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Stories in the Soil

Institutional memory as organisational substrate

We recently went to see “Mud is Everything” at Nottingham Contemporary, an exhibition by the Paraguayan sculptor Julia Isídrez: bulbous anteaters, yawning hippos and strange cylindrical beings, made from clay she gathers herself from the earth near her home in Itá. Her description of that clay echoes our pieces on the organisational substrate, only she says it with the mud in her hands: it is sediment, minerals, microorganisms, insects, mycelia and plant roots. And “it is full of ancestors.”

“All mud used to be something else, and it will be something else again. Mud is malleable but also holds memory.” – Julia Isídrez

Anteater, from "Mud is Everything" by Julia Isídrez
Anteater, from “Mud is Everything” by Julia Isídrez

In the last piece on organisational substrate, I described it as the accumulated structures, technology, incentives, institutional memory and past stories in an organisation that determine what can thrive and what cannot. There’s an informal set of tests I think about for deciding what counts as organisational substrate and what doesn’t: roughly, does it change what can thrive in the organisation? Is it a condition of the organisation rather than an event?* And does it survive the turnover of people? If all or most of the answers are yes, it’s likely to count as substrate.

Just like Julia says, the past shapes the substrate; and in some ways the past is the substrate. Peat, for example, is basically nothing but past life, layer upon layer of sphagnum moss that grew and died faster than it could decompose, accumulating at about a millimetre a year. A ten-metre peat bog is ten thousand years of autochthonous moss: a landscape built from its own dead. And a coral reef is perhaps the purest example of this sort of substrate (and just like peat, very fragile and under-threat) – a living community growing on the accumulated calcified skeletons of its own ancestors. 

“Land, then, is not merely soil; it is a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, and animals.” — Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac

Substrate is made by past life, influences the potential of future life, and is continuously reshaped by those living in it in the present.

The substrate contains memory of past conditions: the flood that deposited a layer of silt or the forest fire that is now represented by a thin dark layer in the soil. The Rothamsted Park Grass experiment shows how even an English meadow contains a detectable trace layer of nuclear weapons testing in the 1960s. 

Organisations lay down similar layers in their substrate too, many of them made of stories. There’s a classic study from 1961 by Jacobs and Campbell, two social psychologists interested in how traditions outlive the people who start them. They used an optical illusion where a stationary point of light in a dark room appears to wander, and they asked people to judge how far it moved. As a group, they tended to settle on a shared answer. Into each group the researchers planted a stooge, who gave a confident and wildly inflated estimate, and the group’s shared answer settled higher. Then the stooge left, and members were gradually replaced one at a time until nobody from the original group remained. The inflated answer persisted even though every founding member was gone; the group was still giving an answer that was seeded by a person none of them had ever met.

The story that taught a factory to keep quiet

There’s also a far more recent real world example: Claudia Pferner spent nearly three years inside a German car plant, exploring the spread of cultures of silence. The whole study landed on a single event years earlier. Karl, who’d been at the company for years as a quality foreman, asked a question at the company-wide management meeting: why was one production area measured on volume when every other area was measured on quality? A few days later he was summoned to a meeting and given a “disciplinary measure involving personal coaching”. Thirteen other interviewees cited Karl’s case as the reason they no longer ask questions in those meetings, even though many of them weren’t even in the room at the time of the incident, and some joined the company after the event and learned the story from colleagues, who retold it as a warning.

A leaf decomposes and becomes part of the ground in the same way that folklore like Karl’s story does in organisations. New joiners absorb it as the conditions of life, simply what happens here to people who do that. 

leaf litter

A caution, however, about stories like Karl’s: when we hear them, most of us cast ourselves as Karl. Very few of us hear it and recognise ourselves as the superiors who disciplined him. If we carry any power in our organisation, the honest question isn’t “would I have asked Karl’s question?”. It’s “have I ever responded like this to a question, and would anyone tell me if I had?”.

“People think that stories are shaped by people. In fact, it’s the other way around.” — Terry Pratchett, Witches Abroad.

Humans are storytelling animals; folklore, folk music, legend, myth and gossip are how we’ve deposited experience into communal knowledge for as long as we’ve been a species. Maybe it’s what actually makes us a species. The substrate is turned over constantly by the small, unglamorous work of people talking to each other, just like the unglamorous but essential work of earthworms. Darwin, in his worm book, said: “It may be doubted whether there are many other animals which have played so important a part in the history of the world, as have these lowly organised creatures.”

Institutional Memory as Substrate

There was a Roman fort called Trimontium in the Scottish Borders, named after the three Eildon Hills nearby, and during hot dry summers, marks appear in the fields where it once stood, showing the walls, tracks and ditches of the huge ancient complex that occupied them, clearly visible from the air. Of course, we’re not actually seeing the ditches and walls, only the crop’s indications of them. Crops growing over an ancient ditch might stay greener and ripen later than their neighbours, because they can root deeper; whilst crops growing over an old wall or a Roman road grow slower and less green. Most of the time this tiny effect is invisible, but drought, hot weather, and resultant stress exacerbate it, so much so that it becomes clearly visible. 

Trimontium from the air by Tim Garratt
Trimontium from the air. Photo by Tim Garratt. This archaeological technique was pioneered by O.G.S. Crawford, a WWI aerial observer who realised reconnaissance photography could read the past as well as the enemy.

Organisations are also full of backfilled ditches, old walls and connections that are no longer there, and whilst the memory of these may often be invisible, during times of stress, these old loyalties, rivalries and fractures can reappear, sometimes with a vengeance. In either case, stress didn’t create these patterns: it just revealed them.

“Learning belongs to the roots, while education belongs to the branches.” – Munir Fasheh, Palestinian thinker and writer

Attending to the substrate

The anthropologist André-Georges Haudricourt argued in 1962 that cultivating tubers and herding sheep represent different dispositions towards other people: one is tending the conditions (for tubers) and the other is commanding (for sheep). Tending is much subtler than commanding, but no less powerful: we could consider (and I believe) that substrate work is the most powerful kind of organisational work there is. It follows, then, that there’s a risk: in cultivating the conditions for some, we risk making them less hospitable for others: with great power comes great responsibility. So our practice must stay attentive, humble, experimental, and above all inclusive: we’re only as safe as the least safe person. And we remember that we’re in the substrate, we’re part of it, making tiny changes to earth, whether we intend to or not.

Which leaves the question: who gets a say in how the substrate is shaped? If the substrate is something we all live in and pass on to those who follow, then it follows that we should collectively maintain, improve and steward it for others and those who come after. This sounds rather like a commons, and commons come with very well-studied structures, rules and practices. That’s the next piece.


*an event can certainly affect the substrate, in much the same way that a forest fire isn’t substrate, but it surely affects it.

References

Earlier pieces in this series:

Five Ecological Concepts for Working in Organisational Change is the parent of the whole ecological thread. Indicator species are one way to read the substrate: the signals at the surface that tell us about the conditions underneath. Rewetting is one way we restore it: working on the conditions rather than mandating what grows. The previous piece is what the substrate is, and this one is what it remembers.

Darwin, C. (1881) The Formation of Vegetable Mould, through the Action of Worms, with Observations on their Habits. London: John Murray.

Haudricourt, A.-G. (1962) “Domestication des animaux, culture des plantes et traitement d’autrui”, L’Homme 2(1), 40–50.

Jacobs, R.C. & Campbell, D.T. (1961) “The perpetuation of an arbitrary tradition through several generations of a laboratory microculture”, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 62(3), 649–658. Worth noting that the inflated answer did fade over enough generations: traditions with no function eventually die out.

Leopold, A. (1949) A Sand County Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press.

Pferner, C. (2026) “‘Have you heard!?’ The narrative roots of organizational silence”, German Journal of Human Resource Management, OnlineFirst. 48 managers, 128 interviews, over nearly three years at a German automotive site.

Pratchett, T. (1991) Witches Abroad. London: Victor Gollancz.

The post Stories in the Soil appeared first on Psych Safety.

Accountability

Accountability

Accountability, quite literally, is the ability to give an account: account-ability. An account is a narrative – the telling of an honest story about what happened, why we did what we did, what was known at the time and what wasn’t, told from our particular position, and situated within the context of what was actually happening. To be accountable is to have the ability to give an account. This isn’t a wordplay or a clever rhetorical manoeuvre. It’s the simple etymology of the word – accountability is meant to be about our capacity for honest explanation. To be accountable is not the same as to be punishable.

But accountability has been colonised by blame. In the world of work, almost without us noticing, the meaning of accountability has been displaced by its near-opposite. The tell is the phrase “Someone must be held accountable” (or something similar), and what that usually means in practice is that someone should suffer consequences. It’s rarely used to mean that someone should be given the conditions in which they can honestly explain what happened, but that someone should bear the cost of it happening. Accountability has turned into blame with better marketing.

Roberts (1991) formalised accountability as a relational tension between an account giver and a recipient, and that framing is important. Accountability requires at least two parties, someone willing to give an account and someone capable of receiving it; it’s relational and dynamic. Philip Tetlock’s work on accountability and cognition shows why the receiving end is so consequential. What he found was interesting but unsurprising: when people know who they’re accountable to and can anticipate what that audience wants, the account they give is shaped accordingly – designed to satisfy the audience rather than give the truest description of events as they actually happened. Every performance review, every post-incident investigation, every board report is subject to this dynamic. The account we receive is the account that the teller believed the audience wanted.

Accountability as a construct has been studied extensively across public administration (Bovens), organisational behaviour (Tetlock, Frink & Ferris), philosophy (O’Neill), and safety science (Dekker), and what strikes anyone who reads across these fields is how rarely any of them mean the same thing by it. The kaleidoscopic definitional confusion is part of the core problem with accountability. Even the classic RACI matrix (the popular tool that gives the appearance of clarity while achieving the texture of a spreadsheet) gets accountability wrong. Much of that confusion is semantic and probably unavoidable, but some of it has structural consequences. The most significant conflation is between accountability and responsibility. Ieraci (2007, via Parris, 2025) draws the distinction clearly: responsibility involves doing, accountability involves reporting. Responsibility is about the work itself, and accountability is about the account of the work. They overlap and interact, but they are not the same thing, and treating them as synonyms has problematic consequences. 

Misunderstanding Accountability

Accountability and responsibility have been used interchangeably for so long that even legislation gets it wrong. This isn’t just pedantry. The conflation matters because once accountability is understood to mean “being responsible for outcomes,” the logical next step is: if the outcome was bad, the accountable person is at fault. Consequence then follows automatically and the account (the narrative, the context, the conditions that were actually present) gets dismissed before it can be heard. And accountability for outcomes is, in any case, the wrong target. Outcomes are partly beyond any of our control. What we can reasonably ask people to account for is their reasoning, their decisions, and their actions, situated within their context. Not the outcome.

“People aren’t just people, they are people surrounded by circumstances.”

— Terry Pratchett

Karl Weick’s sensemaking work is useful here, and shows why this is even worse than it first appears. Accountability in organisations is almost always exercised retrospectively, after the outcome is already known, and hindsight does much of the work before the inquiry begins. The account becomes a post-hoc justification exercise rather than a genuine rendering – an attempt to prove innocence in a process that has already assumed guilt. Structural bias is at play, and the knowledge of the outcome contaminates the inquiry before it begins.

Parris’s example from maritime law shows both mechanisms operating at once. New Zealand’s Maritime Transport Act assigns responsibility to vessel Masters where it clearly means accountability in the liability sense, and the confusion has structural consequences for who gets blamed when things go wrong. The Master at the sharp end becomes legally exposed for outcomes shaped by systemic decisions made at the blunt end. The legislative conflation and the retrospective framing work together: context and conditions get set aside because the outcome is already known, and the law reaches for the nearest human rather than the most relevant cause.

“…they took the captain to court, even though there was not a thing I could have done to have stopped it, to have known about it, or anything… I was held accountable… But I wasn’t responsible.”
Parris, 2025 pp.35

And here’s the crux: responsibility is actually closer to what organisations think they mean by accountability. Responsibility is about roles, obligations, and the act of doing. We can assign responsibility, but we cannot assign accountability – an account is given, not extracted, and every organisational system built around ‘holding people accountable’ rests on a category error with real-world consequences. If accountability cannot be assigned, only taken, then the pressure organisations apply in its name does not produce genuine accounts. It only produces performances of them.

Accountability without context is blame

When we strip the account (the narrative, the context, the local rationality of the person who was there) and retain only the assignment of fault, we haven’t done accountability. We’ve dressed something much older and more primitive in accountability’s clothes.

Blametropism is the organisational tendency to orient toward fault, the way a plant orients toward light, regardless of whether finding fault serves any operational (rather than emotional) use. The organisational or political apparatus of accountability (the investigation, the finding, the consequence) is seldom deployed to truly understand what happened, but instead to locate where the fault should land. The true account is rarely sought; what’s more often sought is a name, a goat that we can expel from the village, laden with our sins. Accountability-as-blame is blametropism in its business suit. It gives the impression of rigour while reliably producing the outcomes of blame.

Marilyn Paul’s systems framing captures the consequences well: blame generates fear, fear generates cover-up, cover-up degrades information quality, degraded information produces more errors, more errors generate more blame. The feedback cycle is self-sustaining and self-defeating, and as reliable as it is depressing. An organisation that uses accountability as a pressure tool destroys its own capacity to learn what’s really happening inside it.

When people learn that giving an account: an honest one, with all its uncertainty and complexity and acknowledgement of error, leads to punishment, they naturally stop giving honest accounts. Instead they give performed accounts – narratives designed to survive scrutiny rather than enable learning.

And the demand for a single account is itself part of the problem. Real situations are experienced differently from different positions within a system. The account of the nurse who administered the wrong medicine, the ward manager who created the rota, the software developer who designed the drug cabinet interface, and the executive who approved the staffing budget are all partial, all genuine, and all necessary. Accountability-as-blame doesn’t just suppress honest accounts. It demands that a complex, plural reality be rendered as a single story with a single author. 

Take the cases of Hadiza Bawa-Garba and RaDonda Vaught: both clinicians who made errors in systemically compromised conditions, both of whom were honest about what happened, and both of whom were subsequently prosecuted. In both cases, the logic was that someone had to be held to account. Investigations were conducted, findings were made and severe consequences followed. What was not sought, in any meaningful sense, was a genuine account. Both clinicians were already carrying the burden of what happened before their prosecutions even began, and the prosecutions compounded an existing problem by converting private grief into public liability. The systemic conditions and the context behind the errors (staffing levels, equipment failures, normalised workarounds and more) were noted but set aside. The apparatus of “accountability” produced the outcome that blame always produces: a conclusion that foreclosed rather than opened inquiry. Our simulation of that day in Leicester in the Learning Lab lets a team see those systemic conditions from the inside.

The lesson that clinicians drew from both cases was not “be more careful.” It was “be less transparent.” That is what accountability without context reliably produces. Onora O’Neill saw the same mechanism from a different vantage point: systems designed to demonstrate transparency often produce performances of transparency rather than the thing itself. The safety audit, the Ofsted inspection and the compliance checklist all create the appearance of account-giving while systematically degrading the conditions in which genuine accounts are possible. The mechanism defeats its own purpose.

An organisation that punishes honest accounts will eventually receive only dishonest ones.

You can’t assign accountability, only take it

The moment an account is compelled, demanded, or extracted under threat of consequence, it ceases to be an account and becomes testimony. Modern societies do not treat confessions given under duress as genuine, and for good reason –  what is said under compulsion is shaped more by the compulsion than by the truth. The same mechanism operates inside organisations. Forced accountability produces self-protection, not transparency. A performance of accountability, not learning. It’s worth noting in this light that we tend to call the most common formal accountability mechanism in organisations an “annual performance review”.

“Currently fashionable methods of accountability damage rather than repair trust.”
– Onora O’Neill

A genuine account has to be a voluntary act. It requires the account-giver to be willing to be seen: to expose their reasoning, their uncertainty, their errors, and their context. That exposure carries real interpersonal and career risk, and where candour carries significant risk but little benefit, most of us will err on the side of caution and silence. This isn’t a character flaw, it’s a rational response to the environment, and changing that calculus is the only reliable route to better accounts.

The distance between the account an organisation says it wants and the account it actually rewards is navigated through social inference: reading the room, calibrating our degree of honesty to the audience, knowing instinctively how much truth is too much. It’s also a skill that is unevenly distributed in most organisations. For many neurodivergent people, candour is simply how to communicate, not a choice to be weighed against consequences. An organisation that performs a desire for honesty while punishing it in practice fails those workers and risks actively deceiving them.

Cultivating the conditions for honesty is considerably more difficult than demanding it, and considerably more effective. The phrase “holding people accountable” implies a power that organisations do not have. We cannot hold someone else accountable. We can only nurture the organisational substrate in which people are able and willing to give an honest account.

What real accountability looks like

Real accountability is dialogic rather than monologic. Roberts draws on Senge’s distinction between discussion and dialogue: discussion in this sense, is like a debate, with positions defended and a winner declared. Dialogue is different: meaning, nuance, context and information flow freely between parties, with the intention of surfacing something neither party could reach alone. Organisational accountability processes are almost universally structured as a defensive discussion – and a genuine account cannot be extracted through cross-examination. It can only emerge through a more open, reflective dialogue, which requires the account-giver to feel safe enough to think out loud, be uncertain, and say “I don’t know” without it becoming evidence against them. Both giving and receiving are equal components of accountability, and the receiving requires its own kind of discipline: the willingness to be changed by what we hear, rather than confirm what we already believed. Maybe the hardest part is the moment right after the event, when everyone is nervous and the pressure to find a name is enormous, and someone has to be the person who says: let’s slow down, let’s find out what actually happened.

Parris’s typology reinforces this binary. Backward/hierarchical accountability is structurally monologic: it already knows what it’s looking for. Forward/process accountability requires dialogue, because it’s genuinely interested in what the system contributed, which can only be discovered, rarely confirmed.

“But surely there have to be consequences sometimes?” Yes, but consequences and accountability are separate questions. We can impose consequences without ever actually receiving an honest account. And if negative consequences are attached to the account, we will never receive an honest one. Consequences cannot come first without contaminating everything that follows. The desire for consequence after failure is often a desire for justice, and that is a fundamental human impulse worth taking seriously. But retributive justice and learning are different projects, and the accountability mechanisms most organisations use are poorly designed for either.

The question after a failure, Dekker argues, is not just “who is accountable?” but (more importantly) “how do we learn?”, and answering the second question well requires the conditions that make genuine accounts possible. It follows that psychological safety and true accountability are mutually dependent. We cannot give a true account if we don’t feel safe, and accountability as punishment makes honesty unsafe. A genuine account shouldn’t feel like a confession. It should feel like a contribution to our collective understanding, and treating it as the former guarantees we will never receive it as the latter. Building the conditions in which genuine accounts are possible is what accountability, properly understood, actually requires.

Account-ability

In the vast majority of organisations, accountability is expected to flow upwards. The powerful receive accounts; whilst they are seldom required to honestly account for themselves to those ‘below’ them. And I’d argue that the most valuable accounts are actually those that flow sideways, worker to worker, where honesty isn’t calibrated to hierarchy.

We have collectively spent considerable energy perfecting the art of demanding honesty from the people for whom we have made honesty unsafe. “Accountability”, a word that belonged to everyone who needed to give an honest account, was appropriated by institutions that needed a more respectable name for blame. Blame is cognitively cheap, emotionally satisfying, and operationally useless. It produces a very clear answer to the question of what to do next, and it is almost always the wrong one.

However, blame is also often politically useful. Blame doesn’t just emotionally satisfy: it secures power. When the investigation concludes and the name is named, someone’s position is secured and someone else’s is eroded, or ended. The apparatus of “accountability” in this case is functioning exactly as designed, just for purposes that aren’t on the tin. 

This is why genuine accountability remains so rare. It asks the powerful to submit to the same conditions they currently use accountability to avoid: to give an honest account of themselves, to be uncertain in public, and to say “I don’t know” to the people they lead. In cultures where blame secures position, a genuine account risks it. The rarity of genuine accountability in organisations is its rational consequence.

Many organisations “hold people accountable” by imposing negative consequences for failure. The organisations that actually handle failure best are the ones that make it safe to give an honest account – they foster account-ability. They are not the same thing. They are, in fact, complete opposites.

References

Bovens, M. (2007) ‘Analysing and assessing accountability: a conceptual framework’, European Law Journal, 13(4), pp. 447–468.

Dekker, S.W.A. (2012) Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability. Farnham: Ashgate. (See also: Dekker (2011) in the map)

Frink, D.D. and Ferris, G.R. (1998) ‘Accountability, impression management, and goal setting in the performance evaluation process’, Human Relations, 51(10), pp. 1259–1283.

Ieraci, S. (2007) ‘Responsibility versus accountability in a risk-averse culture’, Emergency Medicine Australasia, 19(1), pp. 63–64.

O’Neill, O. (2002) A Question of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. → Explore in map

Parris, R. (2025) Accountability: A Lived Experience. MSc thesis. Lund University. → Explore in map

Paul, M. (1997) ‘Moving from blame to accountability’, The Systems Thinker.

Roberts, J. (1991) ‘The possibilities of accountability’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16(4), pp. 355–368. → Explore in map

Roberts, J. (1996) ‘From discipline to dialogue: individualizing and socializing forms of accountability’, in Accountability: Power, Ethos and the Technologies of Managing, pp. 40–61.

Tetlock, P.E. (1985) ‘Accountability: the neglected social context of judgment and choice’, Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, pp. 297–332. → Explore in map

Weick, K.E. (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. (See also: Weick & Roberts (1993) and Weick (1993) Mann Gulch in the map)

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