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European Commission Plan to Give Frontex Trusted Flagger Status Is A Threat to Free Speech

17 November 2026 at 11:33

EFF and 27 other human rights organizations called on the European Commission today to retract a dangerous proposal granting its border agency Frontex power to request that national authorities issue takedown orders for social media content and giving Frontext “trusted flagger” status under the Digital Services Act (DSA), the EU regulation governing online platforms and content moderation in the region.

The extraordinarily improper proposal not only disregards the provisions of the DSA but also places a mechanism of enforcement overreach in the hands of a law enforcement agency that has
failed to safeguard people against serious human rights violations at EU borders.

Under the
proposal, Frontex has the power to “monitor publicly accessible social media content, detect developments relevant to external border management, and support action against illegal online content linked to border-security risks.” Granting Frontex trusted flagger privileges on top of its existing mandate risks creating a powerful tool for over-enforcement, stifling the free expression of migrants, asylum seekers, and other marginalized groups. We warned the Commission of these risks in a letter.

The DSA is supposed to make online platforms more accountable and protect users’ fundamental rights, not give the EU power to sic its border police on people for exercising their right to free expression.

EFF and other rights organizations have for years
sounded alarms about potential abuse under the DSA’s trusted flagger provision, which gives “Digital Services Coordinators” the ability to award entities—including law enforcement agencies—a privileged channel to alert online platforms about illegal content. We’ve taken the firm position that law enforcement cannot be trusted to properly flag illegal content. In July, we told the Commission that giving law enforcement trusted flagger status could undermine fundamental rights and said that police agencies like Frontex should not be made trusted flaggers. 

The EU proposal gives Frontex decision-making power over free expression that is not envisaged under the DSA. First, content removal orders can only be issued by relevant national authorities. The DSA does not foresee a role for entities like Frontex to request such orders. Second,
trusted flaggers notify platforms of suspected illegal content—platforms must prioritize these notices and they have sole responsibility to decide to remove content. It’s not flaggers’ role to request removal orders from national authorities. Combining these powers blur enforcement and flagging functions, which the Commission’s own draft guidelines on trusted flaggers explicitly caution against. 

“The risk of Frontex utilizing its power as both a Trusted Flagger and authority that can demand removal orders, to surveil user-generated speech, and over-flag content under the guise of  ‘border security risk’ is clear. This will likely result in platforms over-censoring content and chilling the speech of already marginalized groups, particularly those from migrant and asylum-seeking communities,” the letter says. 

We urge the Commission to rescind the proposal. It undermines the DSA, threatens fundamental rights of citizens and non-citizens, and is enforcement overreach that does not align with international human rights standards. 

Beyond Catching Up: What Rudi Supek Can Teach Ecosocialism Today

9 November 2026 at 18:06
By Mladen Domazet* In the series Degrowth and Ecosocialism: the global picture Recent electoral and popular movement successes of progressive and left-leaning forces, from Brazil to parts of South-Eastern Europe, have encouraged renewed reflection on the prospects for a really-existing post-growth politics and ecosocialism. If the political mood of the last decade was defined by climate… Continue reading Beyond Catching Up: What Rudi Supek Can Teach Ecosocialism Today

When the Watchdogs Are Silenced: India's Crackdown on Those Documenting Online Censorship

6 November 2026 at 09:30

On November 3, our colleagues at the Software Freedom Law Center, India (SFLC.in) received notifications from X that the Delhi Police had issued takedown requests targeting 42 URLs. Among the accounts and posts targeted were those belonging to SFLC.in, the Internet Freedom Foundation (IFF), and X account @geoblockedindia, as well as posts documenting legal notices and instances of online censorship. 

Takedown requests targeting SFLC.in and other digital rights groups threaten not only their work, but the public’s ability to know when and how online speech is being restricted. 

The requests cite grounds including hate speech, alleged defamation of the Hindu nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), and concerns relating to safety and security. But the context in which these requests have emerged is particularly troubling: they target organizations and individuals whose work involves documenting restrictions on online expression and making those restrictions visible to the public. 

In other words, the organizations being targeted are among those trying to tell the public when and how its speech is being censored. 

SFLC.in is one of India's most important digital rights organizations and promotes innovation and open access to knowledge by helping developers make great free and open-source software, protects privacy and civil liberties for Indians by educating and providing free legal advice, and helps policymakers make informed and just decisions about use of technology. In 2025, we recognized their work with an EFF Award for Defending Digital Freedoms. 

IFF (the Internet Freedom Foundation) is another of EFF's close allies in India. Like EFF, IFF combines advocacy campaigns and strategic litigation to advance digital rights. They write frequently about internet shutdowns and have filed several lawsuits contesting them. 

Among SFLC.in's initiatives is its Free Speech Tracker, which documents instances of online censorship, content restrictions, and account takedowns in India. In a country where government orders to restrict online content are often opaque, this work is absolutely essential. 
 
Recent legal notices object to the tracker itself, as well as the organization’s documentation of restricted content and geo-blocked material. The allegations against SFLC.in include claims that it is "continuously opposing government directions" and publicly circulating information about restricted content, thereby undermining measures taken in the name of national security and public order. 

But documenting government censorship is not the same as undermining public safety. Reporting that content has been restricted is not an endorsement of that content, nor does it constitute an attempt to circumvent the law. It is an exercise in transparency and accountability, and one that allows journalists, researchers, civil society organizations, and the public to understand how governments exercise their power over the information landscape. 

Censorship thrives in the absence of transparency 

The use of legal complaints and platform takedown mechanisms against organizations documenting censorship creates a particularly troubling dynamic. When those who monitor restrictions on expression are threatened with having their accounts or reporting removed, the result is a chilling effect that extends far beyond the immediate targets. Other organizations or journalists may think twice before documenting controversial takedowns or challenging government orders, and the public loses access to an independent record of decisions that affect its ability to speak and access information online. 

There is also an important role here for platforms like X. Platforms must be transparent about the requests they receive, provide meaningful notice to affected users, and ensure that any restrictions are subject to appropriate scrutiny and avenues for appeal. When governments seek to restrict speech, platforms have a responsibility to avoid becoming opaque intermediaries through which censorship is quietly carried out. 

These developments are part of a broader pattern of pressure on independent civil society organizations working to defend freedom of expression and access to information in India. Digital rights groups play an indispensable role in documenting the effects of government policies, identifying patterns of censorship, and challenging restrictions that undermine fundamental rights. Their ability to do so independently is not a peripheral concern; it is a cornerstone of a healthy democratic society. 

The right to freedom of expression includes the right to scrutinize the exercise of government power. That includes the right to document censorship, question the reasons given for it, and make that information available to the public.  

EFF stands in solidarity with SFLC.in, the Internet Freedom Foundation, @geoblockedindia, and all those working to document and challenge restrictions on online expression in India. We urge the authorities in India to respect the rights of digital rights organizations to conduct their work without intimidation or retaliation, and to ensure that any restrictions on online expression comply with international human rights standards. 

 

Independent Digital Media Is Not a Privilege Governments Can Revoke: The Fight to Save Egypt’s Mada Masr

2 November 2026 at 15:10

On November 11, Lina Attalah, founder and editor-in-chief of the independent Egyptian news outlet Mada Masr, will face trial for the second time in just two weeks. This time, she faces charges of spreading false news, an accusation that has become one of the Egyptian government's most frequently used tools for prosecuting journalists. 

The trial follows a conviction on October 27, when Attalah was found guilty of managing an unlicensed news website. The Mada Masr team had repeatedly applied for a license, but their attempts went unacknowledged. The proceedings took place in a single hearing, which Mada Masr states included serious violations of her right to a fair trial. She was sentenced to the maximum fine of 3 million Egyptian pounds (approximately 55,000 USD), forcibly removed from the courtroom, and held for seven hours until the fine was paid. The court also ordered Mada Masr's closure and the confiscation of all equipment belonging to the organization. 

The current wave of repression has also targeted Matsada2sh, a fact-checking and open-source intelligence initiative. Its entire six-person newsroom was violently arrested, illegally detained, and interrogated under torture before being charged with terrorism-related offenses and spreading false news. The team remains in pretrial detention. 

According to CPJ, at least 25 other journalists are currently incarcerated in Egypt. 

Governments seeking to control the flow of information increasingly rely on a combination of legal harassment, financial pressure, criminal prosecution, and restrictions on the infrastructure that makes independent publishing possible. Egypt's media licensing regime is a particularly troubling example. Requiring news organizations to obtain government authorization to operate creates an obvious mechanism for restricting who gets to publish and whose voices are allowed to reach the public.  

The charge of spreading false news is similarly dangerous. Governments around the world have increasingly invoked the language of misinformation to justify restrictions on speech, often without meaningful safeguards against political abuse, as we laid out in our recent submission to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. Governments should never be the arbiters of which reporting is permissible, particularly when that reporting concerns their own conduct. 

Why Mada Masr matters 

Founded in 2013, Mada Masr has spent more than a decade doing the kind of journalism that authoritarian governments find most threatening: documenting abuses, amplifying marginalized voices, and reporting on issues that powerful institutions would prefer remain hidden. 

Its reporting has given torture survivors and the families of political prisoners a platform. It has opened space for debate about reproductive rights. It has brought frontline reporting from Sudan and Gaza, and stood alongside refugees facing xenophobic attacks and security crackdowns. 

Emerging as a digital-first publication, in a media environment where traditional outlets were increasingly constrained, being purely digital allowed Mada Masr’s founders to build an independent publication outside the structures of legacy media.  

At a time when only 43% of Egyptians had access to the internet, going fully digital meant taking a big risk, but it was one that has been rewarding: Despite being blocked by the Egyptian government since 2017, Mada Masr has continued to reach Egyptian and global audiences, and Attalah has received numerous accolades, including the Knight International Journalism Award, the Ordre des Arts et des Lettres, and a spot in TIME Magazine’s 100 most influential people (2020). 

Mada Masr has also consistently engaged with technology and advocated for a free and independent internet for the global majority. It has covered dozens of hot-button tech stories in recent years, from Egypt’s Cybercrime Bill and Israel’s use of AI weaponry in Gaza, to stories about the “privacy chaos” caused by biometrics to more personal essays about the importance of the internet and tech. In August, they launched an open call for proposals on original critical reporting on artificial intelligence. 

Mada Masr may be thoroughly Egyptian, but it doesn’t belong just to Egypt. Its team has made into a publication that represents the kind of independent, local, grounded journalism that international audiences need, particularly at a time when international reporting on state repression is lacking. They built on-the-ground networks to center local voices in Sudan (publishing in both English and Arabic on the conflict) and Gaza out of a sense of cross-border responsibility and solidarity. 

This is precisely why its potential closure should concern everyone who cares about a free press. The ability to publish independently, investigate powerful institutions, and to share information without government interference is fundamental to the exercise of free expression.  

From solidarity to action 

The international community has repeatedly expressed concern about restrictions on press and internet freedom in Egypt. More than 100 organizations have now joined statements of solidarity with Mada Masr, and with Matsada2sh.  

These expressions of support matter, particularly when journalists are increasingly isolated and under threat—but solidarity must also translate into sustained political and institutional pressure. 

The international governments and institutions that maintain relationships with Egypt—including those in the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States—should make clear that the prosecution of journalists and the forced closure of independent media outlets are unacceptable.  

The cases against Lina Attalah, Mada Masr, and Matsada2sh must be dropped. The journalists who remain in detention must be released. And Egypt's licensing regime, with its profound chilling effects on access to information and independent knowledge production, must be brought to an end. 

There is a particular urgency to defending independent media at a moment when governments are finding ever more ways to restrict the circulation of information. Whether through internet shutdowns, platform restrictions, surveillance, or the criminalization of reporting, the result is often the same: fewer opportunities for people to understand what is happening around them, to challenge official narratives, and to hold power accountable. 

We cannot allow the closure of one of Egypt's most important independent newsrooms and the prosecution of its editor-in-chief to become another routine episode in the global erosion of press freedom. Nor should we wait until the last independent journalists have been silenced before recognizing what has been lost. 

To learn more about Lina Attalah in her own reads, you can read our Speaking Freely interview from January 2026. 

  

EFF to Brazil’s ANPD: Data Privacy and Free Expression Must Underpin Platform Regulations

The Brazilian National Data Protection Agency (ANPD) plays a pivotal role in the regulation of digital platforms according to new legislation approved in Brazil. Throughout this year, EFF has presented comments, filed submissions, and met with the agency to emphasize crucial guardrails that the enforcement of new regulations should ensure. 

ANPD is responsible for detailing and applying obligations set in Law n. 15.211/2025, which established rules for the protection of children and adolescents in the digital space. While some provisions establish important privacy safeguards, like prohibiting advertising based on profiling of underage users, the law created mandatory age assurance mechanisms for accessing digital products and services. 

We have raised alarms on the privacy and free expression issues around age-gating the internet. Age verification technology is often inaccurate and privacy-invasive. Examples also show how it’s prone to enforcement overreach, resulting in sites blocked beyond legal requirements. In the UK, providers disproportionately restricted several counseling, support and mental health sites under the Online Safety Act. Current age assurance methods risk wrongly walling off adults with no valid IDs, facial differences, physical disabilities, among others. 

We highlighted these concerns in our comments and submissions underscoring that ANPD should avoid a blanket approach to age assurance obligations. Following the legislation, restrictions should apply only to products and services that are inadequate or prohibited to children and adolescents according to categories already set in regulation, with robust protections against subjective and overbroad interpretations. Guarantees such as access to information, freedom to participate in society and meaningful access to technologies also compound what constitutes the best interests of the child.  

Moreover, we stressed that zero knowledge proofs alone fail to ensure strong user privacy, including safeguards that the law itself sought to secure. Our submission explains why other requirements, such as unlinkability, selective disclosure, batch issuance and processing on device, are crucial for achieving greater levels of protection and mitigating privacy harms. Minimum information being shared to the verifier and no “phoning home” to the issuer of a user’s accepted credentials are conditions that prevent actions like collusion and data sharing about the user. 

We also shared inputs about the scope of the law, asking more clarity on which providers are covered by its obligations and the importance of treating differently non-dominant players like federated networks and free software applications. Without that clarity, this could negatively impact beyond gaming and major platforms that are the main target of these regulations. We elaborated on the agency’s regulation of prevention duties, the relevance of modulating them according to the type and structure of providers, and alerted them that their interpretation should not result in general monitoring obligations. 

On another but related front, we sent comments regarding Brazil’s new internet intermediary rules. Here too, ANPD has a critical regulatory role after a Supreme Court’s decision and presidential decrees changed the liability regime initially set in the law known as “Marco Civil.”  

With the turn to notice and takedown mechanisms and duty of care obligations, we emphasized measures to prevent censorship of protected content. These involve ensuring solid means for appeals of restricted posts, avoiding overreliance on AI-based content moderation, strictly tailoring the application of concepts like duty of care and systemic failure, and not normalizing the blocking of platforms and websites.  

We raised concerns about a trend reflected in the new regulation requiring platforms to proactively report user to authorities with unclear guarantees. Finally, we urged the agency to advance essential transparency and accountability measures for enabling greater public oversight over the application of the new regime. 

As we said before, platform accountability under the new rules ultimately hinges on how accountable its enforcement will be by platforms and state institutions. Rigorous commitment to fundamental rights, including freedom of expression, privacy and data protection, is required so that intended protections don’t instead lead to harms. ANPD must uphold this commitment and make sure that new regulations don’t backfire. 

Amnesty International slams UK universities for ‘crackdown’ on pro-Palestinian solidarity

Several UK universities have restricted Palestine solidarity activism among students and academics, a new report from Amnesty International has claimed.

According to Amnesty, universities have cancelled meetings and events, framed peaceful protest as ‘disruption’, shut down encampments, and taken pre-emptive punitive measures against campaigners – all of which the campaign group says indicates attempts to restrict campaigning in solidarity with the Palestinian people.

Amnesty conducted research looking at events between 7 October 2023 and 30 September 2025 while also examining the preceding 18 months to contextualise patterns of practice.

According to the report, different universities took different approaches over this period. The report stressed that each interference or violation of rights Amnesty found was present in at least one case study, not all were found at each university it looked at.

Amnesty International found that the restrictions highlighted in case studies documented in the report often didn’t meet the high bar in international and UK law for interfering with political speech and peaceful assembly.

The report did, however, find that students and academics have been sanctioned for actions like chanting, clapping and wearing keffiyehs, with these sanctions including suspensions, campus bans, withdrawal of degrees and threats to visa status. Students who are visibly Muslim and those displaying symbols of Palestinian identity have been disproportionately impacted, Amnesty has alleged.

In several cases, Amnesty found that sanctions were imposed before disciplinary hearings had concluded. Amnesty argues that this effectively transformed precautionary measures into punishments and contributes to a chilling effect.

In some cases documented in the report, universities prolonged investigations without clarifying timelines, outcomes or routes for appeal. These prolonged investigations combined with campus bans, restricted access to services, and uncertainty about potential outcomes – had severe impacts on people’s education, mental health and future prospects, Amnesty claims.

Amnesty International found that some universities have relied on overly broad disciplinary codes to restrict solidarity actions, such as by unduly characterising protests as ‘disruptive’, or ‘offensive’, with no apparent evidence of targeted harm. The report found instances of universities treating peaceful protest as trespass, even in spaces such as campus squares, foyers and union buildings which have been used for protests for decades.

According to Amnesty, some universities have adopted measures that require advance approval for protests and others have resorted to court injunctions which impose blanket bans across large parts of campus, exposing students and staff to risk of fines and imprisonment for engaging in protest.

Kerry Moscogiuri, CEO of Amnesty International UK said: “This is an attack on our freedom of speech and the right to protest from the very institutions who are supposed to encourage free thought.

“Students and academics care about the victims of Israel’s genocide in Gaza. It’s beyond belief that some of our prominent universities see this as a threat that requires punitive measures like court injunctions, and harsh punishments that leave students with their lives turned upside down.

“This is part of a wider crackdown on communities coming together to make their voices heard on Israel’s genocide of Palestinians in Gaza and other issues they care about. Just as we’re seeing students facing sanctions for clapping and chanting on our campuses, we’re seeing grandparents, amongst many others, facing arrest for holding placards at the Defend Our Juries protests.”

Through its report, Amnesty argued that UK universities are not acting in isolation when responding to Palestine solidarity protests, but are operating within a network which encouraged repressive responses and that their responses reflect sector-wide practices, shaped by direct government pressure, regulatory direction, lobbying by advocacy groups, and advice from private law firms and security contractors. 

Amnesty has found that some universities have shared legal strategies, received instructions from the Department for Education, and shared their security planning with the effect of clamping down on those perceived to be showing support for the victims of Israel’s apartheid and genocide in Gaza.

In cases profiled in this report, Palestine-related expression frequently came under greater scrutiny, or appeared to have been regulated differently from the way that other student protests at universities might generally be regulated. Students and staff who are Palestinian, Arab, Muslim and from other racialised communities, as well as students who are not British nationals, have experienced particular and disproportionate impacts, Amnesty claims.

22 year old student Usama Ghanem was suspended by Kings College London in 2025 over his involvement in pro Palestinian activism, and told to “return to [Egypt] during this period of suspension”, where he had previously been detained and tortured. His suspension was lifted after review in September 2026. 

Usama said: “I left an authoritarian regime in Egypt to find one at King’s College London. For protesting a genocide our university was funding and demanding divestment, I was indefinitely suspended, monitored, and threatened with deportation to the very authoritarian regime I had fled. As a lead negotiator for our Palestine encampment, I saw King’s discipline 25 other students too. This was about more than punishment, it was an attempt to intimidate us into silence. A university should protect dissent, not surveil and punish students for challenging its complicity in genocide.”

Other universities criticised in the report include Oxford, Cambridge and LSE.

Chris Jarvis is head of strategy and development at Left Foot Forward

Image credit: Scotgunn – Creative Commons

The post Amnesty International slams UK universities for ‘crackdown’ on pro-Palestinian solidarity appeared first on Left Foot Forward: Leading the UK's progressive debate.

Protesters demand ‘No Palantir in our NHS’ as Amnesty steps up campaign against tech giant

On October 8, Amnesty International’s Day of Action against US technology company Palantir, demonstrations took place across the UK calling for an end to the firm’s involvement in the NHS amid concerns over patient data, surveillance and its human rights record.

Palantir specialises in data-analysis software used by governments, intelligence agencies and militaries for purposes including surveillance and intelligence gathering. Its work with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Israeli military has attracted criticism from human rights organisations and campaigners.

In 2023, Palantir secured a £330 million contract to provide its data platform to NHS England. The deal has prompted concerns about the security and handling of sensitive patient information, as well as the appropriateness of awarding a major public sector contract to a company whose international activities have proved controversial.

The campaign comes ahead of the contract’s renewal, scheduled for February 2027. Amnesty International UK is urging NHS trusts and integrated care boards (ICBs) to refuse to use Palantir’s technology.

As well as being linked to ICE, which uses its technology to help track migrants, in January 2024, the company signed a contract with the Israeli military to use its technology in support of what it described as “war-related missions.” Amnesty has highlighted these relationships as part of its campaign against the company’s involvement in public services.

Palantir was co-founded by billionaire Peter Thiel, who also co-founded PayPal. The company’s presence in the UK expanded during the Covid-19 pandemic, when it secured government contracts involving health data.

Thiel has previously criticised the NHS. Speaking in January 2023, he said: “Highways create traffic jams, welfare creates poverty, schools make people dumb and the NHS makes people sick.”

Addressing the Oxford Union debating society, he also compared the British public’s affection for the health service to “Stockholm syndrome,” the term for hostages who feel a bond with their captors.

Opposition to Palantir’s NHS role has also been voiced in Parliament.

In June, the cross-party House of Commons Science, Innovation and Technology Committee called on the government to terminate NHS England’s contract with the company, citing its support for “highly controversial policies and activities.”

Concerns have also been raised about the levels of access Palantir staff may have to identifiable patient data. More than 44,000 formal legal objections have reportedly been submitted by patients.

Campaigners argue that the NHS should retain control over sensitive health information and that the company’s involvement raises questions about data protection, transparency and public accountability.

One of the demonstrations on October 8 took place outside Whittington Hospital in north London.

Andy Bain, president of Islington Trade Unions Council, and Shirley Franklin of the Defend the Whittington Hospital Coalition, part of the protest’s organising team, raised concerns about the potential consequences of linking health data with other public sector systems.

“We want the NHS to be in charge of our data. Palantir’s linking up with the police and social services, and all sorts of things – what’s going to happen with the data? It’s very worrying,” they said.

Jeremy Corbyn, MP for Islington North, also attended the demonstration. He said the dispute was ultimately about who controls the health service and its information.

“It’s all about public control. Are we, the public, going to control our NHS or are we going to hand it over to somebody else? I know the answer I want – which is us,” he said.

Amnesty International UK has launched its ‘No Palantir in our NHS’ campaign, calling on the government to end the company’s involvement in the health service.

The organisation argues that Palantir’s work with the Israeli military and ICE makes its role in the NHS incompatible with the health service’s public responsibilities.

“Palantir is a US software company whose tools are currently used by the Israeli military as they commit genocide against Palestinians in occupied Gaza,” Amnesty states.

It adds: “A company profiting from such grave human rights abuses should have no role in our health system or wider public sector. Amnesty’s message is clear – No Palantir in our NHS.”

Amnesty is urging supporters to sign a letter to health secretary Yvette Cooper calling for Palantir’s removal from the NHS. The campaign also encourages NHS trusts and integrated care boards to refuse to adopt its technology.

With the contract due for renewal in February 2027, the campaign is seeking to increase pressure on the government to reconsider its relationship with the company.

The post Protesters demand ‘No Palantir in our NHS’ as Amnesty steps up campaign against tech giant appeared first on Left Foot Forward: Leading the UK's progressive debate.

Turkish Crackdown On LGBTQ+ Organizations Threatens Freedom of Expression and Association

9 October 2026 at 14:22

EFF strongly condemns Turkey’s state-led discriminatory, oppressive attacks on feminist and LGBTQ+ organisations, media platforms, student groups, and rights defenders and activists within the country.

Since mid-September, access to the websites and social media accounts of a dozen organizations have been blocked by court order, while over 60 members and activists have been detained, their offices and homes raided, mobile phones, laptops and other digital devices seized, and judicial proceedings launched against them. 

These actions threaten the very existence of the LGBTQ+ organizations targeted, limiting their ability to carry out legitimate human rights work, deterring participation and support, and chilling the free speech rights of not just these groups, but any organization that even reports on LGBTQ+ oppression.

A little over a week ago, an Istanbul court shut down the website and social media accounts of T24, Turkey’s longest running independent digital news organization—which has covered government-backed campaigns against and earlier crackdowns on gay rights groups—alleging it had aired “LGBT propaganda” over the past year. 

It’s all part of Turkey’s efforts to portray LGBTQ+ groups and support networks for those living with HIV as criminal organizations that must be suppressed, purportedly to protect family values. Homosexuality is not illegal in Turkey (unlike Uganda, Nigeria, and Egypt, where it is criminalized), but LGBTQ+ organizations and activists have in recent years faced increased government oppression, including criminal proceedings on allegations related to obscenity and violations of Turkey’s Law on Associations, which regulates the activities of nonprofits.

In its new crackdown, the government is targeting LGBTQ+ groups’ websites and social media channels for alleged obscene posts accessible to children. Kaos GL, Turkey’s oldest gay rights organization, said investigations are being led by the Cyber Crimes Bureau of the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office, which took members of its Board of Directors into custody, raided their homes, and searched the organization’s offices, where electronic devices were seized. 

According to Human Rights Watch, prosecutors in Istanbul said those targeted were suspected of “founding, leading, or being a member of a criminal organization,” as well as sex work and drug-related offenses. Publicly available law enforcement and judicial documents about the investigation reportedly don’t say which publications or posts are alleged to be obscene.

The prosecutor’s office launched an investigation of the organization and others under Article 226 of the Turkish Penal Code, which regulates the offense of “obscenity” (without clearly defining it), while the overall operation, dubbed “My Family is Safe” and launched as part of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s “Decade of the Family” program, is being brought under Article 220 of the code. Justifying the crackdown by invoking family values and child safety suggests that the government is trying to enforce a moral code on society based on intolerance of and discrimination against LGBTQ+ people.

New Low for Turkey

Framing the activities of LGBTQ+ rights organizations as violations of organized crime provisions is a new low for Turkey, where free speech and press freedoms have long been under attack. The implication from these raids and investigations is that the organizations’ legitimate civil society work advocating for the rights of queer people—monitoring human rights violations, offering legal aid, running news portals, sponsoring cultural events such as symposiums and film screenings, publishing an online magazine and supporting LGBTQ+ refugees—is suspected of being criminal threatens the basic human rights of the LGBTQ+ community in Turkey.

These actions send a dangerous message to people and organizations exercising freedom of speech and association in support of queer people. Under the penal code, directing a criminal organization is punishable by five to ten years in prison, while merely being a member carries a sentence of two to five years. 

EFF joins hundreds of human, civil, LGBTQ+, and digital rights organizations around the world in calling for the immediate release of all those detained for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association and legitimate human rights work, and the unblocking of all websites and social media accounts of affected organizations. 

For many LGBTQ+ individuals the world over, the internet can be a safer space for exploring identity, finding community, and seeking support. The anti-LGBTQ+ crackdown in Turkey is not happening in a vacuum—unfortunately we are seeing anti-LGBTQ+ bills restricting free expression and privacy, content moderation decisions that disproportionately impact LGBTQ+ users, and other forms of intolerance around the world. 

We urge international civil society and diplomatic partners to raise awareness of and to speak out against the crackdown, and to publicly show support for the legitimacy of Turkey’s LGBTQ+ organizations and the important work they do to ensure that queer people are safe and free.

When No ID Means No Internet: Age Verification and the Right to Access Information

This post was co-authored by Sheila B. Lalwani, a doctorate student and recent COMPASS Fellow hosted by EFF.

Age verification proposals are often presented as a simple tradeoff: sacrifice a little privacy to better safeguard children online. But that framing overlooks a more fundamental question. What happens to people who cannot verify their age at all? This is particularly a problem when users are required to prove their age with identity documents.

Age-related restrictions are developing quickly around the world. While they differ radically across jurisdictions, in the past year, we’ve witnessed a sharp uptick toward mandatory age assurance for social media access but also for other high-risk digital services.

For example:

  • In late 2025, Australia became the first country to implement a minimum age requirement for prohibiting children under age 16 from creating or holding social media accounts. 
  • India passed the Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act that includes mandatory verifiable parental consent and has undertaken ongoing discussions for social media restriction.
  • The United Kingdom passed the Online Safety Act requiring age verification across a swath of services hosting content considered harmful to users under 18. More than half the states across the U.S. have enacted age verification laws. 
  • An EU Commission’s expert report recommends a ban on social media access for users under 13. It also recommends mandatory age verification for platforms to ensure that users are ‘age appropriate.’ 

The Access Problem 

Age verification laws that are predicated on the necessity of users possessing a current passport, driver’s license, credit card, or similar documents proving their identity exclude critical sections of populations.  And this problem is global in nature: Millions of people lack government-issued identification or encounter regular challenges to obtaining or updating it. 

Roughly 15 million adult U.S. citizens lack a driver’s license, and a further 2.6 million lack any government photo ID; leaving large groups blocked from online content or services. The UK has a similar predicament: proof-of-age checks are often reliant on passports, driver’s licenses, or other recognized alternatives, which can pose unique challenges to people without these documents.

Much of the advocacy around age verification discusses the privacy harms of age verification. Yet these measures also threaten something more fundamental: equal access to information and the ability to exercise the right to freedom of expression. 

Unfortunately, age verification systems foster unequal access to information and provide an asymmetric solution to find essential information, build community, and weigh in on public discourse. As governments and companies increasingly require users to prove their age before accessing online services, these individuals risk being excluded from large parts of the internet altogether. 

Effects on Global Majority Countries 

Age verification laws reshape who can speak, who can access information, and who gets excluded from the digital public sphere. In other words, age verification is not a neutral safety measure: it presents a structural barrier to disproportionately exclude certain groups—particularly those in the global majority—and alters the architecture of global online expression. Some of these groups are already marginalized offline, and age verification extends that exclusion into digital spaces.

For instance, 850 million people globally do not have ID. Most of these individuals exist in primarily low and middle income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The World Bank points out that many are members of marginalized groups and more than half of those lacking access to identity documentation also have children whose births have not been registered. Women are particularly vulnerable and are 8% less likely than men to have an ID. Other vulnerable groups, such as adults in low income countries, are less likely to have an ID when they fall below 25 years, as are those with a primary school education or less or those in rural areas. 

A policy paper from EDRi points out that age verification laws provide quick tech solutions but overlook longstanding structural challenges and undermine the universality of the internet. The analysis finds that age verification laws have serious human rights implications and ironically harm the very individuals they deem to protect. Moreover, these laws depend on the collection of harmful mass data that human rights organizations, including EFF, is fighting against—and has for decades. 

For example:

  • In Morocco, a push to restrict children’s access would ban under-13s from creating accounts on gaming platforms. This could potentially create challenges for those with IDs that have incomplete information concerning the year of birth. In addition, this push would also impact those who attempt to leave Morocco.
  • In Egypt, the lack of ID cards has created challenges for minority groups such as the Baha’i.
  • Stateless individuals would also struggle under age verification laws. The Rohingya, the world’s largest population of stateless people, often lack IDs. 
  • Kuwait’s Bidoon population also lacks proper identification materials. According to Amnesty International, this leads many to rely on standard civil identity cards, which can be restrictive.  
  • Nigeria launched a national program to provide ID cards to its population in 2007. Since then, 64.4 million have registered, but that represents just over 30% of the national population.
  • The Kafala system, a practice in several countries across the Middle East, also introduces challenges for age verification laws. Under this legal framework, migrant workers’ legal residency and employment status are bound to a specific employer. This potentially leaves stateless persons or migrant workers vulnerable to forced labor and restricted movements. 

No ID, No Access

Age verification laws are less about confirming the age of a user and more about creating barriers to online participation that many people cannot reliably scale. The net result is reduced access, more data collection, and an increased chance of unequal or mistaken exclusion from accessing information online. 

Nobody doubts the importance of protecting children online. While proponents assert that age verification laws protect minors from harmful material, online harassment, and digital addiction, these laws are not the solution. They subvert fundamental freedom of expression rights and pose significant privacy risks.  

EFF has long warned against age-gating the internet. Age verification technology itself is often inaccurate and privacy-invasive, and as more countries considering implementing ID-based checks, the risks move beyond censorship and surveillance toward excluding some people entirely. That’s why we’re working with groups in the U.S. and around the world to push back against these laws, and why we hope you join our effort.

For more information on how to fight back against dangerous age verification laws, visit our resource hub at eff.org/age

Degrowth practice and thinking in Switzerland

7 October 2026 at 11:23
by Emmanuel Bamdeis* (Degrowth Switzerland) In the series Degrowth and Ecosocialism: the global picture The degrowth vision is gaining influence in a diffuse manner in Switzerland. The popularization of degrowth arguments in Switzerland has been supported by the creation of a number of associations that are openly dedicated to promoting degrowth. Other actors (environmental associations,… Continue reading Degrowth practice and thinking in Switzerland

Ola Bini Ordered to Leave Ecuador Under Obscure Accusations

In a new blow to Ola Bini’s legal guarantees, Ecuadorean authorities retained the free software developer and security expert yesterday in Quito and ordered his immediate deportation from the country. He is barred from returning to Ecuador for 10 years. 

According to information released by his lawyer, Bini was intercepted by a car with four people who identified themselves as immigration agents. He was then taken to an immigration office without further information or a formal order from a competent authority. There, officials told Bini that his visa had been revoked but didn’t show any supporting document.  

Bini's defense filed a habeas corpus to safeguard his freedom and prevent his deportation. Yet, Ecuadorian authorities affirmed that the developer represents a threat or risk to public security and the state structure, and must leave the country. The ground for deportation is a secret report which allegedly asserts that Bini committed acts against the security of Ecuador. The defense could not access its contents.  

The deportation hearing started yesterday at 5pm Quito time. Human rights organizations tried to attend the hearing but were denied entry. The hearing was suspended but later reconvened establishing his immediate deportation. Ola Bini was relocated to Quito's airport and must stay there until he flies back to Sweden. 

The case that led to Bini's unfounded criminal conviction has expired (the statute of limitations ran out) and the court had already formally lifted all precautionary measures against him. Yesterday's events open a new chapter in the nefarious persecution of Ola Bini by Ecuadorean authorities.  

Since Bini’s arbitrary arrest in 2019, EFF has reported about his criminal prosecution fraught with misconceptions and rights violations. The script of what happened yesterday follows the same patterns we saw in the entire case, from its outset with unjustified allegations that Bini was a national security risk. The Observation Mission of Ola Bini’s case, joined by EFF and other digital and human rights organizations, has published reports and raised international awarenness about the perils of this case to the protection of rights online and the beneficial work of security experts.  

In a case surrounded by political interests, Ola Bini’s unanimous acquittal by the lower court in 2023 was overturned after the prosecution’s appeal. The majority of the appeals court convicted Bini for attempted unauthorized access of a telecommunications system without actual evidence to corroborate the accusation claims.  

Now, once again we must sound the alarm. Ecuadorean authorities must explain the accusations against the security expert. We will remain vigilant and ensure that at least this time his rights are respected.  

EU Kids Act Won't Keep the Internet Accountable and Trustworthy

21 September 2026 at 12:27

The EU Commission draft law to restrict young people’s access to the internet that it presented last week will come at a high cost: it will put online services behind age gates, expand the use of intrusive age verification, and undermine the privacy of all users. 

The EU Kids Act aims to protect children from risks associated with social media, video games, and AI systems by introducing age-based access rules, safety requirements, and stronger enforcement and oversight measures. It presents itself as building on the Digital Services Act (DSA) and puts into “hard law” some of the safety-by-design measures specified in the non-binding DSA guidelines on minors’ protection. 

The proposal is built around the following elements: social media age “delay”, safety by design, age assurance and parental responsibility, and strong enforcement. Each of these measures are concerning.  

Mandatory Age Gates for Social Media and Video-Sharing Platforms 

Following the advice of an expert panel, the proposal would create a phased access to social media and video-sharing platforms deemed risky—a threshold met simply by relying on personalized recommender systems or offering “uninterrupted content consumption”: no service accounts for children under 13; restricted accounts under tight parental supervision from 13 to 15; and autonomous accounts in a safe-by-design environment from 15 to 18. Full online access is therefore reserved for adults. 

However they’re designed, age gates undermine civil liberties, reduce safety, and create barriers to internet entry, often at the expense of marginalized groups.

If this sounds complex and like a compliance nightmare, that’s because it is. The access delay comes with privacy-intrusive age verification across the board, relying on the EU age verification scheme. For teenagers, this law means significant control in the hands of their parents, who must set up accounts and prove that they are, in fact, parents, adding yet another problematic layer of verification. 

In fairness, the Kids Act’s gradual approach at least appears to be designed with some proportionality considerations, rather than imposing a blanket social media ban. Just last month a French court declared such undifferentiated bans unconstitutional. The EU Kids Act distinguishes between age groups and certain services and follows a risk-based approach. This means, for example, that age verification is not required for existing accounts if the provider can tell with a “high degree of confidence” that the user is above the age threshold—a vaguely specified standard.  

Yet, the law still indiscriminately covers social media and video-sharing, with virtually all mainstream services being covered by the proposal. The broad scope also sits uneasy with the use of age thresholds, which remain a blunt proxy for maturity. What is more, by focusing heavily on safety and harms, the EU Kids Act pays little attention to the privacy and freedom of expression rights of users, as well as the right of children themselves to access information and to participate online. However they’re designed, age gates undermine civil liberties, reduce safety, and create barriers to internet entry, often at the expense of marginalized groups. They also create a powerful infrastructure for control and further entrench the power of big tech. 

The proposal exempts not-for-profit encyclopedias, scientific repositories and educational services, as well as open-source software-developing and-sharing platforms. However, no exceptions are foreseen for small and medium-sized enterprises, which will only foster the dominance of resource-laden tech companies that were already investing in similar measures. And we know that most companies are well-advised to play it safe and use privacy-unfriendly age checks across their platforms. 

Safety by Design Across Covered Services 

The proposal’s second pillar, “safety by design”, casts a wider net. It applies across social media, video-sharing, online games, AI companions, chatbots and even app stores—with varying requirements. Providers must generally make child-safe design the default and can relax from the requirements only if they use age assurance to establish that the user is an adult. 

For example, rules on addictive features such as infinite scrolling, safe account settings, and more choice over recommender systems are to provide a safe internet experience to young people. As regards AI companions and chatbots, the proposal requires companies to design their services to reduce minors’ exposure to emotional dependencies and harmful interactions. Online games are covered as well: they must come with contact protections. The law also makes app stores the gate keeper for age-appropriate access, based on an age-rating system. 

The devil of these measures lies in the details, but all of them raise fundamental rights concerns and some of them seem poorly suited, if at all, to the decentralized architecture of the Fediverse. The requirement for very large online platforms to set up compliance plans before rolling out new services raises additional questions about the risks of transplanting product-safety doctrines of conformity and risk control into speech regulation. Deciding what is “safe” can easily become a question of what content people can access or share.  

Next Steps  

By choosing to regulate all these aspects through the Kids Act, the Commission not only but creates a privacy minefield, it also intermingles the digital fairness agenda with the more fundamental-rights heavy questions of age assurance and access to information. An unfortunate policy choice that will politicize well-intentioned efforts to curb manipulative and addictive design practices (read our position on the DFA). 

It speaks volume that the Kids Act has not gone through a full impact assessment process, which would typically require a systemic check of alternative policy options and stakeholder consultations. Looking forward, we call on the EU lawmakers to pull the teeth of the most harmful suggestions and to make sure that the new measures don’t erode the fundamental rights of all users. 

EFF and Allies on Brazil's Elections: Privacy Protections are Crucial to Electoral Integrity

EFF, Access Now, and Data Privacy Brasil are putting forward recommendations to strengthen robust privacy and data protection safeguards in the context of Brazil's elections. The recommendations stress the close relationship between violations of personal data protection and challenges to the integrity of electoral processes. They underscore how privacy and data protection guarantees are a crucial tool for curbing the targeted spread of false or manipulative content and other problematic strategies used by political actors that are amplified by digital technologies such as artificial intelligence systems. 

The recommendations are part of a broader regional initiative and build on the legal and institutional safeguards already in place in Brazil. They seek to promote greater coordination among oversight institutions, civil society, and digital platforms, and encourage the solid implementation of privacy and data protection guarantees as drivers of electoral integrity. Read the full document below. 

The Link Between the Integrity of the Electoral Process and Privacy 

Protecting the integrity of the electoral process in the face of internet and social media use is a challenge that many policymakers are addressing or are willing to address. Online, content that can affect the integrity of the electoral process is increasingly personalized. This phenomenon is so concerning that it has been identified as one of the main global short- and medium-term risks. 

In an era of generative AI, the economic cost and technical difficulty of producing and spreading false or synthetic content to deceive, manipulate, or simulate authenticity have been considerably reduced. That intensifies concern over the integrity of the electoral process. Meanwhile, online privacy and personal data protection remain unfinished business in Latin America. 

There is an intrinsic connection between the ability to collect and process large amounts of personal data and the way false or manipulative content is created and distributed—on social media and messaging apps in particular, and on the internet in general. For this reason, applying strict laws and policies on personal data protection and privacy makes it possible to reduce the impact of false or manipulative content. This is especially important in electoral contexts, where such content affects and impoverishes public debate, directly affecting political and electoral rights and the integrity of the electoral process. 

This phenomenon predates the emergence of the internet. However, the rise of new technologies accelerates the generation and spread of false and manipulative content. This is supported by the very economic model that sustains the platforms, amplifying its effectiveness and reach. On the one hand, social media platforms have content recommendation algorithms that use personal data to generate profiles to which they can then serve targeted advertising content, including explicitly political propaganda. This technique is known as "microtargeting." 

Political microtargeting seeks to have a direct or indirect impact on democracy. It is used to persuade voters, to encourage or discourage turnout at the polls, or to raise funds using information that is deliberately taken out of context, inaccurate, or erroneous. 

The control exercised by these companies raises serious concerns about people's rights. By having access to massive amounts of personal information, these companies have the ability to shape the content that users see and interact with. This happens through the construction of profiles that can reveal habits, social relationships, political preferences, and opinions, to mention a few examples. Personal data is the fuel that amplifies risks to the integrity of the electoral process. That’s true whether it’s provided by the users themselves or generated by the platforms from their interactions online. 

For disinformation actors, access to sophisticated tools—such as those used to create "deepfakes" through generative AI, or "bots" programmed to spread content and seek to manipulate public opinion—boosts the effectiveness of this microtargeting in terms of quality and scalability, making it harder to detect as false or manipulative content. AI-generated avatars and synthetic characters that simulate voters, influencers, hosts, commentators, or community leaders can produce footage that appears spontaneous, fabricate the voices of artificial political actors, and make it harder for users to identify if a given public statement was created or mediated by technology. 

In this context, paid promotion with nanotargeting seeks to reach increasingly specific profiles with customized content, and AI-based tools are used to assess and map its impact on social networks. Drawing on the personal data of groups of voters, profiles of "synthetic voters" are created to test messages or strategies in search of the most efficient way to influence real voters. 

This rapid expansion of AI systems and hyper-personalization with data can lead to a problem of "epistemic erosion" for democratic societies, as pointed out by the UN's Independent Scientific Panel on AI Governance in 2026. 

At Access Now, Data Privacy Brasil, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, we point to the enforcement of personal data protection laws and public privacy policies as an efficient mechanism for improving the quality of our democracies and reducing the manipulation of public discourse in digital environments and its impact in electoral contexts. Measures to broaden access to information for electoral decision-making, and to ensure transparency about campaigns' and political parties' use of digital technologies built on the massive processing of personal data, also play a relevant role in guaranteeing the integrity of the electoral process. 

Recommendations for Safeguarding the Integrity of Electoral Processes in Brazil in the Face of New Technologies 

Concern about the effects of spreading false, manipulative, or deliberately decontextualized content is particularly heightened in electoral contexts. From Argentina to Mexico, many countries in Latin America, including Brazil, are holding or will hold significant electoral processes in the coming period. 

Providing the public with quality information from a range of sources is an essential element for the exercise of political rights. In order to safeguard the electoral process, these countries must enforce their privacy and personal data protection laws through their competent authorities, in coordination with their judiciaries and electoral courts. 

Access Now, Data Privacy Brasil, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation propose the following recommendations to protect the integrity of the electoral process by guaranteeing privacy and data protection during electoral contexts: 

1. Strengthen personal data protection guarantees and policies as a key element for the integrity of the electoral process, in particular the principles of necessity, purpose, and proportionality:

  • Prohibit the processing of sensitive personal data (such as philosophical beliefs and the labeling of ideological leanings), including inferred data, that reveals or could reveal people's political preferences for the purpose of targeting political content. In electoral contexts, the processing of sensitive personal data is only legitimate when the person has given their consent in advance, explicitly, and with strictly limited and clearly disclosed purposes of use and transfer. 
  • Processing must be carried out only on personal data that is strictly necessary for the purpose being pursued. 
  • Prohibit adding users to instant messaging groups for political outreach purposes, except in exceptional cases involving lists of political party members or where prior and informed consent has been given by the data subject. 
  • Free, specific, and informed consent means that the person is able to make a real choice, set apart from other choices, and does not run any risk of deception, intimidation, coercion, denial of access to products or services, or other significant negative consequences if they do not give their consent. 

2. Political parties, federations, and coalitions must improve the information made available to the general public about their personal data processing activities in electoral contexts, including: 

  • The personal data processing policy adopted, in compliance with data protection legislation and electoral legislation, including the measures adopted to prevent breaches of the general protection principles, to record personal data processing operations, to obtain consent appropriately, and to ensure technical and administrative security in data processing; 
  • Communication channels where the data subject can obtain information about the processing of their personal data, exercise the rights provided by law, and request to opt out of receiving electronic and instant messages. 
  • Information about the profiling they carry out for electoral purposes and about the procurement and use of data-based digital technologies in this context, including for purposes of paid promotion, microtargeting, network analysis, and prediction of voters' reactions or behavior. 

3. Strengthen cooperation mechanisms between the National Data Protection Authority (ANPD) and the Superior Electoral Court in order to: 

  • Improve communication channels and strengthen joint initiatives to oversee compliance with data protection guarantees in the electoral context, with the publication of periodic enforcement reports. 
  • Identify and dismantle coordinated strategies that compromise the integrity of the electoral process and carry out online activities that pretend to be "organic" and citizen-based when they are in fact funded or coordinated by a party, government, or company, such as bot farms, fake personal accounts managed by a single entity, AI avatars and synthetic characters that simulate real voters in order to manipulate public opinion, among others. 
  • Within the scope of their powers, require the preparation and publication of a data protection impact assessment in cases involving the use of sensitive personal data or emerging technologies for voter profiling. 

4. Authorities, political parties, communicators, and social media platforms must ensure, as far as possible, that the population has access to adequate and relevant information for electoral decision-making. 

  • Political parties, electoral authorities, and data protection authorities must allocate a percentage of their communications budget to warning about the consequences of microtargeting in electoral contexts; and about the use of AI avatars or synthetic voters to simulate support, rejection, outrage, or spontaneous political mobilization. 
  • Strengthen alliances with fact-checkers and other relevant communicators, such as civil society organizations, influencers, and others, to identify campaigns that compromise the integrity of the electoral process and to inform the public about such alliances through different channels, including official government channels.
  • Systematize the electoral proposals developed by candidates and their electoral platforms according to thematic areas to facilitate comparison between political parties. 
  • Agree on strategies between authorities and online platform companies, including social media platforms and chatbots, at the start of electoral periods, so that priority is given to content developed by electoral authorities. 
  • Every body, protocol, or policy created that involves authorities or public entities must be communicated in accordance with proactive transparency standards. 

5. Platforms must disable microtargeting tools for political and electoral content during previously established periods. 

6. Authorities, technical actors, academics, civil society, and/or social media platforms must collaborate in creating an algorithmic impact analysis lab that makes it possible to oversee compliance with these recommendations. 

  • Produce reports on the results achieved, in particular those that document the existence of microtargeting, the use of personal data for targeting, and exposure to varied content in electoral contexts. 
  • Establish strict cybersecurity protocols so that the labs prevent access to real users' private information. 

7. The authorities responsible for overseeing personal data protection and electoral matters must have sufficient functional, economic, and technical autonomy and independence to guarantee the proper exercise of their powers. 

Intermediary Liability in Brazil: The Intricate Path Ahead

Brazil's new internet intermediary liability regime is underway. The implementation of changes established by the Supreme Court includes notice and takedown mechanisms and duty of care obligations. Caution is crucial as these measures can create problematic incentives for enforcement overreach and over censorship of protected speech.  

The court in June issued a new decision clarifying elements of its 2025 finding that the previous liability regime was partially unconstitutional. The government also published in late May two presidential decrees that detail how the new rules apply. 

Under the new regime, social media platforms and other internet applications that curate or interfere with posts can be held liable for third-party content if they don’t remove it after being notified by the user seeking take down unless there's a reasonable doubt that the content is unlawful. For certain specific cases, like crimes against honor (e.g. defamation), platform liability still depends on failing to comply with a judicial order.  

For some serious crimes, like human trafficking and crimes against women, applications have a duty of care to remove related content immediately and can be held liable when systemically failing to do so. The precise limits of what constitutes a systemic failure are still unclear. There are also stricter rules for paid ads, boosted content, and bots. 

The previous regime, set by Article 19 of the law known as the Brazilian Civil Rights Framework for the Internet (“Marco Civil da Internet” in Portuguese), sought to protect freedom of expression online by holding internet application providers liable for user content if they failed to comply with a judicial order to remove it. There were specific, limited exceptions to this rule, like the unauthorized disclosure of nude or private sexual images. This was meant to prevent providers from over-removal of user content to avoid legal action. Yet, the court found that this provision failed to sufficiently safeguard democracy and fundamental rights. 

We outlined the thorny context leading to this shift in Brazil’s intermediary liability rules, including Big Tech’s alignment with the far right and hurdles to approve platform regulation in Congress, through a proper legislative process. 

Brazil’s shift is part of broader discussions and changes in response to growing concerns over online harms and digital platforms’ abuses. However, responses focused on platforms’ liability of user-generated content carry important traps and risks—from entrenching dominant platforms’ power over the information flow to escalating arbitrary online surveillance and censorship. The path ahead must prevent this to the extent possible, and the new presidential decrees provide a mixed contribution towards this task. 

New Decrees: Strengths and Flaws  

The government published two decrees regulating the new regime set by the Supreme Court. One introduces changes to its previous regulation, the Decree 8.771/2016, detailing elements of the decision, including additional duties that the court only briefly addressed (Decree 12.975). The other regulates measures to tackle violence against women online (Decree 12.976). 

The Supreme Court's decision didn't establish guidelines to protect users' due process rights when facing content take down and removal demands. Instead, it relies on providers to self regulate, which could lead to over censorship.  

The decrees’ provisions on user notification systems are helpful in this sense. They stipulate that providers must inform users (both the notifier and the content author) about the decision to remove or keep the content up, why, and the means to appeal. The guidance makes explicit that a platform may reconsider and reinstate content after an appeal and must explain its reasons to the party requesting removal and content author. The decrees also address concerns with the weaponization of notification systems, establishing that internet applications must adopt measures to prevent abuses. 

Decree 12.795 reinforces that applications can keep content up after notification when there’s reasonable doubt that the post is unlawful, stating that the analysis should consider the context of the publications, freedom of religion and belief, and any informational, educational, or critical, satirical, or parodic purpose with the aim of ensuring freedom of expression. With these guidelines, it aims to mirror the Digital Services Act's "notice-and-action" approach. Moreover, for sexual related, intimate content, platforms will provide a specific and easily accessible notice channel where victims or their representatives can follow the case. 

One of the most concerning provisions requires applications to proactively report content related to criminal conduct on their platforms to government authorities. Applications must send the post along with information that can identify the user. The Ministry of Justice will regulate this provision, something the Supreme Court didn't touch on in its decision. While it seems to apply just to those providers already required to comply with new content-related obligations (exempting email and videoconference providers, for example), it takes a disastrous step beyond. It’s not only about preventing the spread of unlawful content online; it gets platforms to police and report users to authorities by handing identification information apparently without a court order. 

Decree 12.795 also details the definition of messaging applications that are exempt from notice and duty of care obligations. It excludes features for public dissemination of content and open groups so that the exemption doesn't apply. It's still unclear what exactly open groups mean. Especially regarding end-to-end encrypted applications, it's crucial that duties to monitor and take down don't affect conversations that are under this security architecture. Perhaps more troubling, the Supreme Court stated in its clarification ruling that a judicial order can determine email, voice and video conference, and messaging providers to take down content of private communications. Any measure must respect privacy and free expression safeguards and refrain from undermining end-to-end encryption. 

Furthermore, decree 12.976 importantly addresses the protection of women online, but it contains a broad definition of online violence against women that will guide how platforms handle takedown notices they receive. This definition involves "any act, conduct, or omission that causes (...) psychological, political, or economic suffering (…) in any aspect of their lives, committed, instigated, facilitated, or aggravated, in whole or in part, by the use of digital technologies." Its breadth could unfortunately result in censoring legitimate criticism and other protected speech, which platforms and authorities must avoid. 

The decrees also establish powers to the Brazilian Data Protection Agency (ANPD) to oversee and regulate the new regime. Among controversies, the decrees give ANPD the power to apply penalties for breaches of content-related obligations. These obligations go beyond agency competencies set in the Data Protection Law and the Law 15.211/2025, focused on the online protection of children and adolescents. They are also not clearly covered by Article 12 of Marco Civil as it stipulates administrative penalties for violations of its data privacy provisions.  

We appreciate that ANPD has been open to civil society's demands and concerns. While it’s crucial that the agency conducts its oversight role preserving a proportionality commitment and keeping solid participation channels, sanction powers must be prescribed by law. 

Alerts for the Path Ahead 

It’s true that there are critical platform accountability problems we must address, especially regarding the big players. And yes, platforms should align their policies and practices with human rights standards, including by dealing diligently with the dissemination of unlawful, toxic content. But accountability efforts should look at platforms’ systems and processes and promote measures to put checks on the power of tech giants, instead of having a prevalent focus on policing and reporting user behavior.  

Key digital competition measures to regulate gatekeeper platforms are under discussion in bill 4675/2025, but the proposal is pending in Congress with no clear timeline for approval.  

One important measure is to ensure accountability of take-down requests, including by the government. The Supreme Court’s decision stipulated that internet applications should publish transparency reports of the removal notices they receive. Government institutions should follow suit by periodically disclosing aggregate data of their own requests to online platforms, covering various types of user data and demands for content and account restrictions. Back in 2016, Marco Civil’s regulation decree established that all federal bodies must annually publish statistical reports on their requests of subscriber data to providers. To the best of our knowledge, federal bodies generally fail to meet this provision. ANPD can play a crucial role in stepping up transparency in the implementation of the new rules. 

Ultimately, platform accountability under the new liability regime hinges on how accountable its application will be by platforms and state institutions, and on the regime's commitment to protecting fundamental rights, including freedom of expression and privacy.  

  

 

EFF and ARTICLE 19 Submission to the European Commission on the DSA Trusted Flagger Guidelines

EFF and ARTICLE 19 have submitted joint comments to the European Commission on draft guidelines for the Digital Services Act’s trusted flagger mechanism. Having long advocated for a DSA that protects freedom of expression while preserving intermediary liability protections and the prohibition on general monitoring, we welcome the Commission's effort to provide practical guidance on how the trusted flagger system should operate. 

The DSA’s trusted flagger system can help platforms identify illegal content more efficiently. But if implemented poorly, it could also encourage over-removal of lawful speech, weaken due process, and give government authorities disproportionate influence over online expression. 

We support the Commission's focus on good practices and illustrative examples, rather than legal interpretations that could inadvertently steer platforms toward particular enforcement outcomes—and argue that the guidelines should include stronger safeguards to protect freedom of expression, due process, and the impartiality of the trusted flagger system. 

We also support the Commission's clarification that the DSA itself does not define "illegal content"; that determination must come from applicable national or EU law. Trusted flaggers submit prioritized notice, but platforms remain responsible for determining whether content is actually illegal. Platforms must therefore conduct careful, informed assessments and should not assume that a trusted flagger notice necessarily warrants restricting content. 

Our submission highlights several areas where the guidelines could be strengthened: 

  • Cross-border assessments require caution. Platforms should not rely on a trusted flagger notice to assess legality across Member States, where national legal frameworks may differ. 
  • Systemic risks extend beyond content moderation. The DSA's systemic risk framework should not rely too heavily on individual moderation decisions, but should also consider broader platform design choices, including recommender systems. 
  • Law enforcement authorities should generally not be granted trusted flagger status. They already have statutory powers under Article 9 of the DSA, and combining those powers with trusted flagger status creates a risk that platforms may treat trusted flagger notices as de facto removal orders, undermining due process and the rule of law. 
  • Civil society organizations play an essential role. Civil society organizations help identify illegal content and report human rights abuses, but the guidelines should also recognize that these organizations may face retaliation for their work and should be protected from abusive campaigns that threaten their independence. 
  • Trusted flaggers should complement—not replace—existing partnerships. The new mechanism should not sideline existing trusted partnership programs, including collaborations with civil society organizations that do not or cannot hold trusted flagger status, especially those outside of the EU with valuable regional expertise.  

Read the full submission here:

European Commission Chooses to Keep EU Users Locked Up Behind Big Tech’s Gates

Users are always seeking more control over their social networking experience to make it better, whether to improve privacy or enhance flexibility. Interoperability between social networking platforms like Facebook and TikTok has so many benefits that solve those issues.  

Say you’re on multiple platforms because you have friends you follow on different networks, but you’ve decided to choose one platform with better privacy practices. With interoperability, you could switch and still interact with friends who remain on larger platforms. It could also enable independent apps with better privacy controls and more user choice. These are the untapped possibilities that could benefit users in the European Union under the 2022 Digital Markets Act (DMA).  

Yet, the European Commission, in its first review of the DMA, announced in April it had decided not to extend the DMA’s interoperability mandate to social networking and didn’t give a deadline or a timeline for enforcing that part of the Act. The Commission said “there is no clear demand” from users and businesses for social networking interoperability and, in any case, it’s too technically complex at the moment. Meanwhile, the Big Tech platforms that have been slow-walking interoperability over the last two years, erecting a myriad of hurdles for users seeking more freedom to choose other platforms, get a pass.

This is a huge disappointment and a missed opportunity by the Commission. Interoperability dismantles one of the biggest barriers faced by users who want to leave the tech giants’ platforms: the choice between changing to a platform you prefer or staying behind on a platform where all your friends, communities, and customers are.

The DMA, which went into force in 2024, aims to foster more choices for European Union users and encourage competition and innovation by forcing so-called gatekeeper platforms like Meta, Apple, and Google, to open their ecosystems to competitors. The regulation does a great deal to foster the integration of competing services and devices with the ecosystems of very large online platforms that act as gatekeepers. It even requires interoperability for messaging services, despite the significant technical and privacy challenges involved.

So, it’s odd that the Commission is using complexity as a shield against taking on social networking interoperability. The internet already runs on complex interoperable systems. Approaches like ActivityPub, the decentralized networking protocol behind the “Fediverse,” which gave rise to decentralized networks like Mastodon, already exist. The DMA shouldn’t mandate a specific protocol, but it can require meaningful interoperability outcomes.

The argument that there’s no real demand for social networking interoperability also falls flat. Users want the ability to move across platforms, choose the content they’d like to see from platforms, and not be tied down to a single platform. But there’s no way to get there—the platforms are doing little to open their social networking ecosystems. And now you have the DMA’s enforcer saying it’s not going to make them change. Demand for alternatives won’t materialize at scale until users see real progress towards interoperability, something the Commission has the power to do.

Having decided there’s little demand and too much complexity to proceed with mandating social networking interoperability, the Commission said it “will continue to monitor and assess how these services evolve.” This wait-and-see-posture only hurts users and strengthens and further entrenches Big Tech incumbents.

The DMA is supposed to center on the rights of technology users and be the pathway to an internet experience where you decide which software runs on your devices, where it’s easy to find the best products and services, and where you can leave a platform for a better one without forfeiting your social relationships.

Meanwhile, Big Tech is also resisting the DMA’s openness requirements. For example, Apple is supposed to be opening up iOS devices to rival app stores. Yet, the smartphone giant’s plan for opening its App Store levies junk fees and onerous conditions on app makers and is effectively impossible for any competitor to use.

It’s not just Apple pushing back against DMA enforcement. Meta's response is a “pay for privacy “system, in which users who do not consent to Meta’s surveillance will have to pay to use the service, or be blocked from it. Whether their plan complies with the DMA remains under review.

Nowhere in the DMA does it say social networking companies get to install a toll booth for users seeking to benefit from privacy rights the regulation grants them. The future EU Digital Fairness Act is another opportunity to protect users from such practices by declaring them unfair.

The Commission has responded to these developments with investigations, preliminary rulings, and fines. Meanwhile, users are missing out on greater choice and flexibility in how they communicate and connect online.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

EFF, TEDIC and CEJIL Challenge Secrecy in the Use of Face Recognition in Paraguay

Seeking transparency and accountability in Paraguay’s use of facial recognition, EFF, the Association of Technology, Education, Development, Research, Communication (TEDIC), and the Centre for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against the state for arbitrarily denying access to information about its implementation and use of the technology as a tool for mass surveillance that erodes people’s privacy rights. 

The case involves the Ministry of the Interior and National Police’s installation in 2019 of surveillance cameras with facial recognition technology in Asunción. Maricarmen Sequera, a lawyer and executive director of TEDIC, filed an information request with the ministry seeking details and protocols about the implementation and use of facial recognition systems and the personal data processing involved. 

The request sought information about, among other things, whether the state had conducted human rights or data protection impact assessments, as well as if it had developed measures and protocols for avoiding abuses, illicit uses of personal data, and other risks in the deployment of the facial recognition system.

The state denied most of the information requested, arguing that implementation details, protocols, and the processing of individuals' personal data were confidential security information. TEDIC contested the secrecy in courts, but the analyses lagged and ultimately sustained the denial of information. 

The petition filed last Friday (19) cites Inter-American standards upholding the public’s right to access information, particularly in relation to national security, that the Paraguayan authorities disregarded in denying TEDIC’s information request. The petition also argues that the refusal of information violated privacy and the right to informational self-determination.

The petition asks the Commission to recognize a violation of those rights and require the state to deliver the information requested. Further, the petition seeks an order compelling the state to adopt mandatory permanent mechanisms of active transparency regarding the acquisition, contracting, implementation, financing, functioning, and use of surveillance technologies by public bodies, especially those that incorporate processing of biometric data or artificial intelligence systems. 

It also asks the Commission to order the state to mandatory procedures for human rights impact assessments prior to acquiring and using surveillance technologies, particularly those that collect biometric data or use artificial intelligence.

The state’s lack of transparency in this case is not an isolated incident, both in Paraguay and in Latin America, where opacity in matters of security and surveillance is the unsettling rule. The situation gets worse with the increasing normalization of intrusive surveillance technologies by states in the region.

The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission emphasized that states should disclose surveillance capabilities and contracts, and acknowledge state use of surveillance technologies at a meaningful level of detail, to facilitate essential public debate on the necessary limitations of surveillance in democratic societies and ensure compliance with international human rights law.

We hope that the Inter-American Commission upholds the robust safeguards in the Inter-American System and advances access to information and privacy rights in a case that can set a crucial precedent for the region.

Internet Age Gates Are a Growing Global Threat

The internet is an essential resource for young people and adults to access information, explore community, and find themselves—both inside countries and across continents. Yet governments around the world continue to introduce and implement legislation requiring all online users to verify their ages before accessing the digital space. In some cases, politicians are going further, putting forth proposals to ban social media for younger users.  

In late 2025, Australia’s government rolled out the first complete ban on users under 16 from having social media accounts. In this sweeping regime, platforms are required to introduce age assurance tools to block under-16s, demonstrate that they have taken “reasonable steps” to deactivate accounts used by under-16s, and prevent any new accounts being created, or face fines of up to 49.5 million Australian dollars ($32 million USD). The 10 banned platforms—Instagram, Facebook, Threads, Snapchat, YouTube, TikTok, Kick, Reddit, Twitch, and X—have each said they’ll comply with the legislation, which led to young people losing access to their accounts overnight. Reddit is currently challenging the law in Australian courts on constitutional grounds. Recent research notes how the ban is preventing teenagers from accessing news in the country. 

In the United Kingdom, rules took effect in mid-2025 under the Online Safety Act that require all online services available in the country to assess whether they host content considered harmful to children; if so, these services must introduce age checks to prevent children from accessing such content. Online services are also required to change their algorithms and moderation systems to ensure that content defined as harmful, like violent imagery, is not shown to young people. 

This approach is reckless, short-sighted, and we’ve already seen it introduce more harm to the young people that it is trying to protect. The UK’s scramble to find an effective age verification method shows us that there isn't one, and we’ve spent years urging UK politicians to abandon any measures that require platforms to collect data or remove privacy protections around users’ identities. 

Earlier this year, Indonesia’s Communications and Digital Affairs Minister, Meutya Hafid, announced that users under 16 would have their accounts on “high risk” platforms deactivated from 28 March. The platforms subject to this ban are YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, Threads, X, Bigo Live, and Roblox; with Hafid noting how this policy would make Indonesia “the first non-Western country to delay children's access to digital spaces according to age.”

Similarly, the Malaysian government has recently pushed forward with plans to ban users under 16 from having accounts on social media platforms with at least 8 million users in Malaysia, including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, and YouTube. Users under the age of 16 are being told to download or transfer their data from these platforms in one month before the restrictions are applied. Platforms failing to comply with the ban may face penalties of up to $2.5 million USD.

In Latin America, Brazil approved a new law in 2025 establishing that providers of information technology products and services directed to children and teenagers, or likely to be accessed by them, must conduct age checks when their products and services offer risks to underage users. Regulation requires age assurance for products and services that are not allowed for children and adolescents in accordance with Brazilian legislation. App stores and operating systems are required to provide age signals for other providers. 

While the law is already in force, full compliance with its obligations is expected for early 2027, after the approval of further regulations and a transition period, and the authority responsible for enforcing the law is the Brazilian National Data Protection Agency. The list of concerns regarding the implementation of the law include: the wide scope of products and services that may fall within age-check obligations, how these obligations can affect non-proprietary operating systems and free software projects, and how effective the law's crucial data protection safeguards will be in a context of likely widespread age checks for accessing content online.

Similarly, the European Union has taken large steps towards mandatory age verification that could undermine privacy, expression, and participation rights for everyone. Politicians are promoting an EU-wide approach to age verification through its age verification “app,” which will be fully interoperable with the Digital Identity Wallet. While this mini-app has been announced as technically ready to be rolled out “for citizens to use,” it comes with its own realm of potential privacy and security concerns, such as long-term identifiers (which could result in tracking) and over-exposure of personal information. 

The European Commission also supports age verification in various legislative initiatives, from proposals that would allow or mandate companies to scan our communication (“Chat Control”) to non-binding guidelines of existing laws, such as the Digital Services Act. The EU Parliament, too, has proposed an EU digital minimum age of 16 for access to social media, a move that aligns with EU Commission’s president Ursula von der Leyen’s recent public support for measures inspired by Australia’s model. To all these initiatives EFF has provided one consistent response: mandatory age verification measures are not the right way to protect young people. 

These proposals restrict the fundamental rights of young people to speak to each other and to access information. They also force all internet users, not just those under a certain age, to upload private data—like a face scan or passport—in order to access a website or service. In considering the vast scope of privacy issues pertaining to the collection, storage, and sharing of this personal information, the problems of age verification in restricting free speech are compounded by these reckless and harmful approaches to verification. 

The problem of censorship and surveillance goes far beyond the borders of the internet. EFF continues to explore support for legislative and litigation challenges that recognize how these laws harm everyone’s rights to privacy, free expression and due process.

Microsoft Took a Step Toward Human Rights Accountability. Google and Amazon (and Others) Should Pay Attention!

For years, civil society organizations, workers, journalists, and human rights experts have warned that major technology companies risk enabling grave human rights abuses when they provide cloud computing, AI, and surveillance infrastructure to governments implicated in violations of international and humanitarian law. While many companies pay lip service to evaluating customers and contracts for human rights implications (lip service Exhibit A: Palantir!), too often those processes fail to provide any meaningful accountability when their standards are not met or are simply ignored. But recent developments at Microsoft suggest that accountability for failing to uphold the human rights standards that a company itself sets, even if incomplete, is possible. 

According to recent reporting, Microsoft’s Israel chief has departed amid an escalating ethical controversy surrounding the company’s business relationships with the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The move follows months of scrutiny, internal dissent, and sustained pressure from inside the organization along with press and civil society, especially after a report by The Guardian revealed that Microsoft technologies were used in systems connected to mass surveillance and military targeting operations in Gaza in ways that appeared to violate Microsoft’s own standards. This did not happen overnight.

In September 2025, Microsoft reportedly suspended certain services after initial investigations raised serious concerns about how its cloud and AI infrastructure may have been used. That alone distinguished Microsoft from many of its peers. Rather than simply dismissing mounting concerns or hiding behind vague claims of neutrality, Microsoft appeared to recognize that providing technology in conflict settings creates real human rights responsibilities. Now, after additional investigation and continued public scrutiny, it appears the company has taken another step, one that should send a strong signal to others that violating Microsoft’s human rights commitments could cost you your job. This is important. 

There is still much more Microsoft should do, of course. The company has yet to fully disclose the scope of its findings, explain exactly which services were suspended, or clarify what safeguards remain in place to prevent its technologies from contributing to human rights abuses in the future. We shouldn’t have to infer the connection between this employment action and the company’s investigation. 

Just prior to reports that Microsoft had fired its Israel Country General Manager, EFF joined Access Now, Amnesty International, Fight for the Future, and 7amleh in a joint May 7, 2026 letter to Microsoft leadership calling on the company to publicly release the findings of its investigation, suspend business relationships tied to serious human rights abuses, and implement meaningful safeguards to prevent its technologies from contributing to further harm. The letter detailed allegations regarding Microsoft’s reported provision of Azure cloud and AI services to Israeli military and intelligence units involved in surveillance and targeting operations, while also pressing the company to take concrete human rights due diligence measures going forward. Those demands remain urgent, even as Microsoft appears to be taking some of the steps we urged.

But even as we push for more, it is important to recognize when a company takes steps in the right direction. Because this is what it means to put human rights commitments into practice. It means acknowledging that human rights policies are not just branding exercises or transparency reports. It means accepting that companies providing cloud infrastructure and AI services have responsibilities when credible evidence emerges that their technologies may be enabling violations of international law. And it means taking concrete action when those risks become known.

The allegations facing Microsoft are serious. Human rights organizations and investigative reporting have documented claims that Microsoft Azure services were used by Israeli military and intelligence units to process large-scale surveillance data, support AI-assisted targeting systems, and sustain military cloud infrastructure during the war in Gaza. The concerns raised extend beyond ordinary business risk; they implicate potential complicity in violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

Faced with these allegations, Microsoft could have chosen the path many tech companies take: deny everything, attack critics, suppress worker dissent, and continue business as usual. Instead, the company appears to have begun responding to the evidence.

Technology companies are not powerless bystanders. Cloud providers and AI companies make choices every day about who gets access to their infrastructure, under what conditions, and with what oversight. When companies claim to uphold human rights principles, those commitments should have operational consequences. Too many companies, in both international and domestic policing contexts, provide technology to institutions that violate people’s human rights and civil liberties, then fall back on the claim that they are merely providing a service that their customers can use how they see fit. This is an ethical failing that falls short of most companies’ publicly expressed commitments. Microsoft’s recent actions suggest that sustained public pressure, worker organizing, investigative journalism, and civil society advocacy can force even the world’s largest technology companies to respond.

Google and Amazon should especially see this as a clear example to follow. Both companies also provide services to the Israeli Ministry of Defense and have faced years of criticism over those contracts and services, including from EFF. Yet neither has demonstrated the level of responsiveness or accountability that Microsoft has shown. If Microsoft can suspend services, investigate allegations, and make leadership changes amid mounting evidence and ethical concerns, then other cloud giants can no longer pretend that meaningful action is impossible.

The technology industry has spent years insisting that ethics and human rights matter. The real test has always been whether those principles survive when profits, government contracts, and geopolitical pressure are on the line. Microsoft’s recent steps are not the end of that story, but they may mark the beginning of what real accountability can look like.

We’re looking at you, Amazon and Google. If Microsoft can do it, why can’t you?

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