMobi SDK automatically forwards location signals when available.” InMobi provides developers with a setting to opt out, but explicitly recommends sharing location data. Developer documentation highlights the financial incentive for location sharing, stating “location-enriched impressions typically yield higher revenue.” 


[Observed on “Getting Started with Android SDK Integration,” 7/31/26]

Apps that use InMobi may not need location information to function or may only need access to approximate location information, but InMobi highly recommends that developers request precise location permissions “to enable accurate ad targeting.” They even encourage developers to request Wi-Fi network information permissions, which (when paired with precise location permissions) provide Wi-Fi access point identifiers that can also be used for location tracking.


[Observed on “Getting Started with Android SDK Integration,” 7/31/26]

InMobi has been accused of misleading developers over location sharing practices in the past: In 2016, they settled with the FTC over charges that they bypassed users’ location permissions for apps and tracked their precise locations through WiFi network data (Android now requires apps to request location permissions to access this WiFi data too).

BidMachine Updates Previously Inaccurate Developer Documentation After EFF's Technical Analysis Observed Precise Location Data Collection

BidMachine claims to reach over 600 million “direct SDK users.” 

BidMachine reveals that it collects location data by default on the “Advanced Settings” page of its Android SDK Integration guide, stating that the “SDK can automatically track user device location to serve better ads” as long as developers request location permissions for their app. Before publication, EFF reached out to BidMachine for comment, notifying them of our plan to highlight their Android SDK location sharing practices.  


[Observed on “Advanced Settings” on 7/31/26, before EFF asked BidMachine for comment]

After EFF reached out, BidMachine changed their documentation to clarify the practice, but not their default collection of location information once app-level permissions are granted. This updated section still fails to explain how developers can opt out of BidMachine location tracking, which is critical for app developers that require location access for core features but wish to prevent user data from being shared with advertisers.


[Observed on “Advanced Settings” on 8/3/26, after EFF asked BidMachine for comment]

Before EFF reached out, BidMachine’s “App Privacy Details On Google Play” page had stated that they only collected coarse location data and precise location data was “not collected.” However, our technical analysis of two apps, which Exodus Privacy determined include the BidMachine SDK, contradicted this claim: Network requests from the apps QR Scanner and GPS Speedometer to a BidMachine domain include precise location coordinates.


[Observed on “App Privacy Details On Google Play” on 7/31/26, before EFF asked BidMachine for comment]

After EFF reached out, BidMachine also corrected its documentation to make it clear precise location is collected by the SDK whenever the app-level permission is granted:


[Observed on “App Privacy Details On Google Play” on 8/3/26, after EFF asked BidMachine for comment]

com.appswing.qr.barcodescanner.barcodereader_bidmachine.flows

com.ktwapps.speedometer_bidmachine.flows

In response to our request for comment, BidMachine stated that it wasn't possible for them to get location information “unless the user has granted the app the relevant permission through the operating system.” They also stated that“publishers are responsible for configuring their apps' permission and consent flows.”

Verve Emphasizes Consent More in its Play Store Language Than its Configuration Guide 

Verve has claimed its HyBid SDK reaches “over 1.5 billion users across more than 10,000 apps worldwide.” 

Verve’s configuration guide for its HyBid Android SDK (formerly called Pubnative HyBid) makes clear that location tracking is “enabled by default,” stating, “If the user has given location permissions, HyBid SDK will use the available user location to provide better targeted ads.” 


[Observed on “HyBid Android SDK - HyBid Configuration,” 7/31/26]  

Verve’s guidance for data disclosure to the Google Play Store tells a more careful story. Despite the fact that location tracking is enabled by default, the Google Play Data Safety Guidance states that the SDK “does not collect or attempt to collect [location] information independently.”


[Observed on “Google Play Data Safety Guidance,” 7/31/26]  

It also emphasizes user consent, claiming the SDK will only collect location data “if the publishers allows its app to collect location data from users after obtaining user’s explicit consent to such data collection” (emphasis added). The configuration guide lacks recommendations or instructions for obtaining user consent to share location data with Verve, beyond app-level access. Instead, the configuration guide highlights the financial incentives for developers to add location permissions to their app.


[Observed on “HyBid Android SDK - HyBid Configuration,” 7/31/26]  

When reached for comment, Verve clarified that “in its current Android implementation, the SDK reads the cached network-provider location and does not use the GPS data of the end user's device. Furthermore, any geolocation data is coarsened prior to processing, ensuring that location is limited to an accuracy radius of no less than 1,850 feet.” It also said that it contractually requires apps to comply with data protection laws. 

To Verve’s credit, the HyBid SDK is open source, so careful developers can check the code instead of relying on documentation alone. HyBid’s open-source code shows that latitude and longitude coordinates are rounded to two decimal places, and that it does only collect and share network-derived location data, confirming the statement the company sent to us. If an app has precise location permissions, networked-derived location data rounded to two decimal places could be accurate within approximately 0.5 square miles, which is still more precise than the 1.2 square miles typically revealed with Android’s approximate location permission. But even coarse location data, especially when collected repeatedly over time, can reveal movements that should remain private by default.

Verve’s response also conveyed a willingness to revise their documentation: “As part of our ongoing commitment to providing clear and comprehensive developer resources, we continually review and enhance our documentation, and we will take your observations into account as part of that process.”

Huawei Highlights Financial Incentives for Location Data Sharing Before Showing Developers How to Opt Out

Huawei has claimed its Petal Ads SDK is embedded in more than 85,000 apps worldwide.

Huawei’s “Integrating the Petal Ads SDK into an Android App” guide begins with a recommendation that developers obtain location permissions to increase app revenue and an acknowledgement that location sharing will happen by default in apps with location permissions.


[Observed on “Integrating the Petal Ads SDK into an Android App,” 7/31/26]

A separate “Use of Location Data for Ads” page repeats that the Petal Ads SDK will include users’ location information in ad requests if an app has access to location information. Neither of those pages mention that developers can use the setRequestLocation method to disable the default collection of location information (this setting is referenced in the last section of the Ads SDK Compliance Guide). Huawei’s Ads SDK Privacy Statement states that “The SDK and its services will not store precise location information, and will only use it to determine the approximate device location.” However, the guide does not specify how Huawei defines approximate versus precise location data. 


[Observed on “Use of Location Data for Ads,” 7/31/26]

Location Data Sharing Can Happen Without Users’ Knowledge or Meaningful Consent 

In some cases, after an app itself obtains location permission, advertising SDKs can separately obtain and share users’ location information without their knowledge or meaningful consent. Neither app that EFF observed sharing precise location data with BidMachine (QR Scanner and GPS Speedometer) showed a notice or requested consent before doing so. Additionally, neither apps’ Google Play Store “Data safety” section includes location data under “This app may share these data types with third parties.” The lack of transparency and control that users have over their location on mobile apps is dangerous. QR Scanner and GPS Speedometer are just two examples of apps that quietly share users’ location data through advertising SDKs, but they have been downloaded more than 50 million and 10 million times, respectively. 

App-level location permissions alone cannot signal meaningful consent to location collection and sharing by third-party advertising SDKs.

Even if users’ were to grant these apps permission to obtain their location data, they would likely not expect their location data to be shared with third parties. Many users don’t know that granting location permissions to an app grants the same permissions to third-party SDKs embedded in the app, or that an app they're using contains code from outside companies. And many apps that request location permissions, like GPS Speedometer, require it for core functionality. App-level location permissions alone cannot signal meaningful consent to location collection and sharing by third-party advertising SDKs.

Location Privacy Issues Extend Beyond These Four SDKs

Our initial focus on four advertising SDKs does not mean that other SDKs adequately protect location data or that developers never choose to share location data when it’s not the default. Advertising SDKs not discussed in this report have been criticized and sued for allegations that they collect location data without valid user consent. 

The issues we’ve highlighted around privacy-invasive defaults, financial incentives, and unclear documentation extend beyond the specific SDKs we analyzed. Multiple studies have found that advertising SDKs often steer developers toward increased data collection through their design and documentation. A 2021 study found that popular advertising SDKs used dark patterns to nudge developers towards sharing more sensitive data. A 2024 study identified discrepancies between several SDKs’ documentation and their actual data collection practices. And a 2025 study concluded that developers have minimal influence over SDKs’ data transmission, often leaving them with the choice of accepting SDKs' invasive data collection or avoiding them entirely. 

Fighting Back Against AdTech Companies That Enable and Encourage Location Data Sharing 

EFF’s analysis shows that advertising SDKs don’t just allow developers to share location data–they often encourage it. Default settings, financial incentives, and unclear documentation can make sharing users’ location the easiest option for developers.

Users can take extra steps to defend their location privacy, but they shouldn’t have to. Developers, regulators, and legislators must act to stop apps from leaking users’ location to advertising companies and data brokers.

Developers

Developers should carefully evaluate all third-party SDKs they include in their apps and disable unnecessary data collection whenever possible. Regardless of advertising SDKs’ default settings, developers have a responsibility to protect their users’ location data. But protecting users’ privacy shouldn’t depend on developers reading the right piece of SDK documentation. Advertising SDKs should not make sharing personal data the default, especially for data as sensitive as a person’s location. 

Regulators

Regulators should continue to hold app developers accountable when they unlawfully share personal data and include libraries which subject users to privacy harms, as they have in the past. But they should also scrutinize the companies whose SDKs encourage these practices at scale. Otherwise, companies can continue to design SDKs that make invasive data sharing the default while shifting the responsibility and consequences to developers who include their tools. 

Legislators

The US is in dire need of a federal law to protect all Americans’ location privacy, one which doesn’t preempt stronger state privacy laws, and has a private right of action empowering individuals to sue those who violate their privacy. Countries across the globe should likewise enact legislation that protects their users’ location privacy. Everyone deserves privacy as a universal human right.

Legislators can address the root of the problem by banning online behavioral advertising. This would remove the primary incentive for companies to track and share your personal data. It would also prevent users' precise locations from being broadcast to data brokers through RTB auctions. 

Until then, developers should be wary of ad libraries that betray their users’ location privacy.

Notes on Methodology

We were interested in looking at network traffic for various Android ads SDKs that send precise location by default when granted location permissions. We chose Android for this investigation because of the relative openness of and our familiarity with analysis on the platform. We’ve used publicly available resources like Exodus Privacy and AppBrain to identify popular ads SDKs and the apps which include them.

In a lab setting, we set up a machine to view our own http(s) traffic using mitmproxy from our test device, and connect the test device to that machine in order to view our real-time traffic.  Where needed, we use the dynamic instrumentation toolkit Frida to ensure the traffic we generate can be analyzed.

We’ve included flows files in this post, which can be opened in mitmproxy to show the requests we’ve observed with location coordinates.

The Fourth Circuit Says Border Agents Can Search Your Phone By Hand, No Suspicion Required

22 July 2026 at 22:30

Legal intern Suzanne Castillo was the principal author of this post.

The Fourth Circuit issued a disappointing opinion in U.S. v. Belmonte Cardozo, a case in which EFF filed an amicus brief, alongside the national ACLU, its Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia affiliates, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL).

We argued that electronic device searches at the border should require a warrant based on probable cause, but at minimum, regardless of whether an officer searches by hand or with forensic software that plugs into a device and downloads its entire contents for search, the same Fourth Amendment standard should apply to all device searches at the border.

Unfortunately, the court rejected that argument and ruled that a lower standard applies to manual searches, allowing the government to conduct extraordinarily invasive electronic device searches without any suspicion of wrongdoing, simply because the border officer chooses to search by hand rather than with a forensic tool.

The Border Search Exception Meets Your Phone

The Fourth Amendment requires that government searches of persons or property be reasonable, which usually means obtaining a warrant based on probable cause from a judge.

But a warrantless search can still be reasonable if it falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, including the exception that allows officers to search your belongings at the border. The border search exception allows warrantless searches of persons or property crossing the U.S. border, including the functional equivalent of the border such as international airports, given the government’s interests in controlling who and what may enter the country.

Historically, courts have categorized border searches of luggage, vehicles, and personal effects as “routine” and thus reasonable even if conducted without any suspicion that the traveler has engaged in wrongdoing; courts have also held that more invasive “nonroutine” searches, such as certain body searches and searches that damage property, require reasonable suspicion.

But a person’s privacy interests in the personal data on a phone or laptop are extraordinarily different than their limited privacy interests in the contents of their suitcase.

The Supreme Court addressed cell phone privacy in Riley v. California (2014), holding that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement did not apply to cell phones, thereby generally requiring a warrant for phone searches, at least at the interior of the country. The court recognized the unprecedented privacy interests people have in their cell phones and how even brief manual searches can reveal the “sum of an individual’s private life,” including our political affiliations, religious beliefs, sexuality, and more. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that because electronic device searches bear “little resemblance” to searches of bags or physical containers, they should be evaluated differently.

Following Riley, the Fourth Circuit considered two border device search cases involving forensic searches, in which border officers used external software to extract and analyze a device’s data.

In U.S. v. Kolsuz (2018), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic search of a cell phone at the border “must be considered a nonroutine border search, requiring some measure of individualized suspicion” of a transnational offense, but the court declined to decide whether the standard is only reasonable suspicion or instead a probable cause warrant.

Then in U.S. v. Aigbekaen (2019), the Fourth Circuit held that a forensic device search at the border in support of a purely domestic law enforcement investigation requires a warrant. The court also reiterated the general Kolsuz rule for a forensic border-related device search: the “Government must have individualized suspicion of an offense that bears some nexus to the border search exception's purposes of protecting national security, collecting duties, blocking the entry of unwanted persons, or disrupting efforts to export or import contraband.”

In Belmonte Cardozo, manual searches were finally before the court.

A Disappointing Decision

Jose Belmonte Cardozo was already on the U.S. government’s radar when he traveled from Bolivia to the U.S. and was met by a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer at Washington Dulles International Airport. The officer manually searched his cell phone and found child sexual abuse material (CSAM), considered “digital contraband,” leading to Belmonte Cardozo’s arrest and criminal prosecution.

At issue on appeal was what standard should apply to manual device searches at the border. The Fourth Circuit held that, unlike forensic searches, manual searches are “routine” and thus reasonable under the Fourth Amendment without a warrant or individualized suspicion.

The court’s holding hinged on four differences between manual and forensic searches: (1) in a manual search, a person does the searching, not a machine; (2) a manual search’s breadth depends on the officer’s time and energy, while forensic searches are comprehensive; (3) manual searches reveal only what a user can typically access, while forensic searches can uncover deleted files, cached fragments, metadata, and more; and (4) manual searches are subject to an officer’s fading memory or imperfect notes, while forensic searches create a permanent copy.

But in identifying these technical differences, the court never explains why they justify a lower standard for manual searches.

The Fourth Circuit’s holding is problematic because, as we argued in our amicus brief, manual searches reach the same categories of data as forensic searches—data that can reveal highly personal aspects of our identities and our lives. It does not matter if a search is conducted by an agent’s thumbs or by software: the end result is equally as invasive, therefore all device searches should fall under the warrant requirement, or at least the same Fourth Amendment standard.

The court repeatedly emphasized that the search here lasted only two minutes, suggesting that the time-limited search was not privacy-invasive. But an individual’s privacy interests in their personal data don’t change based on how their phone is searched or how long. Scrolling for two minutes through someone’s personal text messages or photos is an invasion of privacy that may reveal intimate details about the person even in that short period of time.

Moreover, as devices’ native search functions improve, manual searches can surface personal information in seconds through keyword searches, even for photos, where it might have taken an hour of scrolling to find the same information, further showing that a time-limited search is not necessarily less privacy-invasive. What matters is not the breadth of the search itself, but the unprecedented (and growing) breadth of data on our phones.

A Silver Lining

There’s one silver lining: by relying on the fact that the search lasted two minutes, the Fourth Circuit left open the possibility that lengthier manual searches could trigger heightened suspicion requirements. But until a clear line is drawn, border officers within the Fourth Circuit’s jurisdiction can use manual searches to sidestep heightened Fourth Amendment standards that would otherwise apply. In the meantime, EFF will keep fighting against extraordinarily invasive warrantless, suspicionless device searches at the border, and for robust privacy standards to protect our most personal data.

Andy Burnham’s ‘Manchesterism’, a degrowth perspective

16 July 2026 at 10:23
Tomorrow, Andy Burnham will become the next UK Prime Minister.  He has set out his vision for his premiership, under the title ‘Manchesterism’.  Much ink has already been spilled in scrutinising it.  Our sister site, Steady State Manchester, carried this article following his speech at the city’s People’s History Museum.  Steady State Manchester has been… Continue reading Andy Burnham’s ‘Manchesterism’, a degrowth perspective

EFF and Allies: X’s FTC Petition to Waive Privacy Violation Order Should be Rejected

X Corp. should not be able to escape privacy compliance because it changed its name. 

On May 15, X Corp. filed a petition before the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to set aside or modify an order issued in 2022 requiring the company to report regularly to the FTC for its violations of user data. The order or “consent decree” is a result of misleading the platforms’ 140 million users by using private information given to secure accounts, like phone numbers and email addresses, for targeted advertising. It also fined the company $150 million for the infraction. As part of an open comments period, EFF and allies including Demand Progress Education Fund (DPEF), National Consumers League (NCL) and Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) call on the FTC to reject this petition.

The 2022 order was a renewal of an order stemming from a previous violation. Back in 2011, Twitter (now X) reached a settlement with the FTC after the regulator found Twitter had failed to secure users’ personal information, resulting in exposure of that data to hackers. The settlement banned the company from misrepresenting its data protection measures, required it to set up safeguards on user data, and regularly report its security posture for twenty years. The renewal updated the expiration of X’s obligations to 2042, but if the FTC accepts X's petition, it would end much sooner.

In arguing to set aside the order, X remarks that since the order in 2011 it has “built an entirely new privacy and information security program staffed by new personnel operating under new leadership with a … philosophy grounded on the importance of privacy and information security.” 

These sweeping assurances that corporate restructuring led to a fundamental change in X’s policy and practices around user data should be met with a healthy dose of skepticism, given evidence to the contrary. For example, the company’s quiet rollout integrated its AI model Grok with the platform in 2024, trained (without meaningful consent) on X user data. The company was also subject to a massive data breach in 2025. Even if a rotation of leadership led to prioritizing privacy and information security, our letter highlights that this would not be sufficient grounds to remove the order, “because the FTC orders bind the corporate entity. Those obligations do not dissolve when the employees who negotiated or administered it depart.”

X argues that its entry into the AI space should be reason not to continue the oversight, claiming that “terminating the Order is critical to advancing American leadership in artificial intelligence.” Here again, broad-stroke claims that the guardrails in place “[diverts] engineering resources from innovation to compliance paperwork” ignores the dangers that AI introduces to user data. Far from being a reason to waive the order, clever attacks on models trained on user data has the ability to supercharge the types of secondary use violations that led to the 2022 order renewal. After all, an entire art has been developed around engineering LLM prompts to reveal the data a model was originally trained on.

Our response to X’s petition debunks many claims the company uses in its arguments. For example, there’s little evidence the order placed an undue financial burden on X. In our letter, we note that the compliance cost is merely “a rounding error against the $200 billion valuation of X Corp. following the xAI merger.”

Strong safeguards on our information require eagle-eyed oversight when that data is abused and misused for profiteering ventures. X’s actions not only showed us this in the past, but continue to do so in the present day. We and our civil society partners urge the FTC to take the clear, sensible path and reject X’s petition.

A New Bill Takes Aim at Government Pressure to Silence Lawful Online Speech

Last week, Senators Ted Cruz and Ron Wyden introduced the Justice Against Weaponized Bureaucratic Overreach to Networked Expression, or JAWBONE Act. The bipartisan legislation creates a federal cause of action against government officials who coerce or attempt to coerce broadcasters, interactive computer services, or AI providers into taking actions against lawful, First-Amendment-protected speech, and establishes a transparency system for government communications with those intermediaries about user expression.

We thank the Senators for their leadership on this important issue. Jawboning occurs when the government pressures private companies to censor speech protected by the First Amendment, and it’s not always obvious to the public or to the victims what has actually happened. Deleting posts or cancelling accounts because a government official or agency demanded it or even made threats in making those demands—just like spying on people’s communications on behalf of the government—raises serious free speech concerns. Among other things, this bill would provide a new legal right to bring claims against the government in federal court, in addition to what the First Amendment provides.

At EFF, we’re continuing to fight back on behalf of those censored by government coercion. One recent example: we represent the creator of ICEBlock, an app that allows the public to report immigration enforcement activity in their communities. In June 2025, high-ranking federal officials began threatening to investigate and prosecute the creator of ICEBlock, Joshua Aaron. In October 2025, the U.S. Attorney General demanded Apple remove ICEBlock from the App Store, and the company complied. The government’s coercion violated Aaron’s First Amendment rights.

We’ve also filed a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit against the same government agencies that threatened Aaron and other services that provided forums to report ICE activity. The lawsuit seeks the disclosure of the government’s communications with Apple, Google, and Meta that forced the services to remove lawful speech.

When federal officials pressure private companies into censoring protected speech, it can violate the First Amendment. But, not every communication from a government agency to a platform is unconstitutionally coercive. Treating legitimate communication and information-sharing between the government and private actors as though it were always unconstitutional would chill the valuable, good-faith engagement that supports a healthier and safer internet and nation for all Americans. This is a complex issue, and one that is important for Congress and the courts to get right. 

Finally, contrary to what many in Congress have been saying, social media platforms and other internet intermediaries have their own First Amendment rights to decide how they moderate users’ speech. They are not “state actors” and do not have an obligation under the First Amendment to allow all user speech on their platforms. EFF filed an amicus brief setting out our position in 2018, and we’ve said it in many cases since. The Supreme Court recognized again in the Netchoice cases that these services have a right to curate and edit their users’ speech, whether or not it aligns with the government’s position. And, it’s important to defend that First Amendment right so that governments cannot dictate how to edit a company’s site according to the government’s wishes and desires. To prevent jawboning by default, companies must be free to curate their platforms as they wish.

EFF applauds Senators Cruz and Wyden for taking this critical issue seriously, and we look forward to working with Congress on this bipartisan bill as it moves through the process. We hope it lands on the right balance to provide additional protections for everyday users around freedom of expression. 

Move Fast, Surveil Things

Update, June 8, 2026: Following widespread public scrutiny and WIRED’s critical reporting, Meta has stripped the unactivated facial recognition code from its latest Meta AI app update.

Meta has deployed facial recognition code to millions of their always-on surveillance glasses, according to new reporting by Wired. EFF’s Threat Lab was able to confirm that the facial recognition code is present through static analysis of the application. 

This dangerous new Meta functionality stores faceprints as a series of 2,048 numbers uniquely representing the positioning of a person’s facial features. When this feature is activated, it will convert every new face in the sightlines of the surveillance glasses into a series of numbers, and compare it to all the existing faceprints in the user’s database.

Wired and EFF confirmed that the code is present and active, though not yet exposed to consumers. Another researcher confirmed that when they manually added a face to the app database by connecting the phone to a computer in debug mode and issuing a few commands, the glasses would subsequently detect that face when it came into view. 

Meta has already paid $650 million to settle a BIPA lawsuit challenging mass facial recognition of every photo posted to its platform, a feature which it has since shut down. 

Despite the billions of reasons not to, Meta seems to have created the capacity to turn their customers into a distributed surveillance machine. This is just one more reason to think twice before buying or using Meta’s surveillance glasses. 

Considering that Meta previously wrote in an internal document that they want to launch facial recognition “during a dynamic political environment where many civil society groups that we would expect to attack us would have their resources focused on other concerns," this invasive new feature doesn't come as a surprise. But Meta's surveillance plans won't escape public scrutiny that easily, and we'll be watching if this feature is rolled out to the public. 

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