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Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's election

2 April 2026 at 16:14
Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's election

Russian agents linked to the Kremlin spent much of 2024 working on secretive operations to infiltrate Argentina’s media to discredit the country’s new far-right libertarian president, Javier Milei, according to leaked documents seen by openDemocracy.

In the run-up to his election victory in December 2023, Milei began seeking favour with Joe Biden’s administration in the US. While the pair were unlikely to see eye to eye on Milei’s domestic politics – he famously appeared on stage brandishing the chainsaw he was going to use to “destroy the state from within” – Milei adopted US-friendly geopolitical positions, including support for Ukraine, even inviting Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky to his inauguration and hosting him in the presidential palace.

This support appears to have ruffled feathers in Moscow. A propaganda network backed by Russian foreign intelligence and internally known as ‘the Company’ began working to undermine Milei’s government and further divide Argentina’s already polarised society, according to a tranche of Russian-language documents obtained by The Continent, an African news outlet, and shared with a consortium of investigative newsrooms including openDemocracy, Dossier Center, iStories, All Eyes on Wagner, and Forbidden Stories.

The documents offer exclusive and unprecedented details of the operations and activities that the Kremlin’s agents at ‘the Company’ carried out in more than 30 countries across South America and Africa between February and November 2024.

These include commissioning surveys and polls and assembling briefings on subjects as varied as Argentina’s military-industrial complex, oil resources in the Antarctic, profiles of political leaders, political parties and worker unions and “expert interviews” with “politicians, opposition political scientists and economists”.

The Company even made plans to support opposition candidates in Argentina’s 2025 mid-term legislative elections.

Its most intensive campaign, though, involved creating “a network for the distribution of media content in Argentine mass media and the local segment of social networks”.

openDemocracy has identified at least 250 pieces of content – news, analyses and opinion pieces – that the Russians claimed to have placed in more than 20 online Argentinian news outlets from June to October 2024.

While the Company budgeted more than $280,300 for this content, we have been unable to verify whether the payments were made, and if so, whether they were made to the media, journalists or third parties. The comparatively large figures for Argentina’s cash-strapped media suggest that the Russian agents may have inflated the amount of money required to their superiors in St Petersburg.

The documents also provide clear links between the ‘The Company’, the Russian Foreign Intelligence SVR, and the Wagner group of the late oligarch and mercenary Yevgeny Prigozhin, as laid out in a previous openDemocracy investigation, which revealed how the Kremlin-backed ‘Company’s’ agents tried to prop up former President Luis Arce’s faltering government in Bolivia.

As Bolivia’s left fractured, the Kremlin sent ex-Wagner agents
Exclusive: New dossier exposes how Russian operatives sought to ensure their ally won Bolivia's presidential election
Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's electionopenDemocracyDiana Cariboni
Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's election

The Company’s existence in Argentina was first publicly confirmed in a speech by Milei’s spokesperson in October 2025. Its operations, the spokesperson said, included disseminating content in social media, influencing local civil organisations, foundations, and NGOs, conducting focus groups with Argentine citizens, and gathering political information to be used in favour of Russian interests.

“This is the declassified portion of the information,” the spokesperson said, “Of course, there's a whole lot of classified information, which is a state secret.”

Now, for the first time, openDemocracy and its investigative partners are able to shed more light on the Russian operations.

Fake fees

In October 2024, an author called Manuel Godsin published a story about universities protesting Milei’s budget cuts for the Realpolitik news site. It was a topic relevant to his interests; the biography at the end of the piece says Godsin has a PhD from the University of Bergen and is a member of a Centre for Political and Strategic Studies.

What the editors at Realpolitik failed to notice, though, is that Godsin doesn’t exist.

His face belongs to a Russian man named Mikhail Malyarov, as was revealed by Africa Confidential last year and corroborated by an investigation by Code for Africa published last month, which found that Godsin is a “fictitious identity”, created to “whitewash Russian narratives in the mainstream media” using content generated by ChatGPT.

openDemocracy found that Godsin’s article is one of 20 published by Realpolitik that appears in the Russian files. Our analysis of the documents reveals the Russians reported paying $11,000, or $550 a piece, to host the articles on Realpolitik. The site’s director, Santiago Sautel, told openDemocracy he had not received any payments for carrying these articles, and that he didn’t know any of the authors of the 20 pieces.

“We publish opinion pieces all the time,” Sautel said. “We do not know the origin of these particular ones. We can confirm, however, that they were not the result of any underhanded manoeuvre hatched behind closed doors at a diplomatic mission. And if any of these pieces were orchestrated in the shadows to serve a specific agenda, we are unaware of it.”

Realpolitik was far from the only Argentine digital outlet fooled by the agents – we have confirmed that more than 20 outlets with differing audiences, resources and political outlooks published their articles. For the most part, this content was not unlike the day-to-day coverage of news and critical commentary about the state of the economy and the increased diplomatic tensions with progressive governments in the region.

Yet our analysis of the articles and the Company’s corresponding documents reveals they were unusual in two key ways. First, many of the pieces contained references favourable to Russia and critical of the US, as well as distortions, exaggerations and fake news.

Secondly, they were extortionate – if the Russian documents are to be believed. The Company reported spending between $350 and $3,100 on each article, figures that were shocking to Argentinian media representatives we spoke with; journalists in the country typically earn less than $700 a month. Our analysis indicates the payments must have been inflated in the documents, which were written for the agents’ superiors.

Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's election
A facsimile of one of the Russian spreadsheets showing the names of the media outlets, the theme, the payment details and the article’s URL

openDemocracy, Forbidden Stories and Filtraleaks, which partnered for this investigation, contacted all the media outlets mentioned in the documents and interviewed editors, directors or journalists from 15 of them. Many asked not to be identified.

Two sources told us that they had been paid for publishing some of the articles, but that the payments were far lower than those recorded in the documents. Both were approached by the same intermediary, who gave them different, yet similar, accounts of the origin of the articles and the money: a group of Argentine businesspeople concerned at the state of national industry, or angry at Milei’s cuts to public works budgets.

openDemocracy’s analysis of the leaked documents indicates the Russian agents attempted to exaggerate the scope of their operations in other ways, too, with some of the articles’ URLs listed twice in their spreadsheets.

All of the Argentine journalists we spoke to denied any involvement with the Company or any associated Russian influence campaigns. Most said the articles they’d published had been provided for free by a third party, described as a “news agency”, “consultant” or “intermediary”, but could not name the agency in question. Several admitted that the articles were published without much editorial oversight, and said they did not know the authors of the pieces.

Our interviews with the media representatives reveal the Russian disinformation operation in Argentina exploited an increasingly common global practice: PR agencies offer free or paid content to resource-strapped newsrooms to gain client visibility. Although media standards require that such arrangements be disclosed, this often does not happen. Our conversations with editors and journalists in Argentina indicate this may have been the case.

openDemocracy made contact with one such intermediary, who said he provided editing services for some of the articles mentioned in the documents and was paid the market rate. The intermediary expressed surprise that these articles were part of a Russian influence operation. He noted that editing was a legitimate profession.

“It is possible, but uncommon, for a journalist to publish content without their editor's knowledge; but if it is true that this network paid to place more than 250 articles, it is very unlikely that no editor any outlet did not know about this,” Martín Becerra, media expert and researcher of the National Scientific and Technical Research Council (CONICET) told openDemocracy.

“The increasing precariousness of the media, the excessive relaxation of editorial oversight create an environment conducive to disinformation campaigns and manipulative operations of all kinds and stripes,” he added.

In their press conference in October 2025, the Argentinian authorities identified two Russian citizens, Lev Konstantinovich Andriashvili and his wife Irina Yakovenko, as key members of the disinformation campaign.

Andriashvili and Yakovenko left Argentina for St. Petersburg days after their names were exposed by the government, but they returned to the country soon after, according to research published by the Argentinian Journalism Forum in January this year. At the time of publication, Andriashvili and Yakovenko still live in Buenos Aires.

In a written response to openDemocracy request for comments, Andriashvili said: “We have never contacted the media, journalists or Argentine political figures. Nor do we have any connection with the organisation mentioned in your description. Furthermore, no evidence has been presented to support these accusations, simply because none exists.”

Fake authors

Godsin was not the only fictitious analyst commenting on Argentina’s public affairs.

Gabriel di Taranto, a prolific commentator with a master’s degree in political communication from the Universidad Nacional de Avellaneda in Argentina, published 20 pieces for three different websites: Diario Registrado, C5N and Ámbito.

But the university doesn’t offer a master’s degree in political communication, and a person with that name was never registered as a student, according to a statement that it provided to consortium member Forbidden Stories. The face used on di Taranto’s author profile was generated using Nvidia AI software, according to a 2018 article by the Metro, a British newspaper, and it has been used on several social media profiles.

‘Juan Carlos López’ and ‘Marcelo Lopreiatto’ were other fictitious authors who ‘wrote’ articles for Diario Registrado. Juan Carlos López (a very common name in Argentina) published nine articles recorded in Russian documents and published in Diario Registrado; his face can be found in a photo bank and, again, on social media profiles associated with different names on Facebook and LinkedIn.

The face on the author page of Marcelo Lopreiatto, who penned 12 articles for Diario Registrado and the website C5N TV news channel, can be traced back to a 2019 article about a company giving away AI-generated headshots as a promotion.

Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's election
Estas caras no pertenecen a estos autores falsos. De izquierda a derecha: Gabriel di Taranto, Marcelo Lopreiatto, Juan Carlos López y Manuel Godsin | James Battershill / openDemocracy

In all, Diario Registrado published 26 stories that openDemocracy traced back to the Russian misinformation campaign. The documents claim the Company paid $28,600 to place these articles on the site. The outlet’s editor didn’t reply to our requests for an interview.

C5N published 17 articles that the Company paid $32,500 for, according to the Russian documents. Fourteen of these articles were under Lopreiatto and di Taranto’s fictitious bylines. C5N’s editors declined to comment.

The Russians also claimed to have paid $20,000 for eight articles in Ámbito, a traditional financial newspaper that moved online in 2024; $16,500 for 10 pieces in A24.com, the news website of the A24 TV channel; $40,700 for 37 pieces on Diario Con Vos, a news site that was at the time part of the Radio Con Vos media group and has since changed its name to Es Nota; $12,000 for 16 stories on Big Bang News and $6,300 for 18 stories on Dos Bases.

In a written response sent to openDemocracy following the publication of this article, Ámbito’s general director, Gabriel Morini, denied that his media outlet had received any money or had any connection to destabilisation campaigns originating in Russia. “Neither AMFIN SA, nor NEFIR SA [Ámbito’s publishers], nor any marketing agency representing these publishing companies has received any payment from any entity or nation to publish inaccurate, negative, or campaign-related information intended to favour or harm any government.”

Regarding the content, Morini added: “None of those disputed articles (8) can be classified as fake news.” He pointed out that several of the articles in question were written by a real person in Argentina, who was writing under their own name, while others had no author but were news based on facts. Regarding another of the articles, signed by the fake profile Gabriel di Taranto, Morini explained: “Ámbito acknowledges a flaw in its editorial process that led it to verify only that other publications existed under the same name in other media and assumed it must be a real person without verifying the details of his existence. The opinion piece in question referred to the conflict over oil in the war between Russia and Ukraine.”

Editors from A24 and Dos Bases didn’t answer our repeated requests for comments, while Es Nota (formerly Diario Con Vos) declined to comment. A source from Big Bang News denied any involvement with Russian campaigns or money, and claimed all its pieces we identified in the Russian documents had been assigned by the outlet’s editors to its own journalists.

openDemocracy also found stories planted by the Russian agents at Infobae, El Destape, La Patriada Web, En Orsai, Sección Ciudad, El Ciudadano Web, Política Argentina, Tiempo Argentino, El Cronista, Osorno en Vivo (Chile), Infocielo, Data Clave, Agenda Urbana, Ciudadano Agro, Contraste MDP and En la Mira del Poder.

El Grito del Sur, a leftist digital outlet founded in 2012, appears to have published six stories placed by the Russian network. The Russians claim to have spent $2,400 to place each article, a claim denied by the publication. El Grito del Sur denied accepting payment for content, though it said it does take “any information intended to discredit Milei’s government, provided it is based on objective facts”.

In an email, El Grito del Sur’s editor in chief, Yair Cybel, said he would not share information about their journalists or contributors with openDemocracy. “We’re not snitches or informers, certainly not for the British media”.

He added: “Our outlet wholeheartedly supports the Russian Federation in its conflict with Ukraine, Palestine in the genocide it is subjected to by Israel, and Argentina in its claim over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands.

“Our entire editorial committee eagerly hopes that Putin’s Russian troops will advance to take London and will make its humble contribution through its reporting to ensure that this comes to pass”.

Fake news

On August 23, 2024, news website El Destape published a story about three Argentinians detained by the Chilean police while carrying an explosive device, a drone and “electronic maps” of Chile’s Ñuble region, near the Argentine border.

The piece was authored by Fernanda Velázquez, whose only digital footprint is her author page on El Destape, and picked up by two Chilean websites, which ran shorter and identical versions, Osorno en Vivo and La Razón.

But the story was fake news planted by the Russians “to create tension between Argentina and Chile”, according to the documents translated and analysed by openDemocracy, which reveal a plan to plant a “story about Milei sending a sabotage group to organise a terrorist attack on the Trans-Andean gas pipeline in Chile to disrupt a gas contract in US interests”. El Destape did not respond to openDemocracy’s request for comment, but the story was subsequently taken down.

Juan Luis Rubilar, the editor of the Chilean outlet Osorno en Vivo editor that carried a version of the story, told openDemocracy: “Someone copied the article and posted it online. We don’t know who. No payment was received. We’re very sorry if it’s fake, we can take it down from the website.”

Representatives of La Razón didn’t reply to our questions.

The Russian files also included ideas for other fake news stories to inflame tensions between Chile and Argentina – which were on the verge of a war in 1978 – such as publishing a “map of the partition of Chile after the war with Argentina” or false claims that Argentina was drafting recruits for a war with Chile. openDemocracy could not find these stories online, suggesting they were ultimately not published.

Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's election
Capturas de pantalla de publicaciones digitales que muestran graffitis y una pancarta con contenidos de la Compañía contra Ucrania y Milei | James Battershill/openDemocracy

The Russians also sought to exploit the Argentinian president's obsession with his cloned dogs. Outlining one of the agents’ objectives, the documents say: “Goal and description: Injected a story about Milei purchasing five dog collars from Cartier worth $64,000 in the US.” A fake story on these same lines appeared in a news website from the Dominican Republic and an Instagram post.

Other aims were more sinister, though – particularly its plan to shape the Argentine narrative on Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Under President Alberto Fernández’s Moscow-friendly administration, Argentina maintained a neutral stance on the conflict. Milei, by contrast, joined the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, an international coalition launched by the Biden administration to coordinate humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine, although his administration later said it would not provide military support after the Russian embassy expressed “disappointment” over the decision.

The documents indicate the Kremlin did not stop at expressions of disappointment, though. The Company launched a covert campaign in Buenos Aires under the banner “Argentina doesn’t need a foreign war” – commissioning 89 works of graffiti across the city, hanging banners opposing Ukraine at football matches, and waging a so-called “anti-war campaign” on social media.

Fake authors, fake stories: Inside the Russian campaign to influence Argentina's election
Publicaciones digitales muestran graffitis y una pancarta que reproducen contenidos de la Compañía contra Ucrania y Milei | James Battershill/openDemocracy

The agents also told their superiors that they were assigning articles to “popular” columnists – openDemocracy was able to identify pieces they published on this theme, but none were by well-known commentators, and most did not have bylines – and contacting politicians and writing their statements “on the harm of support of Ukraine for Argentine national interests”. openDemocracy could not confirm whether this took place.

In fact, the leaked documents include a biography of one Alexey Evgenievich Shilov, that states he joined the Company in 2016 and “organised and conducted a socio-political operation to discredit the pro-Ukrainian policy of the leadership of Argentina”. Yet despite these efforts, the war in Ukraine remained a marginal issue for the public in Argentina.

Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025, and his inconsistent negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, further complicated the politics in the region: A month into Trump’s tenure, the US voted against a UN resolution calling for an immediate Russian withdrawal from the Ukraine occupied territories. Argentina, which had previously been supportive of Ukraine, abstained.

Later that year, Milei’s party secured a narrow victory and won more seats in Congress – despite being embroiled in corruption scandals – after Trump made clear that a $20bn bailout for the Argentinian economy was contingent on Milei’s party winning the mid-term elections, leading to concerns that it was, in fact, the US that was interfering in Argentina’s elections.

“The outcome of [the Russian] investment was the opposite of what was theoretically intended, which also makes me question its true motives,” Becerra, the media expert, said. He suggested that the intention of Russia’s operations in Argentina could have been to deepen the sense of national crisis by undermining the credibility of its institutions.

“Wagner and Putin disinfo operations involve creating chaos and disorder, undermining the credibility of institutions that were once regarded as legitimate, including the media and journalists”, he said. The goal, ultimately, is “to take advantage of the turmoil”.

Becerra cautioned that Russian disinfo campaigns should not be read as single-purposed. “In one context, they may favour someone like Donald Trump and, in another, damage his reputation”.

openDemocracy has reached out to the Argentinian presidential office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the intelligence service SIDE, the Russian embassy, Shilov and the SVR for comment. None of them answered our questions.

* Sofía Álvarez Jurado and Santiago O’Donnell contributed to this investigation.

Investigative team for this series: Lydia Namubiru, Youri van der Weide, Sabrina Slipchenko, Emmanuel Freudenthal, Kiri Rupiah, Ira Dolinina, Léa Peruchon, Édouard Perrin, Katya Hakim, Diana Cariboni, Eloïse Layanand, Sofía Álvarez Jurado.

Partners: openDemocracy, The Continent, All Eyes on Wagner/INPACT, Forbidden Stories, iStories, Dossier Center.


This story was updated on 9 April 2026 to include answers provided by Ambito media outlet.

Exclusive: Agents linked to the Kremlin ‘paid’ for fake news by fake authors to be published by Argentine press

Do blue-blocking glasses improve sleep?

By: dynomight
3 July 2025 at 00:00

Back in 2017, everyone went crazy about these things:

goggles

The theory was that perhaps the pineal gland isn’t the principal seat of the soul after all. Maybe what it does is spit out melatonin to make you sleepy. But it only does that when it’s dark, and you spend your nights in artificial lighting and/or staring at your favorite glowing rectangles.

You could sit in darkness for three hours before bed, but that would be boring. But—supposedly—the pineal gland is only shut down by blue light. So if you selectively block the blue light, maybe you can sleep well and also participate in modernity.

Then, by around 2019, blue-blocking glasses seemed to disappear. And during that brief moment in the sun, I never got a clear picture of if they actually work.

So, do they? To find out, I read all the papers.

Light and eyes

Before getting to the papers, please humor me while I give three excessively-detailed reminders about how light works. First, it comes in different wavelengths.

Color Wavelength (nm)
violet 380–450
blue 450–485
cyan 485–500
green 500–565
yellow 565–590
orange 590–625
red 625–750

Outside the visible spectrum, infrared light and microwaves and radio waves have even longer wavelengths, while ultraviolet light and x-rays and gamma rays have even shorter wavelengths. Shorter wavelengths have more energy. Do not play around with gamma rays.

Other colors are hallucinations made up by your brain. When you get a mixture of all wavelengths, you see “white”. When you get a lot of yellow-red wavelengths, some green, and a little violet-blue, you see “brown”. Similar things are true for pink/purple/beige/olive/etc. (Technically, the original spectral colors and everything else you experience are also hallucinations made up by your brain, but never mind.)

Second, the ruleset of our universe says that all matter gives off light, with a mixture of wavelengths that depends on the temperature. Hotter stuff has atoms that are jostling around faster, so it gives off more total light, and shifts towards shorter (higher-energy) wavelengths. Colder stuff gives off less total light and shifts towards longer wavelengths. The “color temperature” of a lightbulb is the temperature some chunk of rock would have to be to produce the same visible spectrum. Here’s a figure, with the x-axis in kelvins.

The sun is around 5800 K. That’s both the physical temperature on the surface and the color temperature of its light. Annoyingly, the orange light that comes from cooler matter is often called “warm”, while the blueish light that comes from hotter matter is called “cool”. Don’t blame me.

Anyway, different light sources produce widely different spectra.

A graph of the combined plots of the emission spectra for different light sources.

You can’t sense most of those differences because you only have three types of cone cells. Rated color temperatures just reflect how much those cells are stimulated.

Your eyes probably see the frequencies they do because that’s where the sun’s spectrum is concentrated. In dim light, cones are inactive, so you rely on rod cells instead. You’ve only got one kind of rod, which is why you can’t see color in dim light. (Though you might not have noticed.)

Finally, amounts of light are typically measured in lux. Your eyes are amazing and can deal with upwards of 10 orders of magnitude.

Situation lux
Moonless overcast night 0.0001
Full moon 0.2
Very dark overcast day 100
Sunrise or sunset 400
Overcast day 1,000
Full daylight 20,000
Direct sunlight 50,000

In summary, you get widely varying amounts of different wavelengths of light in different situations, and the sun is very powerful. It’s reasonable to imagine your body might regulate its sleep schedule based that input.

Experiments

OK, but do blue-blocking glasses actually work? Let’s read some papers.

Kayumov

Kayumov et al. (2005) had 19 young healthy adults stay awake overnight for three nights, first with dim light (<5 lux) and then with bright light (800 lux), both with and without blue-blocking goggles. They measured melatonin in saliva each hour.

The goggles seemed to help a lot. With bright light, subjects only had around 25% as much melatonin as with dim light. Blue-blocking goggles restored that to around 85%.

I rate this as good evidence for a strong increase in melatonin. Sometimes good science is pretty simple.

Burkhart

Burkhart and Phelps (2009) first had 20 adults rate their sleep quality at home for a week as a baseline. Then, they were randomly given either blue-blocking glasses or yellow-tinted “placebo” glasses and told to wear them for 3 hours before sleep for two weeks.

Oddly, the group with blue-blocking glasses had much lower sleep quality during the baseline week, but this improved a lot over time.

I rate this as decent evidence for a strong improvement in sleep quality. I’d also like to thank the authors for writing this paper in something resembling normal human English.

Van der Lely

Van der Lely et al. (2014) had 13 teenage boys wear either blue-blocking glasses or clear glasses from 6pm to bedtime for one week, followed by the other glasses for a second week. Then they went to a lab, spent 2 hours in dim light, 30 minutes in darkness, and then 3 hours in front of an LED computer, all while wearing the glasses from the second week. Then they were asked to sleep, and their sleep quality was measured in various ways.

The boys had more melatonin and reported feeling sleepier with the blue-blocking glasses.

However, the sleep quality measurements show no real effect. They are all pretty close in the two groups, sometimes slightly better with the blue-blocking glasses and sometimes slightly worse.

I rate this as decent evidence for a moderate increase in melatonin, and weak evidence for near-zero effect on sleep quality.

Gabel

Gabel et al. (2017) took 38 adults and first put them through 40 hours of sleep deprivation under white light, then allowed them to sleep for 8 hours. Then they were subjected to 40 more hours of sleep deprivation under either white light (250 lux at 2800K), blue light (250 lux at 9000K), or very dim light (8 lux, color temperature unknown).

Their results are weird. In younger people, dim light led to more melatonin that white light, which led to more melatonin that blue light. That carried over to a tiny difference in sleepiness. But in older people, both those effects disappeared, and blue light even seemed to cause more sleepiness than white light. The cortisol and wrist activity measurements basically make no sense at all.

I rate this as decent evidence for a moderate effect on melatonin, and very weak evidence for a near-zero effect on sleep quality. (I think its decent evidence for a near-zero effect on sleepiness, but they didn’t actually measure sleep quality.)

Esaki

Esaki et al. (2017) gathered 20 depressed patients with insomnia. They first recorded their sleep quality for a week as a baseline, then were given either blue-blocking glasses or placebo glasses and told to wear them for another week starting at 8pm.

The changes in the blue-blocking group were a bit better for some measures, but a bit worse for others. Nothing was close to significant. Apparently 40% of patients complained that the glasses were painful, so I wonder if they all wore them as instructed.

I rate this was weak evidence for near-zero effect on sleep quality.

Shechter

Shechter et al. (2018) gave 14 adults with insomnia either blue-blocking or clear glasses and had them wear them for 2 hours before bedtime for one week. Then they waited four weeks and had them wear the other glasses for a second week. They measured sleep quality through diaries and wrist monitors.

The blue-blocking glasses seemed to help with everything. People fell asleep 5 to 12 minutes faster, and slept 30 to 50 minutes longer, depending on how you measure. (SOL is sleep onset latency, TST is total sleep time).

I rate this as good evidence for a strong improvement in sleep quality.

Knufinke

Knufinke et al. (2019) had 15 young adult athletes either wear blue-blocking glasses or transparent glasses for four nights.

The blue-blocking group did a little better on most measures (longer sleep time, higher sleep quality) but nothing was statistically significant.

I rate this as weak evidence for a small improvement in sleep quality.

Janků

Janků et al. (2019) took 30 patients with insomnia and had them all go to therapy. They randomly gave them either blue-blocking glasses or placebo glasses and asked the patients to wear them for 90 minutes before bed.

The results are pretty tangled. According to sleep diaries, total sleep time went up by 37 minutes in the blue-blocking group, but slightly decreased in the placebo group. The wrist monitors show total sleep time decreasing in both groups, but it did decrease less with the blue-blocking glasses. There’s no obvious improvement in sleep onset latency or the various questionnaires they used to measure insomnia.

I rate this as weak evidence for a moderate improvement in sleep quality.

Esaki (again)

Esaki et al. (2020) followed up on their 2017 experiment from above. This time, they gathered 43 depressed patients with insomnia. Again, they first recorded their sleep quality for a week as a baseline, then were given either blue-blocking glasses or placebo glasses and told to wear them for another week starting at 8pm.

The results were that subjective sleep quality seemed to improve more in the blue-blocking group. Total sleep time went down by 12.6 minutes in the placebo group, but increased by 1.1 minutes in the blue-blocking group. None of this was statistically significant, and all the other measurements are confusing. Here are the main results. I’ve added little arrows to show the “good” direction, if there is one.

These confidence intervals don’t make any sense to me. Are they blue-blocking minus placebo or the reverse? When the blue-blocking number is higher than placebo, sometimes the confidence interval is centered above zero (VAS), and sometimes it’s centered below zero (TST). What the hell?

Anyway, they also had a doctor estimate the clinical global impression for each patient, and this looked a bit better for the blue-blocking group. The doctor seemingly was blinded to the type of glasses the patients were wearing.

This is a tough one to rate. I guess I’ll call it weak evidence for a small improvement in sleep quality.

Guarana

Guarana et al. (2020) sent either blue-blocking glasses or sham glasses to 240 people, and asked them to wear them for at least two hours before bed. They then had them fill out some surveys about how much and how well they slept.

Wearing the blue-blocking glasses was positively correlated with both sleep quality and quantity with a correlation coefficient of around 0.20.

This paper makes me nervous. They never show the raw data, there seem to be huge dropout rates, and lots of details are murky. I can’t tell if the correlations they talk about weight all people equally, all surveys equally, or something else. That would make a huge difference if people dropped out more when they weren’t seeing improvements.

I rate this as weak evidence for a moderate effect on sleep. There’s a large sample, but I discount the results because of the above issues and/or my general paranoid nature.

Domagalik

Domagalik et al. (2020) had 48 young people wear either blue-blocking contact lenses or regular contact lenses for 4 weeks. They found no effect on sleepiness.

They also found that blocking blue light was harmful for attention and working memory.

I rate this as very weak evidence for near-zero effect on sleep. The experiment seems well-done, but it’s testing the effects of blocking blue light all the time, not just at night. Given the effects on attention and working memory, don’t do that.

Bigalke

Bigalke et al. (2021) had 20 healthy adults wear either blue-blocking glasses or clear glasses for a week from 6pm until bedtime, then switch to the other glasses for a second week. They measured sleep quality both through diaries (“Subjective”) and wrist monitors (“Objective”).

The differences were all small and basically don’t make any sense.

I rate this weak evidence for near-zero effect on sleep quality. Also, see how in the bottom pair of bar-charts, the y-axis on the left goes from 0 to 5, while on the right it goes from 30 to 50? Don’t do that, either.

See also

I also found a couple papers that are related, but don’t directly test what we’re interested in:

  • Appleman et al. (2013) either exposed people to different amounts of blue light at different times of day. Their results suggest that early-morning exposure to blue light might shift your circadian rhythm earlier.

  • Sasseville et al. (2015) had people stay awake from 11pm to 4am on two consecutive nights, while either wearing blue-blocking glasses or not. With the blue-blocking glasses there was more overall light to equalizing the total incoming energy. I can’t access this paper, but apparently they found no difference.

Drumroll

For a synthesis, I scored each of the measured effects according to this rubric:

Rating Meaning
↑↑↑ large increase
↑↑ moderate increase
↑ small increase
↔ no effect
↓ small decrease
↓↓ moderate decrease
↓↓↓ large decrease

And I scored the quality of evidence according to this one:

Rating Meaning
★☆☆☆☆ very weak evidence
★★☆☆☆ weak evidence
★★★☆☆ decent evidence
★★★★☆ good evidence
★★★★★ great evidence

Here are the results for the three papers that measured melatonin:

Study Effect on melatonin Quality of evidence
Kayumov ↑↑↑ ★★★★☆
Van der Lely ↑↑ ★★★☆☆
Gabel ↑ ★★★☆☆

And here are the results for the papers that measured sleep quality:

Study Effect on sleep Quality of evidence
Burkhart ↑↑↑ ★★★☆☆
Van der Lely ↔ ★★☆☆☆
Gabel ↔ ★☆☆☆☆
Esaki ↔ ★★☆☆☆
Shechter ↑↑↑ ★★★☆☆
Knufinke ↑ ★★☆☆☆
Janků ↑↑ ★★☆☆☆
Esaki (again) ↑ ★★☆☆☆
Guarana ↑↑ ★★☆☆☆
Domagalik ↔ ★☆☆☆☆
Bigalke ↔ ★★☆☆☆

We should adjust all that a bit because of publication bias and so on. But still, here are my final conclusions after staring at those tables:

  1. There is good evidence that blue-blocking glasses cause a moderate increase in melatonin. It could be large, or it could be small, but I’d say there’s an ~85% chance it’s not zero.

  2. There is decent evidence that blue-blocking glasses cause a small improvement in sleep quality. This could be moderate (or even large) or it could be zero. It might be inconsistent and hard to measure. But I’d say there’s an ~75% chance there is some positive effect.

I’ll be honest—I’m surprised.

So….

If those effects are real, do they warrant wearing stupid-looking glasses at night for the rest of your life? I guess that’s personal.

But surely the sane thing is not to block blue light with headgear, but to not create blue light in the first place. You can tell your glowing rectangles to block blue light at night, but lights are harder. Modern LED lightbulbs typically range in color temperature from 2700K for “warm” lighting to 5000 K for “daylight” bulbs. Judging from this animation that should reduce blue frequencies to around 1/3 as much.

Old-school incandescent bulbs are 2400 K. But to really kill blue, you probably want 2000K or even less. There are obscure LED bulbs out there as low as 1800K. They look extremely orange, but candles are apparently 1850K, so probably you’d get used to it?

So what do we do then? Get two sets of lamps with different bulbs? Get fancy bulbs that change color temperature automatically? Whatever it is, I don’t feel very optimistic that we’re going to see a lot of RCTs where researchers have subjects install an entire new lighting setup in their homes.

How much information is in DNA?

By: dynomight
8 May 2025 at 00:00

This is an article that just appeared in Asimov Press, who kindly agreed that I could publish it here and also humored my deep emotional need to use words like “Sparklepuff”.


Do you like information theory? Do you like molecular biology? Do you like the idea of smashing them together and seeing what happens? If so, then here’s a question: How much information is in your DNA?

When I first looked into this question, I thought it was simple:

  1. Human DNA has about 3.1 billion base pairs.
  2. Each base pair can take one of four values (A, T, C, or G)
  3. It takes 2 bits to encode one of four possible values (00, 01, 10, or 11)
  4. Thus, human DNA contains 6.2 billion bits.

Easy, right? Sure, except:

  1. You have two versions of each base pair, one from each of your parents. Should you count both?
  2. All humans have almost identical DNA. Does that matter?
  3. DNA can be compressed. Should you look at the compressed representation?
  4. It’s not clear how much of our DNA actually does something useful. The insides of your cells are a convulsing pandemonium of interacting “hacks”, designed to keep working even as mutations constantly screw around with the DNA itself. Should we only count the “useful” parts?

Such questions quickly run into the limits of knowledge for both biology and computer science. To answer them, we need to figure out what exactly we mean by “information” and how that’s related to what’s happening inside cells. In attempting that, I will lead you through a frantic tour of information theory and molecular biology. We’ll meet some strange characters, including genomic compression algorithms based on deep learning, retrotransposons, and Kolmogorov complexity.

Ultimately, I’ll argue that the intuitive idea of information in a genome is best captured by a new definition of a “bit”—one that’s unknowable with our current level of scientific knowledge.

On counting

What is “information”? This isn’t just a pedantic question, as there are actually several different mathematical definitions of a “bit”. Often, the differences don’t matter, but for DNA, they turn out to matter a lot, so let’s start with the simplest.

In the storage space definition, a bit is a “slot” in which you can store one of two possible values. If some object can represent 2ⁿ possible patterns, then it contains n bits, regardless of which pattern actually happens to be stored.

So here’s a question we can answer precisely: How much information could your DNA store?

A few reminders: DNA is a polymer. It’s a long chain of chunks of ~40 atoms called “nucleotides”. There are four different chunks, commonly labeled A, T, C, and G. In humans, DNA comes in 23 pieces of different lengths, called “chromosomes”. Humans are “diploid”, meaning we have two versions of each chromosome. We get one from each of our parents, made by randomly weaving together sections from the two chromosomes they got from their parents.

At least, that's true for the first 22 chromosomes. For the last, females have two "X" chromosomes, while males have one "X" and one "Y" chromosome. There's no mixing between these, so men pass on one to their children pretty much unchanged.

Technically there’s also a tiny amount of DNA in the mitochondria. This is neat because you get it from your mother basically unchanged and so scientists can trace tiny mutations back to see how our great-great-…-great grandmothers were all related. If you go far enough back, our maternal lines all lead to a single woman, Mitochondrial Eve, who probably lived in East Africa 120,000 to 156,000 years ago. But mitochondrial DNA is tiny so I won’t mention it again.

karyotype

Chromosomes 1-22 have a total of 2.875 billion nucleotides; the X chromosome has 156 million, and the Y chromosome has 62 million. From here, we can calculate the total storage space in your DNA. Remember, each nucleotide has 4 options, corresponding to 2 bits. So if you’re female, your total storage space is:

  (2×2875 + 2×156) million nucleotides
     × 2 bits / nucleotide
     = 12.12 billion bits
     = 1.51 GB.

If you’re male, the total storage space is:

  (2×2875 + 156 + 62) million nucleotides
     × 2 bits / nucleotide
     = 11.94 billion bits
     = 1.49 GB.

For comparison, a standard single-layer DVD can store 37.6 billion bits or 4.7 GB. The code for your body, magnificent as it is, takes up as much space as around 40 minutes of standard definition video.

So in principle, your DNA could represent around 212,000,000,000 different patterns. But hold on. Given human common ancestry, the chromosome pair you got from your mother is almost identical to the one you got from your father. And even ignoring that, there are long sequences of nucleotides that are repeated over and over in your DNA, enough to make up a significant fraction of the total. It seems weird to count all this repeated stuff. So perhaps we want a more nuanced definition of “information.”

On compression

A string of 12 billion zeros is much longer than this article. But most people would (I hope) agree that this article contains more information than a string of 12 billion zeros. Why?

One of the fundamental ideas from information theory is to define information in terms of compression. Roughly speaking, the “information” in some string is the length of the shortest possible compressed representation of that string.

So how much can you compress DNA? Answers to this question are all over the place. Some people claim it can be compressed by more than 99 percent, while others claim the state of the art is only around 25 percent. This discrepancy is explained by different definitions of “compression”, which turn out to correspond to different notions of “information”.

If you pick any two random people on Earth, almost all of their DNA will be exactly the same. It's often said that people are 99.9 percent genetically identical, but this is wrong—it only measures substitutions and neglects things like insertions, deletions, and transpositions. If you account for all these things, the best estimate is that we are ~99.6 percent identical.

Fun facts: Because of these deletions and insertions, different people have slightly different amounts of DNA. In fact, each of your chromosome pairs have DNA of slightly different lengths. When your body creates sperm/ova it uses a crazy machine to align the chromosomes in a sensible way so different sections can be woven together without creating nonsense. Also, those same measures of similarity would say that we’re around 96 percent identical with our closest living cousins, the bonobos and chimpanzees.

The fact that we share so much DNA is key to how some algorithms can compress DNA by more than 99 percent. They do this by first storing a reference genome, which includes all the DNA that’s shared by all people and perhaps the most common variants for regions of DNA where people differ. Then, for each individual person, these algorithms only store the differences from the reference genome. Because that reference only has to be stored once, it isn’t counted in the compressed representation.

That’s great if you want to cram as many of your friends’ genomes on a hard drive as possible. But it’s a strange definition to use if you want to measure the “information content of DNA”. It implies that any genomic content that doesn’t change between individuals isn’t important enough to count as “information”. However, we know from evolutionary biology that it’s often the most crucial DNA that changes the least precisely because it’s so important. Heritability tends to be lower for genes more closely related to reproduction.

The best compression without a reference seems to be around 25 percent. (I expect this number to rise a bit over time, as the newest methods use deep learning and research is ongoing.) That’s not a lot of compression. However, these algorithms are benchmarked in terms of how well they compress a genome that includes only one copy of each chromosome. Since your two chromosomes are almost identical (at least, ignoring the Y chromosome), I’d guess that you could represent the other half almost for free, meaning a compression rate of around 50 percent + ½ × 25 percent ≈ 62 percent.

On information

So if you compress DNA using an algorithm with a reference genome, it can be compressed by more than 99 percent, down to less than 120 million bits. But if you compress it without a reference genome, the best you can do is 62 percent, meaning 4.6 billion bits.

Which of these is right? The answer is that either could be right. There are two different definitions of a “bit” in information theory that correspond to different types of compression.

In the Kolmogorov complexity definition, named after the remarkable Soviet mathematician Andrey Kolmogorov, a bit is a property of a particular string of 1s and 0s. The number of bits of information in the string is the length of the shortest computer program that would output that string.

In the Shannon information definition, named after the also-remarkable American polymath Claude Shannon, a bit is again a property of a particular sequence of 1s and 0s, but it’s only defined relative to some large pool of possible sequences. In this definition, if a given sequence has a probability p of occurring, then it contains n bits for whatever value of n satisfies 2ⁿ=1/p. Or, equivalently, n=-log₂ p.

The Kolmogorov complexity definition is clearly related to compression. But what about Shannon’s?

Well, say you have three beloved pet rabbits, Fluffles, Marmalade, and Sparklepuff. And say you have one picture of each of them, each 1 MB large when compressed. To keep me updated on how you’re feeling, you like to send me these same pictures over and over again, with different pets for different moods. You send a picture of Fluffles ½ the time, Marmalade ¼ of the time, and Sparklepuff ¼ of the time. (You only communicate in rabbit pictures, never with text or images.)

But then you decide to take off in a spacecraft, and your data rates go way up. Continuing the flow of pictures is crucial, so what’s the cheapest way to do that? The best thing would be that we agree that if you send me a 0, I should pull up the picture of Fluffles, while if you send 10 I should pull up Marmalade, and if you send 11, I should pull up Sparklepuff. This is unambiguous: If you send 0011100, that means Fluffles, then Fluffles again, then Sparklepuff, then Marmalade, then Fluffles one more time.

It all works out. The “code length” for Fluffles is the number n so that 2ⁿ=1/p:

pet probability p code code length n 2ⁿ 1/p
Fluffles ½ 0 1 2 2
Marmelade ¼ 10 2 4 4
Sparklepuff ¼ 11 2 4 4

Intuitively, the idea is that if you want to send as few bits as possible over time, then you should give short codes to high-probability patterns and long codes to low-probability patterns. If you do this optimally (in the sense that you’ll send the fewest bits over time), it turns out that the best thing is to code a pattern with probability p with about n bits, where 2ⁿ=p. (In general, things don’t work out quite this nicely, but you get the idea.)

In the Fluffles scenario, the Kolmogorov complexity definition would say that each of the images contains 1 MB of information since that’s the smallest each image can be compressed. But under the Shannon information definition, the Fluffles image contains 1 bit of information, and the Marmalade and Sparklepuff images contain 2 bits. This is quite a difference!

Now, let’s return to DNA. There, the Kolmogorov complexity definition basically corresponds to the best possible compression algorithm without a reference. As we saw above, the best-known current algorithm can compress by 62 percent. So, under the Kolmogorov complexity definition, DNA contains at most 12 billion × (1-0.62) ≈ 4.6 billion bits of information.

Meanwhile, under the Shannon information definition, you can assume that the distribution of all human genomes is known. The information in your DNA only includes the bits needed to reconstruct your genome. That’s essentially the same as compressing with a reference. So, under the Shannon information definition, your DNA contains less than 12 billion × (1-0.01) ≈ 120 million bits of information.

While neither of these is “wrong” for DNA, I prefer the Kolmogorov complexity definition for its ability to best capture DNA that codes for features and functions shared by all humans. After all, if you’re trying to measure how much “information” our DNA carries from our evolutionary history, surely you want to include that which has been universally preserved.

On biology

At some point, your high-school biology teacher probably told you (or will tell you) this story about how life works:

  1. First, your DNA gets transcribed into matching RNA.

  2. Next, that RNA gets translated into protein.

  3. Then the protein does Protein Stuff.

If things were that simple, we could easily calculate the information density of DNA just by looking at what fraction of your DNA ever becomes a protein (only around 1 percent). But it’s not that simple. The rest of your DNA does other important things, like regulating what proteins get made. Some of it seems to exist only for the purpose of copying itself. Some of it might do nothing, or it might do important things we don’t even know about yet.

So let me tell you that story again with slightly more detail:

  1. In the beginning, your DNA is relaxing in the nucleus.

  2. Some parts of your DNA, called promoters, are designed so that if certain proteins are nearby, they’ll stick to the DNA.

  3. If that happens, then a hefty little enzyme called “RNA polymerase” will show up, crack open the two strands of DNA, and start transcribing the nucleotides on one side into “pre-messenger RNA” (pre-mRNA).

  4. Eventually, for one of several reasons—none of which make any sense to me—the enzyme will decide it’s time to stop transcribing, and the pre-mRNA will detach and float off into the nucleus. At this point, it’s a few thousand or a few tens of thousands of nucleotides long.

  5. Then, my personal favorite macromolecular complex, the “spliceosome”, grabs the pre-mRNA, cuts away most of it, and throws those parts away. The sections of DNA that code for the parts that are kept are called exons, while the sections that code for parts that are thrown away are called introns.

  6. Next, another enzyme called “RNA guanylyltransferase” (we can’t all be beautiful) adds a “cap” to one end, and an enzyme called “poly(A) polymerase” adds a “tail” to the other end.

  7. The pre-mRNA is now all grown up and has graduated to being regular mRNA. At this point, it is a few hundred or a few thousand nucleotides long.

  8. Then, some proteins notice that the mRNA has a tail, grab it, and throw it out of the nucleus into the cytoplasm, where the noble ribosome lurks.

  9. The ribosome grabs the mRNA and turns it into a protein. It does this by starting at one end and looking at chunks of three nucleotides at a time, called "codons". When it sees a certain "start" pattern, it starts translating each chunk into one of 20 amino acids and continues until it sees a chunk with a "stop" pattern.Since there are 4 kinds of nucleotides, there are 4³=64 possible chunks, while your body only uses 20 amino acids. So the ribosome, logically, gives some amino acids (like leucine) six different codons, and others (like tryptophan) only one codon. Also there are three different stop codons, but only one start codon, and that start codon is also the codon for methionine. So all proteins have methionine at one end unless something else comes and removes it later. Biology is layer after layer of this kind of exasperating complexity, totally indifferent to your desire to understand it.
  10. The resulting protein lives happily ever after.

It’s thought that ~1 percent of your DNA is exons and ~24 percent is introns. What’s the rest of it doing?

Well, while the above dance is happening, other sections of DNA are “regulating” it. Enhancers are regions of DNA where a certain protein can bind and cause the DNA to physically bend so that some promoter somewhere else (typically within a million nucleotides) is more likely to get activated. Silencers do the opposite. Insulators block enhancers and silencers from influencing regions they shouldn’t influence.

While that might sound complicated, we’re just warming up. The same region of DNA can be both an intron and an enhancer and/or a silencer. That’s right, in the middle of the DNA that codes for some protein, evolution likes to put DNA that regulates some other, distant protein. When it’s not regulating, it gets transcribed into (probably useless) pre-RNA and then cut away and recycled by the spliceosome.

There's also structural DNA that's needed to physically manipulate the chromosomes. Centromeres are "attachment points" used when copying DNA during cell division. Telomeres are "extra" DNA at the ends of the chromosomes.

Telomeres shrink as we age. The body has mechanisms to re-lengthen them, but it mostly only uses these in stem cells and reproductive cells. Longevity folks are interested in activating these mechanisms in other tissues to fight aging, but this is risky since the body seems to intentionally limit telomere repair as a strategy to prevent cancer cells from growing out of control.

Further complicating this picture are many regions of DNA that code for RNA that’s never translated into a protein but still has some function. Some regions make tRNA, whose job is to bring amino acids to the ribosome. Other regions make rRNA, which bundle together with some proteins to become the ribosome. There’s siRNA, microRNA, and piRNA that screw around with mRNA produced. And there’s scaRNA, snoRNA, rRNA, lncRNA, and mrRNA. Many more types are sure to be defined in the future, both because it’s hard to know for sure if DNA gets transcribed, it’s hard to know what functions RNA might have, and because academics have strong incentives to invent ever-finer subcategories.

There are also pseudogenes. These are regions of DNA that almost make proteins, but not quite. Sometimes, this happens because they lack a promoter, so they never get transcribed into mRNA. Other times, they might lack a start codon, so after their mRNA makes it to the ribosome, it never actually starts making a protein. Then, there are instances when the DNA has an early stop codon or a "frameshift" mutation meaning the alignment of the RNA into chunks of three gets screwed up. In these cases, the ribosome will often detect that something is wrong and call for help to destroy the protein. In other cases, a short protein is made that doesn't do anything.

In more serious cases, these mutations might make the organism non-viable, or lead to problems like Tay-Sachs disease or Cystic fibrosis. But this wouldn’t be considered a pseudogene.

On messiness

Why? Why is this all such a mess? Why is it so hard to say if a given section of DNA does anything useful?

Biologists hate “why” questions. We can’t re-run evolution, so how can we say “why” evolution did things the way it did? Better to focus on how biological systems actually work. This is probably wise. But since I’m not a biologist (or wise), I’ll give my theory: Cells work like this because DNA is under constant attack from mutations.

Mutations most commonly arise during cell replication. Your DNA is composed of around 250 billion atoms. Making a perfect copy of all those atoms is hard. Your body has amazing nanomachines with many redundant mechanisms to try to correct errors, and it’s estimated that the error rate is less than one per billion nucleotides. But with several billion nucleotides, mutations happen.

There are also environmental sources of mutations. Ultraviolet light has more energy than visible light. If it hits your skin, that energy can sort of knock atoms out of place. The same thing happens if you’re exposed to radiation. Certain chemicals, like formaldehyde, benzene, or asbestos, can also do this or can interfere with your body’s error correction tricks.

Finally, we return to the huge fraction of your DNA (~50-60 percent) that is repeats of the same sequences. Some of this is caused by the machinery "slipping" while making a copy, leading to a loss or repetition of some DNA. There are also little sections of DNA called "transposons" that sort of trick your machinery into making another copy of those sections and then inserting them somewhere else in the genome.

“DNA transposons” get cut out and stuck back in somewhere else, while “retrotransposons” create RNA that’s designed to get reverse-transcribed back into the DNA in another location. There are also “retroviruses” like HIV that contain RNA that they insert into the genome. Some people theorize that retrotransposons can evolve into retroviruses and vice-versa.

It’s rare for retrotransposons to actually succeed in making a copy of themselves. They seem to have only a 1 in 100,000 or in 1,000,000 chance of copying themselves during cell division. But this is perhaps 10 times as high in the germ line, so the sperm from older men is more likely to contain such mutations.

Mutations in your regular cells will just affect you, but mutations in your sperm/eggs could affect all future generations. Evolution helps manage this through selection. Say you have 10 bad mutations, and I have 10 bad mutations, but those mutations are in different spots. If we have some babies together, some of them might get 13 bad mutations, but some might only get 7, and the latter babies are more likely to pass on their genes.

But as well as selection, cells seem designed to be extremely robust to these kinds of errors. Instead of just relying on selection, there are many redundant mechanisms to tolerate them without much issue.

And remember, evolution is a madman. If it decides to tolerate some mutation, everything else will be optimized against it. So even if a mutation is harmful at first, evolution may later find a way to make use of it.

On information again

So, in theory, how should we define the “information content” of DNA? I propose a definition I call the “phenotypic Kolmogorov complexity”. (This has surely been proposed by someone before, but I can’t find a reference, try as I might.) Roughly speaking, this is how short you could make DNA and still get a “human”.

The “phenotype” of an animal is just a fancy way of referring to its “observable physical characteristics and behaviors”. So this definition says, like Kolmogorov complexity, to try and find the shortest compressed representation of the DNA. But instead of needing to lead to the same DNA you have, it just needs to lead to an embryo that would look and behave like you do.

infographic

The idea is this: Take a single-cell human embryo with your DNA, and imagine all the different ways you can modify the DNA. This would include not only removing useless sections but also moving things around. Limit yourself to changes that still lead to a "person" that would still look like you and have all the same capabilities you do. Now, compress each of those representations. The smallest compressed representation is the "information" in your DNA.

This definition isn’t totally precise, because I’m not saying how precisely the phenotype needs to match. Even if there’s some completely useless section of DNA and we remove it, that would make all your cells a tiny bit lighter. We need to tolerate some level of approximation. The idea is that it should be very close, but it’s hard to make this precise.

So what would this number be? My guess is that you could reduce the amount of DNA by at least 75 percent, but not by more than 98 percent, meaning the information content is:

  12 billion bits
     × 2 bits / nucleotide
     × (2 to 25 percent)
     = 480 million to 6 billion bits
     = 60 MB to 750 MB

But in reality, nobody knows. We still have no idea what (if anything) lots of DNA is doing, and we’re a long way from fully understanding how much it can be reduced. Probably, no one will know for a long time.

So much blood

By: dynomight
5 May 2025 at 00:00

In a recent post about trading stuff for money, I mentioned:

Europe had a [blood plasma] shortage of around 38%, which it met by importing plasma from paid donors in the United States, where blood products account for 2% of all exports by value.

The internet’s reaction was: “TWO PERCENT?” “TWO PERCENT OF U.S. EXPORTS ARE BLOOD!?”

Well, I took that 2% number from a 2024 article in the Economist:

Last year American blood-product exports accounted for 1.8% of the country’s total goods exports, up from just 0.5% a decade ago—and were worth $37bn. That makes blood the country’s ninth-largest goods export, ahead of coal and gold. All told, America now supplies 70% or so of the plasma used to make medicine.

I figured the Economist was trustworthy on matters of economics. But note:

  1. That 1.8% number is for blood products, not just blood.
  2. It’s a percentage of goods exported, excluding services.
  3. It’s wrong.

The article doesn’t explain how they arrived at 1.8%. And since the Economist speaks in the voice of God (without bylines), I can’t corner and harass the actual journalist. I’d have liked to reverse-engineer their calculations, but this was impossible since the world hasn’t yet caught on that they should always show lots of digits.

So what’s the right number? In 2023, total US goods exports were $2,045 billion, almost exactly ⅔ of all exports, including services.

How much of that involves blood? Well, the government keeps statistics on trade based on an insanely detailed classification scheme. All goods get some number. For example, dirigibles fall under HTS 8801.90.0000:

Leg warmers fall under HTS 6406.99.1530:

leg warmers

So what about blood? Well, HTS 3002 is the category for:

Human blood; animal blood prepared for therapeutic, prophylactic or diagnostic uses; antisera and other blood fractions and modified immunological products, whether or not obtained by means of biotechnological processes; vaccines, toxins, cultures of micro-organisms (excluding yeasts) and similar products:

The total exports in this category in 2023 were 41.977 billion, or 2.05% of all goods exports. But that category includes many products that don’t require human blood such as most vaccines.

To get the actual data, you need to go through a website maintained by the US Trade Commission. This website has good and bad aspects. On the one hand, it’s slow and clunky and confusing and often randomly fails to deliver any results. On the other hand, when you re-submit, it clears your query and then blocks you for submitting too many requests, which is nice.

But after a lot of tearing of hair, I got what seems to be the most detailed breakdown of that category available. There are some finer subcategories in the taxonomy, but they don’t seem to have any data.

So let’s go through those categories. To start, here are some that would seem to almost always contain human blood:

Category Description Exports ($) Percentage of US goods exports
3002.12.00.10 HUMAN BLOOD PLASMA 5,959,103,120 0.2914%
3002.12.00.20 NORMAL HUMAN BLOOD SERA, WHETHER OR NOT FREEZE-DRIED 38,992,251 0.0019%
3002.12.00.30 HUMAN IMMUNE BLOOD SERA 5,608,090 0.0003%
3002.12.00.90 ANTISERA AND OTHER BLOOD FRACTIONS 4,808,069,119 0.2351%
3002.90.52.10 WHOLE HUMAN BLOOD 22,710,898 0.0011%
TOTAL (YES BLOOD) 10,834,483,478 0.5298%

Next, there are several categories that would seem to essentially never contain human blood:

Category Description Exports ($) Percentage of US goods exports
3002.12.00.40 FETAL BOVINE SERUM (FBS) 146,026,727 0.0071%
3002.42.00.00 VACCINES FOR VETERINARY MEDICINE 638,191,743 0.0312%
3002.49.00.00 VACCINES, TOXINS, CULTURES OF MICRO-ORGANISMS EXCLUDING YEASTS, AND SIMILAR PRODUCTS, NESOI 1,630,036,341 0.0797%
3002.59.00.00 CELL CULTURES, WHETHER OR NOT MODIFIED, NESOI 79,384,134 0.0039%
3002.90.10.00 FERMENTS 361,418,233 0.0177%
TOTAL (NO BLOOD) 2,869,107,296 0.1403%

Finally, there are categories that include some products that might contain human blood:

Category Description Exports ($) Percentage of US goods exports
3002.13.00.00 IMMUNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, UNMIXED, NOT PUT UP IN MEASURED DOSES OR IN FORMS OR PACKINGS FOR RETAIL SALE 624,283,112 0.0305%
3002.14.00.00 IMMUNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, MIXED, NOT PUT UP IN MEASURED DOSES OR IN FORMS OR PACKINGS FOR RETAIL SALE 5,060,866,208 0.2475%
3002.15.01.00 IMMUNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, PUT UP IN MEASURED DOSES OR IN FORMS OR PACKINGS FOR RETAIL SALE 13,317,356,469 0.6512%
3002.41.00.00 VACCINES FOR HUMAN MEDICINE, NESOI 7,760,695,744 0.3795%
3002.51.00.00 CELL THERAPY PRODUCTS 595,963,010 0.0291%
3002.90.52.50 HUMAN BLOOD; ANIMAL BLOOD PREPARED FOR THERAPEUTIC, PROPHYLATIC OR DIAGNOSTIC USES; ANTISERA AND OTHER BLOOD FRACTIONS, ETC. NESOI 914,348,561 0.0447%
TOTAL (MAYBE BLOOD) 28,273,513,104 1.3826%

The biggest contributor here is IMMUNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (be they MIXED or UNMIXED, PUT UP or NOT PUT UP). The largest fraction of these is probably antibodies.

Antibodies are sometimes made from human blood. You may remember that in 2020, some organizations collected human blood from people who’d recovered from Covid to make antibodies. But it’s important to stress that this is quite rare. Human blood, after all, is expensive. So—because capitalism—whenever possible animals are used instead, often rabbits, goats, sheep, or humanized mice.

I can’t find any hard statistics on this. But I know several people who work in this industry. So I asked them to just guess what fraction might include human blood. Biologists don’t like numbers, so this took a lot of pleading, but my best estimate is 8%.

When looking at similar data a few years ago, Market Design suggested that immunoglobulin products might also fall under this category. But as far as I can tell this is not true. I looked up the tariff codes for a few immunoglobulin products, and they all seem to fall under 3002.90 (“HUMAN BLOOD; ANIMAL BLOOD PREPARED FOR THERAPEUTIC, PROPHYLATIC OR DIAGNOSTIC USES; ANTISERA AND OTHER BLOOD FRACTIONS, ETC. NESOI”).

What about vaccines or cell therapy products? These almost never contain human blood. But they are sometimes made by growing human cell lines, and sometimes those cell lines require human blood serum to grow. More pleading with the biologists produced a guess that this is true for 5% of vaccines and 80% of cell therapies.

Aside: Even if they do require blood serum, it’s somewhat debatable if they should count as “blood products”. How far down the supply chain does that classification apply? If I make cars, and one of my employees gets injured and needs a blood transfusion, are my cars now “blood products”?

Anyway, here’s my best guess for the percentage of products in this middle category that use human blood:

Category Description Needs blood (guess) Exports ($) Percentage of US goods exports
3002.13.00.00 IMMUNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, UNMIXED, NOT PUT UP IN MEASURED DOSES OR IN FORMS OR PACKINGS FOR RETAIL SALE 8% 49,942,648 0.0024%
3002.14.00.00 IMMUNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, MIXED, NOT PUT UP IN MEASURED DOSES OR IN FORMS OR PACKINGS FOR RETAIL SALE 8% 404,869,296 0.0198%
3002.15.01.00 IMMUNOLOGICAL PRODUCTS, PUT UP IN MEASURED DOSES OR IN FORMS OR PACKINGS FOR RETAIL SALE 8% 1,065,388,517 0.0521%
3002.41.00.00 VACCINES FOR HUMAN MEDICINE, NESOI 5% 388,034,787 0.0190%
3002.51.00.00 CELL THERAPY PRODUCTS 80% 476,770,408 0.0233%
3002.90.52 HUMAN BLOOD; ANIMAL BLOOD PREPARED FOR THERAPEUTIC, PROPHYLATIC OR DIAGNOSTIC USES; ANTISERA AND OTHER BLOOD FRACTIONS, ETC. NESOI 90% 822,913,704 0.0402%
TOTAL (GUESSED BLOOD)   3,207,919,363 0.1569%

So 0.5298% of goods exports almost certainly use blood, and my best guess is that another 0.1569% of exports also include blood, for a total of 0.6867%.

Obviously, this is a rough cut. But I couldn’t find any other source that shows their work in any detail, so I hoped that by publishing this I could at least prod Cunningham’s law into action. Sorry for all the numbers.

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