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Social Media When Elections Are Close: Doing the Impossible Better

Everyone knows, or should, that perfect (balanced, targeted, transparent, swift and swiftly appealable) content moderation at scale is impossible. That doesn’t mean powerful social platforms don’t have to try to get at least reasonably close, especially when access to good information can have a profound effect on political participation and speech.

That’s why so many people, including the Meta Oversight Board, criticized Meta for suspending a major political Instagram account for hours during a huge early voting push on October 17; and for allegedly boosting one candidate in Brazil’s recent presidential election. Meta denies deliberate interference in either instance, blaming “mistakes” in its automated content moderation systems (including AI tools that can’t tell the difference between enthusiastic follower engagement and a bot attack).

Mistakes or not, with early voting in the U.S. midterms already underway, these events serve as a stark reminder that all major social media platforms need to have stronger systems in place to ensure that they serve, rather than impede, democratic communication.

Access to good information can have a profound effect on political participation and speech.

This is not inherently an “AI” problem: automated systems can process content at a scale that humans never could, potentially enabling better moderation at scale and alleviating the psychological load on ill-paid moderators whose jobs require them to view incredibly disturbing content. But automated systems also reproduce existing biases, struggle to understand context, and often make mistakes that disproportionately affect journalists, activists, artists, and other vulnerable and marginalized communities. And moderation errors are even more likely when the language is spoken principally by the global majority. In 2020, leaked documents showed that Meta’s algorithms incorrectly deleted nonviolent Arabic-language content 77 percent of the time, while failing to detect hate speech under the company’s own policies in many instances. Where these systems are faltering in Arabic, they’re positively failing in less-resourced languages. As a 2025 report from the Center for Democracy and Technology found, labeled datasets in certain languages and dialects such as Maghrebi Arabic and Kiswahili contain inconsistencies, bias, and inaccuracies due to the limited hiring of annotators who actually speak the languages as well as shifts in the languages themselves. An investigation into ChatGPT’s outputs in several low-resource languages demonstrates the depth of problem.

But language disparities are just one of several concerns as automated moderation becomes more widespread. From the systemic suppression of content from Palestine to the repeated misclassification of LGBTQ+ content as adult or explicit material, these varied examples demonstrate the risks of overreliance on automated moderation—and the need for stronger safeguards.

Fortunately, there is a great deal companies, policymakers, and civil society can do to help ensure that highly automated systems operate in ways that respect human rights, minimize predictable harms, and provide meaningful accountability when they fail. If companies are going to continue relying on automation to moderate users’ speech—and there is little reason to believe they won’t—then accountability must evolve alongside these technologies.

That work should start with publicly committing to the Santa Clara Principles 2.0. Specifically:

  1. Automated technologies should help, not replace, human moderators. For example, automated systems can help flag and prioritize content for review, while humans can interpret context, handle sensitive cases, and refine system performance. This investment is particularly important during the weeks immediately before and after an election.
  2. Companies must be transparent about when and how automation is used in content decisions.
  3. Companies must regularly audit their automated systems for bias, with particular attention to low-resource languages, vulnerable and marginalized communities, and conflict zones.
  4. Companies should strengthen personal data protection guarantees and policies. Automated content moderation often relies on personal data and profiling, so companies should think carefully about what data these systems use, what's necessary and proportionate and how their systems shape moderation outcomes.
  5. Users must have the ability to appeal, and to provide context when they believe human or automated moderation decisions have wrongfully removed their content. Appeals should be promptly evaluated and decided by human moderators.
  6. Companies should regularly assess the human rights impact of their moderation decisions, and issue public statements of the results
  7. If they rely on third-party vendors, companies should carefully (and regularly) audit those vendors for compliance with these same principles
  8. Lawmakers should avoid promoting and passing legislation that effectively or explicitly mandates automated moderation systems
  9. Policymakers should also refrain from attempting to dictate platforms technical and design choices to favor or disfavor particular expression.
  10. Policymakers should work to educate the public about how their personal data may be collected and used in electoral contexts.

These recommendations understand that automated content moderation isn’t just a technical problem for clever engineers and product teams to solve. Because content moderation shapes public discourse and fundamental rights, its design and oversight must respond to the concerns of policymakers, civil society, independent researchers, and the communities most affected by these systems.

One other distinct and enduring problem makes transparency, checks, and accountability all the more urgent: too few companies have far too much power over our political communication and organizing. Social media gave people the ability to wrest some control over political messaging away from media oligopolies. But we’ve met the new boss and while it’s not the same as the old boss, the song is pretty familiar. The real promise of the web to democratize communication is not likely to be met by social media oligarchs, no matter how sophisticated their content moderation practice.

French Court’s Site-Blocking Orders Drive Quad9 Out Of France

A nonprofit service that protects internet users’ privacy is leaving France. Quad9, a free DNS resolver, has said it will reluctantly stop serving users in France on November 24. This follows a French court order that Quad9 must block access to websites that are accused of infringing the copyrights of a sports broadcaster. Forcing a responsible privacy service out of an important market is a predictable result of trying to force infrastructure providers to be copyright police.

When you visit a website, a DNS resolver reads the domain name you type in—like eff.org— and translates it into a numerical IP address that’s used to direct data across the internet. A DNS resolver can see the names of websites you connect to, so its privacy policies are important. Quad9 is an NGO that’s incorporated in Switzerland, in part to protect its users from data demands. The company also helps protect users from malware and phishing by blocking domains that are known to be malicious. Services like Quad9 offer an alternative to the DNS resolvers of local internet service providers and wireless carriers, which are vulnerable to demands from law enforcement, censorship, and commercial surveillance.

In a blog post explaining its decision, Quad9 explains that the French court’s order forces it to make a decision that, either way, is bad for users. It could either “extend French law to the whole world (blocking globally)” or try to identify and block users only in France—something that it can’t do reliably, and a move that could leave the company facing massive fines if it fails to block websites perfectly within France. Quad9 says it is facing about 20 other lawsuits in France seeking similar blocking orders. 

Rather than accept these demands, Quad9 has decided to withdraw its service from France. That is a real loss for French users who rely on the service to protect their privacy and security. It is also the right thing to do, when faced with the alternative: making promises it can’t keep, or abandoning users’ rights worldwide. 

Quad9’s decision will not remove any allegedly infringing material from the internet. The organization doesn’t host websites. Users looking for particular websites can  easily switch to another DNS resolver. So the material targeted by copyright holders will remain online and accessible, even while they drive a privacy-protecting service out of France. 

These events matter beyond the borders of France, and U.S. lawmakers should pay attention. Congress is considering multiple site-blocking proposals, which would require ISPs and other intermediaries, including DNS resolvers, to block access to websites in the name of protecting copyright. These bills threaten speech and our ability to access information online, and they are invitations to abuse. The Quad9 withdrawal shows another cost: if internet services get forced into being copyright cops, users can lose services that they rely on for privacy and security. 

Worse still, if neutral services like Quad9 are forced to build site-blocking systems for the benefit of copyright holders, it becomes far easier for other powerful interests, including repressive governments, to demand the same systems be used to censor speech they dislike, globally. 

Congress should reject site-blocking bills. They’re a threat to the open internet, and don’t help creators or creativity. 

War as a Pretext: Gulf States Are Tightening the Screws on Speech—Again

War does not only reshape borders. It also reshapes what can be seen, said, and remembered. 

When governments invoke “misinformation” during wartime, they often mean something simpler: speech they do not control. Since the escalation of conflict between the United States, Israel, Iran, and related spillover attacks in the Gulf, several governments have intensified efforts to silence dissent and restrict the flow of information.

Journalism under pressure

For journalists, the space to operate—already constrained in much of the Gulf—is narrowing further. Across the region, several countries (including the UAE, Qatar, and Jordan) have restricted access to conflict areas, warned of legal consequences for publishing footage, and drawn red lines around wartime reporting. These measures weaken independent coverage, elevate official narratives, and make it harder for the public to get an accurate account of events on the ground.

Reporters Without Borders has documented an intensifying crackdown on journalists across Gulf countries and Jordan, including restrictions on reporting, legal threats, and heightened risks for those who deviate from official narratives. This aligns with the broader warning from the UN that repression of civic space and freedom of expression has significantly deepened across the region during the war.

Criminalizing speech, one post at a time

For ordinary internet users, the restrictions are just as severe. Since February, hundreds of people have reportedly been arrested across the region for social media activity linked to the war. In many Gulf states, the legal infrastructure enabling this is already well-established: expansive cybercrime and media laws criminalize vaguely defined offenses such as “spreading rumors,” “undermining public order,” or “insulting the state”. In wartime, these provisions become catch-all tools: flexible enough to apply to nearly any form of dissent.

In Bahrain, authorities have reportedly cracked down on people who protested or shared footage of the conflict online. The Gulf Centre for Human Rights has reported 168 arrests in the country tied to protests and online expression, with defendants potentially facing serious prison terms if convicted.

In the UAE, authorities have arrested nearly 400 people for recording events related to the conflict and for circulating information they described as misleading or fabricated. Police have claimed this material could stir public anxiety and spread rumors, and state-linked reporting has described the crackdown as part of a broader effort to defend the country from digital misinformation.

Saudi Arabia has also intensified restrictions, issuing a statement on March 2 banning the sharing of rumors or videos of unknown origin, and issuing a campaign discouraging residents from taking or posting photos. The campaign included a hashtag that reads “photography serves the enemy.” Journalists have been prevented from documenting the aftermath of airstrikes on the country. Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan have adopted similar restrictions on wartime imagery and reporting.

Qatar’s Interior Ministry has arrested more than 300 people for filming, circulating, or publishing what the ministry deemed to be misleading information. Taken together, these measures show how quickly wartime speech is being folded into existing legal systems designed to punish dissent.

The regional playbook

What’s striking is how consistent these measures are across different countries. As we recently wrote, governments across the broader region have enacted sweeping cybercrime and media laws over the past fifteen years, which they are now putting to use. Across different countries, the same tools are being used: existing laws, fresh bans on sharing wartime imagery, and tighter restrictions on journalists and reporting. The vocabulary changes slightly from place to place, but the logic is the same: national security, public order, rumors, and social stability are justifications for control.

This is not just a series of isolated incidents. It is a regional playbook for silencing critics and narrowing the public record. Gulf states have long relied on censorship and surveillance; the war has simply made those methods easier to justify and harder to challenge.

From “digital hopes” to digital control

As we’ve documented in our ongoing blog series, digital platforms were once seen—at least in part—as spaces that could expand public discourse in the region. But as we’ve also argued, those early “digital hopes” have given way to systems of regulation and control. 

The current crackdown is a continuation of that trajectory, not a temporary departure from it. States are not just reacting to the war; they are leveraging it to consolidate long-standing ambitions to dominate the digital public sphere.

It may be tempting to see these measures as temporary, but emergency powers—like the one enacted in Egypt following the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat that lasted for more than three decades—have a way of sticking around. Legal precedents that are set during wartime often become normalized—or reinvoked during times of crisis, as occurred in 2015, when France brought back a 1955 law related to the Algerian War of Independence amidst the Paris attacks.

And the stakes are high. As we’ve seen in Syria and Ukraine, regulations and platform policies can cause wartime human rights documentation to disappear. When journalists are constrained and eyewitness footage is criminalized, accountability is weakened. And when arrests become widespread, people learn to self-censor.

Protecting freedom of expression in times of conflict is a requirement for accountability, not a concession to disorder. When people can document, report, and share information freely, it becomes harder for abuses to be hidden behind official narratives. Even in wartime, the public interest is best served by defending the space to tell the truth, not by silencing speech.

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