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The Justice Department Wants To Give Patent Trolls More Power 

17 November 2026 at 21:08

Software patents are mostly vague, hard to define, and widely abused. Most tech patent lawsuits aren’t filed by companies that make real products. They’re filed by patent trolls, companies that acquire patents to extract payments through litigation and legal threats. 

A patent on one feature of a smartphone shouldn’t give the patent owner the power to threaten the existence of the entire product line. But that is exactly the leverage patent trolls want—and the current administration is helping them to get it. 

In two recent patent cases, Radian Memory Systems v. Samsung and Collision Communications v. Samsung, the Justice Department and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office have asked courts to make it easier for patent owners to get injunctions. These are judicial orders that can force companies to stop selling products or remove features from them, rather than simply pay monetary damages. 

The threat of an injunction can pressure a company to pay far more than what a patent is actually worth. In 2006, NTP Inc., a patent holding company with no products of its own, was able to pressure BlackBerry manufacturer Research in Motion Ltd. to pay a $612 million settlement when it was on the verge of an injunction. 

Protection Against Patent Trolls

In May 2006, the Supreme Court rejected the practice of granting permanent injunctions almost automatically after a finding of patent infringement. In eBay v. MercExchange, the high court held that patent owners must satisfy the same tough requirements that plaintiffs in non-patent cases must meet to get a permanent injunction. After eBay, patent owners had to show “irreparable harm,” that they can’t be adequately compensated by money, that the “balance of hardships” favors the plaintiff, and, critically, that an injunction would not harm the “public interest.” 

At EFF, we celebrated eBay v. MercExchange as a major win for internet users. More than twenty years ago, we saw that software patents were going to be a disaster—not just for small companies (which they are), but for freedom of expression online. As EFF explained in its brief: 

The United States Patent and Trademark Office has issued patents on methods fordownloading video programs, publishing web pages, sending email messages, making internet telephone calls, and even online fundraising methods. Injunctions against uses of these technologies—and many similar technologies—will inevitably affect, and may even chill, free expression on the internet. 

The eBay rules make sense because the monopolies provided by patents are only justified when they serve a public purpose: promoting scientific and technological progress. Enforcing patents is not supposed to come at the cost of later innovators, free expression, or people’s access to technology. 

Now, two decades after eBay, the government is urging courts to interpret those protections in ways that could give patent owners greater leverage. It’s unusual for the government to intervene in private patent disputes, but the current administration has done so repeatedly—and not on the side of the public. 

Patent Licensing Disputes Shouldn't Threaten Entire Product Lines 

In June 2025, the Justice Department and Patent Office filed a “statement of interest” in Radian Memory Systems v. Samsung, a dispute over patents involving solid-state drives (SSDs), the storage devices commonly used in modern computers. Radian, a patent assertion company tied to Fortress Investment Group, sought a preliminary injunction that would block sales of Samsung’s products even before a judge or jury had decided whether there was patent infringement. 

In its statement, the government argued that even a patent owner whose business depends entirely on patent licensing could suffer irreparable harm, because calculating how much money it should get might be difficult. “In cases of unique assets, courts have commonly found irreparable harm when damages are difficult to calculate,” the DOJ writes in its brief. 

But courts regularly resolve disagreements about patent royalty rates, a patent’s contribution, and comparable licenses. The fact that those disagreements exist does not, by itself, establish that monetary damages wouldn’t be enough to compensate the patent owner. If courts adopted the DOJ’s views here, a difficult but ordinary part of patent litigation could become a reason for finding irreparable harm, making it easier for patent owners to seek injunctions that threaten entire product lines. Pure patent-licensing businesses would love that—they would routinely start to ask for injunctions, since eBay’s most important protections would be weakened. 

The government also says that “the prospect of an injunction can facilitate negotiation among the parties.” That’s exactly the problem. A company negotiating under threat of shutdown might pay massive sums to patent litigation shops in order to avoid disruption to product lines or customers. The payment is more likely to reflect the value of the threat, rather than the value of a patent. Radian ultimately withdrew its request for a preliminary injunction, but the government's arguments about when injunctions should be available remain concerning. 

A Second Attempt To Weaken eBay

Remarkably, the government returned to this argument in February of this year, in a case called Collision Communications v. Samsung, which had already gone to trial. In this case, Collision, a patent-licensing entity that acquired its patents from a defense contractor, was awarded a $445.5 million jury verdict for infringement of four patents, and then sought an injunction. 

Even though the jury had awarded Collision $445.5 million in damages, the government still intervened in the case, arguing that patent owners like Collision, which do not make products, should not be denied injunctions because they rely on patent licensing. They also argued that the difficulty of calculating monetary damages can support an injunction. 

Although the court agreed that Collision had suffered irreparable harm and that monetary damages would be inadequate, U.S. District Court Judge Rodney Gilstrap rejected Collision’s argument that ongoing patent infringement automatically establishes irreparable harm. He ultimately denied the injunction because Collision didn’t satisfy two other requirements of the eBay test: showing that the balance of hardships favored an injunction and that an injunction would not harm the public interest. 

Now Collision has appealed, and the argument is in front of the Federal Circuit, the nation’s top patent court. A brief from the Public Interest Patent Law Institute (PIPLI) explains what is at stake: when a patent owner doesn’t have any products, an injunction can prevent the public from accessing critical technology altogether. Since the patents here involve how mobile phones connect to cellular networks, “the effect on the public goes far beyond what these patents claim as improvements,” PIPLI explains. 

The outcome could extend well beyond these two companies. The eBay test requires courts to consider who a permanent injunction would hurt, and who would benefit—including the public. A patent owner’s desire for more negotiating leverage should not override the interests of millions of people who rely on their phones. Yet that’s exactly the kind of leverage the government’s arguments could make it easier for patent owners to obtain, at the expense of the public.   

The Government Should Protect the Public, Not Patent Owners

Patent owners can already collect damages and royalties when their patents are infringed. But they should not get a shortcut to shutting down tech products just because calculating damages is hard work. 

The Justice Department should defend the eBay safeguard. Instead, this administration is helping patent owners find ways around it. Courts should reject those arguments. We shouldn’t even have to say it, but we do: making patent threats more valuable does not align with the public’s interest.

This post is the second of a three-part series about how the current administration is using its power to give patent holders more power at the public’s expense. The final post will publish next week. See our previous post:

Why Fewer People Are Challenging Bad Patents

The number of petitions being filed at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) has collapsed. That’s not reason for celebration. The PTAB is an important line of defense against low-quality software patents being used in lawsuits against people and companies.

The drop didn’t happen because suddenly patents have become higher quality. It’s simply because USPTO leadership is increasingly refusing to consider good challenges to patents, for reasons unrelated to the merits. The process has become so unreliable that many would-be patent challengers aren’t even trying.

Inter partes review (IPR) is a process that allows people to challenge patents at the Patent Office, rather than having to fight an expensive lawsuit in federal court. It’s one of the most important ways to get bad patents out of the system.

In the third quarter of 2026, July through September, only 97 IPR petitions were filed at the PTAB, compared to 327 petitions during the same period in 2025. Similarly, only 37 IPR petitions were filed in September 2026, compared to 129 petitions in December 2024—the last full month before the current USPTO leadership began reshaping how the Board handles patent challenges.

This dramatic decline shouldn’t just concern patent lawyers. EFF has fought bad patents because so many software and internet patents make claims to the basic tools of free expression online, like sending email, using online ads, or publishing web pages. When bad patents go unchallenged, they affect everyone who cares about the freedom to write new code and make new technology.

That’s why EFF has defended IPR since it came on the scene more than a decade ago. It provides a faster and less expensive way to challenge patents that should never have been granted. Congress created IPRs because the Patent Office makes mistakes. District court litigation is an extraordinarily expensive way to correct them. Without a meaningful administrative review process, bad patents remain powerful weapons in the hands of patent trolls and others seeking to extract settlements from companies that often did nothing wrong.

Now, USPTO leadership is dismantling that safeguard.

Petitions and Institution Rates Are Falling

Since Congress created the IPR patent challenge process in 2012, the PTAB has always had some discretion in deciding which petitions deserve review. But institution rates today are much lower than their typical historical range.

Between fiscal years 2022 and 2024, the PTAB instituted between 66% and 68% of IPR petitions. In fiscal year 2026, which concluded in September 2026, the institution rate fell to 41%. And institution is only the first step of an IPR—it means the PTAB has agreed to hear the challenge, not that the challenger won, and the patent will be invalidated.

That decline helps explain why fewer petitions are being filed in the first place. Preparing an IPR petition takes substantial time and money. While cheaper than federal court, it’s still a complicated administrative process. Before filing, a challenger typically needs to search for prior art, hire experts, and develop detailed technical and legal arguments about why the patent never should have been granted.

Companies were willing to pay for IPRs because, historically, they could expect a predictable process. Petitions that met the statutory standard generally had a reasonable prospect of being heard and decided on the merits. But the USPTO has made it harder to get petitions heard and is throwing them out for reasons that have nothing to do with the merits of the challenges. Faced with these odds, many potential challengers aren’t filing at all.

Even After a Challenge Is Accepted, The USPTO Director Can Cancel It

When the PTAB decides to hear an IPR case, that means the petition has been “instituted”—but that has never meant that the petitioner will definitely win. It means the PTAB has determined the challenge warrants a full merits review, and the parties could expect the proceeding to continue toward a final written decision. But under the current USPTO leadership, that expectation has disappeared. The PTAB’s institution decisions are being repeatedly vacated by the Director.

USPTO Director John Squires has vacated at least 29 decisions granting institution of IPR proceedings, and subsequently denied the petitions, terminating those proceedings before a final written decision. These include cases that PTAB judges had already agreed to hear, as well as proceedings that Squires himself had previously allowed to proceed. This level of retroactive intervention is unprecedented.

In some cases, the parties had already invested substantial time and money litigating before the PTAB, only to have the proceeding terminated based on new reasoning by the Director’s office that arose after institution.

For example, in Revvo Technologies v. Cerebrum Sensor Technologies, the Director vacated an institution decision and remanded the case to the Board. The Board then instituted review again, but the Director reversed that decision. Using a new approach, the Director said that the petition had inconsistencies between claim construction positions taken before the PTAB and in district court. Since then, that decision has been cited as a basis for terminating several other instituted proceedings.

The result is another layer of uncertainty for people who want to challenge bad patents. Getting through the front door of an institution decision is much harder than it used to be—and now, even getting through that door doesn’t mean the PTAB will decide your challenge. Predictability is one of the things that made IPRs work.

Congress Created the PTAB To Avoid Costly Litigation

Congress created IPRs in part because challenging a questionable patent in federal court is enormously expensive and risky. Patent examiners work under serious time constraints, and some patents that shouldn’t have been granted will inevitably issue. Not every patent dispute requires years of expensive district court litigation. Congress recognized that, and created an administrative process, staffed with experts more capable of correcting those mistakes.

That system has benefited the public. Since 2012, it has helped invalidate thousands of patent claims that never should have been issued. The IPR process has protected startups, software developers, nonprofits, and small businesses that otherwise would have faced crushing litigation costs simply for building products or offering services that use everyday internet technology.

EFF supports a balanced IPR system because it should be easier to fight against bogus patents that should never have been issued. The cost of fighting a patent can be a weapon in itself, and weak patents don't just burden large technology companies. Patent trolls routinely target small businesses and independent developers, and have gone after podcasters, retailers, and even coffee shops and nonprofits. These organizations have neither the resources nor the desire to spend years litigating over potentially invalid patents in federal court. IPR offers a chance to challenge those patents before litigation costs get out of control.

If we weaken the IPR system, bad patents become much harder and more expensive to challenge.

We Shouldn't Accept This as the New Normal

Some defenders of the current approach argue that lower institution rates reflect more balance in the patent system. But institution rates at the PTAB have plummeted from 68% to 41% in just two years—a nearly 40% decline. IPR petition filings have reached historic lows. And even proceedings that have already been instituted can now be terminated months later, without a decision on the merits.

These developments send a troubling message to members of the public who might want to use the PTAB: don't bother. The PTAB doesn’t need to institute every petition. But it does need to provide a process that is transparent, predictable, and fair. Right now, confidence in the system is disappearing.

If companies, individuals, and nonprofits conclude that IPRs aren’t worth pursuing, the consequences won't stop at the PTAB. More weak patents that never should have been granted will survive, and patent trolls will use them. That means more defendants facing expensive district court litigation or paying settlements driven by the cost of litigation.

That's not what Congress intended when it created IPRs. It should not become the PTAB's “new normal.”

EFF Challenges Secrecy In Eastern District of Texas Patent Case 

24 April 2026 at 22:57

Clinic students Emily Ko and Zoe Lee at the Technology Law and Policy Clinic at the NYU School of Law were the principal authors of this post.

Courts are not private forums for business disputes. They are public institutions, and their records belong to the public. But too often, courts forget that and allow for massive over-sealing, especially in patent cases. 

EFF recently discovered another case of this in the Eastern District of Texas, where key court filings about Wi-Fi technology used by billions of people every day were hidden entirely from public view. The public could not see the parties’ arguments about patent ownership, the plaintiff’s standing in court, or licensing obligations tied to standardized technologies.

EFF Seeks to Uncover Sealed Information in Wilus 

The case Wilus Institute of Standards and Technology Inc. v. HP Inc., highlights a recurring transparency problem in patent litigation. 

Wilus claims to own standard essential patents (SEPs) related to Wi-Fi 6 — technology embedded in everyday devices. Wilus sued Samsung and HP for patent infringement. HP argued that Wilus failed to offer licenses on Fair, Reasonable, and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms, which are required to prevent SEP holders from exploiting their position, by blocking fair access to widely used technologies. 

In reviewing the docket, EFF found that many filings were improperly sealed under a lenient protective order without the required, specific justification needed in a proper motion to seal. Because there is a presumption of public access to court filings, litigants must file a motion to seal and demonstrate compelling reasons for secrecy. This typically requires a document-by-document and line-by-line justification. 

In the Eastern District of Texas, that standard is often not enforced. Instead, district judges allow litigants to hide information using boilerplate justification in a protective order without explaining why specific documents or specific parts in a document should be hidden. 

In Wilus, two sets of documents stood out. 

First, Samsung moved to dismiss the case, arguing Wilus may not have validly obtained the patents — raising doubts about whether they had standing to sue at all. Wilus’s opposition to that motion was filed completely under seal, with no redacted public version available at all. That briefing likely addresses the patent assignment agreements that underpin Wilus’s business model — information the public has an interest in, especially in cases involving non-practicing entities (NPEs) like Wilus. 

Second, filings related to HP’s supplemental briefing on FRAND obligations were also sealed in full, with no redacted versions available to the public. Whether Wilus is bound by FRAND has implications far beyond this case. Companies subject to FRAND must adhere to reasonable licensing terms, while those that are not can charge significantly higher licensing fees. 

In both instances, the public was shut out of arguments that bear directly on how essential technologies are licensed and controlled.

EFF Pushes For Public Access 

EFF raised these concerns with Wilus’s counsel and pressed for public access to the sealed records. Wilus ultimately agreed to file redacted versions of several documents now available as Document Numbers 387, 388, and 389. 

That result is progress, but it shouldn’t require outside intervention. Public versions of court filings should be the default, not something negotiated after outside pressure.

Even now, these newly filed redacted versions conceal significant portions of the parties’ arguments. The public still cannot fully see how this case about technologies that are used every day is being litigated. 

Why Public Access Matters 

Sealing court records is designed to be rare. To overcome the presumption of public access, litigants must show compelling reasons for secrecy. That’s because open courts are a distinguishing feature of American democracy. The public, journalists, and policymakers all have the right to observe proceedings and hold both government actors and private litigants accountable. 

Some filings do contain trade secrets or commercially sensitive information. But that doesn’t mean litigants should be able to hide information without explaining why. The Eastern District of Texas allows litigants to bypass the requirement to explain why.

EFF confronted this very same issue in its attempt to intervene in another Eastern District of Texas case, Entropic v. Charter. The same pattern appeared again in Wilus: instead of narrowly tailored redactions supported by specific reasoning, filings were withheld wholesale. 

Courts Must Enforce the Standard

Courts, not third parties, are responsible for protecting the public’s right of access. 

That means enforcing the “compelling reasons” standard, as a matter of course. Parties seeking to seal sensitive information should be required to justify each proposed redaction. The Eastern District of Texas’ current approach falls short. By allowing broad, unsupported sealing through expansive protective orders, it effectively treats judicial records as confidential by default. 

Heavy caseloads don’t change the rule. Administrative burden cannot override constitutional and common law rights. Judicial records are presumptively public. Courts, including the Eastern District of Texas, should enforce that presumption. 

Other Federal Courts Get It Right 

The Eastern District of Texas is an outlier. In the Northern District of California, judges routinely reject overbroad sealing requests. As Judge Chhabria’s Civil Standing Order explains: 

[M]otions to seal . . . are almost always without merit. . . . Federal courts are paid for by the public, and the public has the right to inspect court records, subject only to narrow exceptions. 

The filing party must make a specific showing explaining why each document that it seeks to seal may justifiably be sealed . . . Generic and vague references to “competitive harm” are almost always insufficient justification for sealing. 

This approach reflects the law: sealing must be narrowly tailored and specifically justified.

Court Transparency is Fundamental 

At first glance, secrecy in patent litigation may not seem alarming. But it signals a broader erosion of transparency. The widespread use of expansive protective orders in the Eastern District of Texas is a practice that risks spreading if courts do not enforce the law. 

These practices allow private parties to obscure information about disputes involving technologies that shape modern life. That undermines a core principle of a free society: transparency regarding the actions of powerful actors. 

Courts are not private forums for business disputes. They are public institutions, and their records belong to the public. 

So long as these practices continue, EFF will keep advocating for transparency and working to vindicate the public’s right to access court records.

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