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Outage Chaos: Who Turned Off All The Computer?

It's been a tough couple of weeks for anyone trying to use email, fly, spend money, use an Apple device*, or do signals intelligence. Technical service outages are nothing new, but why do so many big ones seem to be happening all at once? Are hackers, AI, and international conflicts to blame? And what can we do about it?

Since most service interruptions don't make the news, it's hard to get a baseline on how often we see them happen normally. But after a major incident like the Microsoft cloud outage on November 12, any smaller disruption is more likely to become a story as part of a pattern instead of an isolated incident. We would have heard plenty about the Air Traffic Control problems anyway, but the November 18 disruption to the PlayStation Network might have gotten less attention. There might appear to be a spike or an upward trend in outages, but we can't easily verify that, and the increased coverage will tend to make it seem more significant and interconnected than it necessarily is regardless.

One boring reason we might see an uptick in problems right now is the date on the calendar. With Thanksgiving travel, Black Friday, Cyber Monday, Giving Tuesday, and Surveillance Sunday (we assume) all coming up, organizations often schedule major system updates for the first three weeks of November. This helps them prepare for holiday traffic, and lets them shift the outage risk to the time before those dates when they may consider it far more important to maintain reliable service.

While none of these particular outages have yet been directly attributed to AI (or to malicious hackers), bank CEOs and the NSA briefed congress and reportedly attributed at least some of them to rushed attempts to patch vulnerabilities found by AI. That’s understandable: all software updates carry risk, and companies and governments are having to deploy more updates, and faster, than they’ve ever needed to before. Some of those updates are to important infrastructure, where an outage would be very disruptive, but the impact of leaving vulnerabilities unpatched would be even worse.

Vulnerabilities are a type of software bug that affects security. Once a vulnerability is found in a given piece of software and disclosed, typically the software maker will release a patch fixing that vulnerability. That’s why so many update notes say things like “performance improvements and security fixes” — the security fixes are patches to vulnerabilities.

Companies and governments that run infrastructure face a challenging tradeoff: deploy patches quickly or slowly and cautiously? Patching quickly is important to keep systems secure. But every software update runs a risk: any change to a deployed system can have unintended consequences that snowball into a disastrous outage.

This exacerbates a much deeper problem long discussed in the engineering culture of many, if not most organizations. Keeping networks, servers, and applications not just secure but resilient in the face of patches, reboots, and capacity changes requires an investment in staff, time, hardware, and processes for frequent maintenance, redundant systems, realistic staging environments, automated rollbacks, monitoring, and pre-deployment testing. These investments are rarely as attractive to decision-makers as a new product or feature, or at times, sadly, as layoffs.

This should come as no surprise when we think of our apps, web sites, airlines, and bank cards as supported by electronic infrastructure. As in the more visible physical world, maintenance can only be deferred for so long before the costs become immediate and dramatic. We accept the cost of an occasional short term bridge closure to reduce the risk of a bridge collapse, and highway departments schedule road work nearly every night of the year to repair and prevent the worst potholes.

When this kind of work is endlessly deferred in the world of software, we speak of technical debt: issues we already know about that aren't causing a big enough problem right now to divert us from other work, but that, if left unaddressed, can easily multiply and interact to cause outages or other complications. This can show up as routine steps that have to be done by hand instead of automatically on a schedule, a programmer's shortcut that works well in one specific situation but is more fragile in general, an operating system six months (or years) overdue for a reboot, or a piece of networking hardware no longer supported for patches by its manufacturer. On the other hand, when maintenance work is well-resourced and routine, it should be rare for even major security updates to cause significant issues.

What’s needed in the short term is a big investment in the people and training needed to roll out patches promptly and safely. What’s needed in the long term is a big investment in software security, eliminating entire classes of vulnerabilities, like memory safety, before they are ever written.

For organizations that have gotten used to patching slowly and cautiously, suddenly switching gears to patching quickly is a big challenge. And the flood of vulnerability disclosures enabled by AI means that everyone is being asked to switch gears like that at once.

Fortunately, it’s not a zero-sum game: patches can be rolled out quickly and cautiously, with investments in reducing technical debt and expanding maintenance budgets as described above. These measures are expensive and time-consuming, but necessary. For governments asking how to respond to AI-enabled cybersecurity threats, investing in the people and training necessary to stay on top of patches will pay big dividends in reliability and security.

For individuals, consider the trade-offs when relying on a single provider for many services you rely on. Consumer cloud and device offerings tie together many of the things we need to function on a daily basis like email, messaging, file storage, and even payments, but that convenience and simplicity comes with the risk of losing access to it all if that service goes offline (or suspends your account). Trying out interoperable alternatives is a great way to reduce your reliance on a single company.

Finally, for any critical data, learn the 3-2-1 rule for backups: Keep three different copies on two different types of storage with one copy in a different physical location. For many users, a laptop or other personal device, cloud storage, and a local backup disk exemplify this rule, as long as the laptop stores data on its own drives, not only in the cloud.

Among other things, the accelerated rollout of AI has made it all the more critical  to reinvest in people and systems to keep our software, networks, governments, and interconnected world stable.

*Apple is an EFF donor. EFF donors do not influence our agenda or our positions.

Outage Chaos: When Tech is too Big to Fail

Outages happen, but we deserve a resilient internet where no one outage at one company can put people at risk and disrupt the global economy. We can only get there by addressing an over-reliance on a few cloud monopolists through effective antitrust laws and interoperability requirements.

Service outages, like we’ve seen recently at Microsoft, Apple*, banks, courts, airlines, and elsewhere, can be more than an annoying hurdle. Losing a vital service due to an error can cause the same impacts as a government-ordered internet shutdown—people losing access to vital information and lines of communication.  As usual, the greatest harms are faced by people on the margins globally.

There’s not much hope in companies out-nerding these issues either. Technical errors will always exist, whether it’s a bug, negligence from an administrator, or a malicious attack. The problem is an over-reliance on any one company or system when these inevitable outages occur. It’s a matter of public safety and economic stability that policymakers mitigate the impact of these disruptions before they occur. 

In order to do so, we must ensure antitrust prevents providers of key technical systems from becoming too big to fail.

The harms inflicted by tech monopolies go beyond monetary costs to the end user. In fact, monopolists can often offer lower prices, or even offer free services, thanks to their greater scale and incentive to shut out competitors using free-flowing investment capital. The problem is this puts a few tech companies in a position of incredible influence. The true cost is a loss of control when our private data, access to knowledge, and free expression all become mediated by tools owned by a handful of billionaires.

Losing diversity in our digital infrastructure creates a less stable and less resilient internet for everyone.

This isn’t just a bad deal for us as individuals. Losing diversity in our digital infrastructure creates a less stable and less resilient internet for everyone. When everything from daily tasks to national security is reliant on a few digital monocultures, one mistake or exploit can cascade into an explosive impact. The risks multiply in the current investment climate, where financial markets reward companies that strip-mine redundancy and resiliency from critical systems. Even if you see the problem coming, an outage that hits clients, suppliers, collaborators or loved ones proves just as disruptive. We need to remove these chokepoints for good, which means a digital sovereignty movement that makes the web more free by design—not just importing existing levers of control into another nation's borders.

Central to this effort must be undercutting platform control by fostering interoperability, i.e. when tools are made to be compatible among competitors. When this is done carefully, it’s not only easier to switch to better alternatives, we wind up with more alternatives as it becomes more viable to compete or offer complementary tools alongside existing systems. 

This is what made systems like email great. You could choose your own apps and services, even using several simultaneously, and never lose touch with a contact. Early architects of the internet did not take reliable hosting for granted. Services were often on a machine a few rooms over, and needed to be prepared for the occasional interruption of service.

But in the age of hyperscalers and massive data centers, the infrastructure underlying the web isn’t owned by many scattered IT departments, it’s rented from a handful of “cloud” providers. These providers managed to scale up quickly and replace interoperability with walled gardens, enticing customers with lower costs while making it costly to leave and tightly controlling how services behave. Once in control, these platforms have every incentive to enshittify their services and devalue their workers, delivering an increasingly shoddy and restrictive service. 

This context makes building interoperability an act of defiance—often coming from the sweat of open source developers. These projects may be tolerated by monopolists in the short term, but can be one boardroom decision away from being broken entirely. A better internet means championing these creators through funding, liability protections, and requiring big players to cooperate. Here is what lawmakers should do:

Federal and state legislators should—

  • Defend competitive compatibility. Developers merely providing alternative interfaces for tools should be shielded from liability. In the U.S., that means explicit protections under DMCA, CFAA, and corporate Terms of Service agreements. These protections should cover shared protocols and APIs as well as automated content retrieval through scraping. 
  • Encourage interoperability. Lawmakers should force open key aspects of platform infrastructure by requiring big tech to support: (1) data portability, so users can move to a new service (2) back-end interoperability, to support more tools with competitive compatibility and (3) delegability, so people are not prevented from having code act on their behalf. So far, the Digital Markets Act in the EU has provided some positive examples of such legislation
  • Fund open source. In order to be sustainable, interoperable tools and standards cannot rely solely on corporate interest and volunteer labor. Programs like the EU Sovereign Tech Fund could help create viable alternatives within and beyond the borders of the EU.

Municipalities and institutions should—

  • Buy interoperable services. At any level, government agencies should set minimum interoperability requirements in procurement and hold a competitive bidding process to evaluate vendors’ privacy, security and lock-in risks. Agencies dependent on a sole provider, including through cooperative purchase agreements, are stuck with corporate price-gouging and even higher switching costs.
  • Fund Departments of Information Technology. Cloud services are often adopted to offset spending on IT professionals but, when these departments atrophy, institutions become even more reliant on the cloud providers. Maintaining in-house talent prevents this cycle of dependency and improves emergency responses to outages. 
  • Adopt a plus-one approach to public communications. Institutions shouldn’t force citizens into walled gardens just to access public communications. In addition to posts to corporate social media, government agencies should share the same information on an open protocol—whether it’s bluesky, the fediverse, or just an RSS feed.  By putting these in the open, more people will have access to urgent alerts and can create new useful tools.

Building a more resilient and democratic internet is possible, and many people are already hard at work doing just that. Above are some necessary steps to get corporate and government interests out of the way of rewilding the net with greater community and individual controls. The dream of the internet as a digital commons operating for the public good is not dead yet, and is worth fighting for.

*Apple is an EFF donor. EFF donors do not influence our agenda or our positions.

Google's New Remote Attestation Scheme is As Bad As Its Old One

Google owes its existence to the open web, but today, its technological “innovations” have much to do with locking users into a “walled garden.” The latest of these is “reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification,” an experimental initiative that will let companies block users if they are running independent, "de-googled" versions of Android. These “indie Android” versions are favored by people who want to protect their privacy and their attention by blocking trackers and ads. Worse, this is just the latest in a line of similarly user-hostile measures. 

Long before “agentic AI,” we had the idea that software would act as your agent on the internet. That's why the old-fashioned technical term for a browser is a “user agent.” Your browser acts on your behalf to retrieve information and then show it to you, in the format you choose. It's your agent. 

This is a powerful and profound idea. It is because browsers are our “agents” that we expect them to accept our directives, say, by blocking pop-ups, or by turning off autoplay sound, or by blocking commercial surveillance trackers. 

Your browser does all that because your browser works for you. The reason your browser can work for you is that the web is an open, standardized technology. In theory, anyone who follows the standards published by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) can make a browser, and that web browser can connect to any web server. Browsers and servers are interoperable. It's the same force that means you can put anyone's gas in your gas-tank, or anyone's shoelaces in your shoes, or anyone's milk on your cereal. 

But what if manufacturers could dictate those choices to you? What if your light socket refused to use a lightbulb unless it was officially blessed by the socket's manufacturer? What if your dishwasher refused to wash your dishes unless you bought them from one of the manufacturer's “dish partners?” What if your toaster refused to toast “unauthorized bread?” 

It's hard to see how a company could win its market with this strategy. After all, if the dishes are really better than the competition's, you'd buy them voluntarily, without any need for law or technology to force the matter. The only reason to make a dishwasher that refuses a rival's dishes is if the manufacturer's own dishes are ugly, expensive, and/or badly made. 

But once a company owns the market—once they've achieved dominance by buying out their rivals; by bribing potential competitors to stay out of their lane; and by engaging in deceptive conduct to trap key suppliers and customers—they can cement their dominance by blocking interoperability, keeping out rival dishes, milk, gas, lightbulbs, shoelaces and bread, capturing their whole market and squeezing it. 

Once a company owns the market, they can cement their dominance by blocking interoperability.

That's what Google has done, and that's what Google wants to do more of Google's commercial behavior has been so unethical, deceptive and abusive that the company just lost three federal antitrust cases. This thrice-convicted monopolist paid Apple—more than $20b/year— to stay out of the search market: It cheated app vendors, ripping them off with sky-high junk fees and onerous conditions that raised prices while lowering the share of your spending that went to the companies whose products you were paying for. It cheated advertisers, rigging the ad market to gouge businesses on ad prices and underinvesting to fight rampant ad-fraud, sucking hundreds of billions out of the productive economy for overpriced ads that no one saw. 

Google wasn't always this way. The “don't be evil” company owes its very existence to the open web ecosystem. When the company started to index the web in 1998, it was playing on an open field, where any web server could talk to any “user agent,” even one whose user was a startup like Google, that was making a copy of every page on the server. 

For years, Google thrived on the open web, and built open technologies. Android—the mobile operating system that Google bought in 2005 —was presented as an “open” alternative to existing mobile offerings, and as the mobile market collapsed into two companies—Google and Apple—Google always presented Android as the open alternative to Apple's “walled garden.” But there were always ways in which Google's “open” Android wasn't exactly open. The company engaged in illegal “tying” arrangements that forced hardware vendors and carriers to lock out versions of Android that were created by Google's competitors. 

In other words, even though Google offered a mobile platform that was (mostly) technically open, it found other ways to try to choke off the market oxygen for alternative Android versions that tried to capitalize on that technical openness. 

But life finds a way. The existence of an open, modifiable, tinkerer-friendly mobile operating system meant Android hackers could create alternatives to Google's (de facto) walled garden, which thrived in the cracks in that garden wall. Operating systems like CalyxOS, PureOS and Graphene offered a more private, more secure Android experience, one that was largely “de-Googled,” blocking Google's relentless acquisition of your private data. 

And Google's data-hunger is relentless. Android exfiltrates a chunk of your personal and behavioral data every five minutes. The “resting heartbeat” of Android surveillance pulses and pulses, irrespective of whether you're using your device, and the instant you unlock your screen, that heartbeat quickens, sending even more data to the company. All that data has proven irresistible to authoritarian governments. Donald Trump's enforcers have seized on Google data as a vital source of information about the identity of protesters and the location of migrants hunted by ICE. 

So there are plenty of reasons why users would seek out these de-Googled alternatives to Android, finding them in spite of Google's efforts to block access to competing technologies. The worse it got, the better those alternatives looked. 

Perhaps this explains Google's years-long effort to increase the technical barriers to using modified versions of Android, beefing these up to match the commercial restrictions that stand in the way of a de-Googled existence. 

Back in 2023, Google floated the idea of “Web Environment Integrity” (WEI), a set of modifications to web standards that would force your computer to disclose its operating environment to the web servers it connected to, even if you objected to this disclosure. 

WEI was a form of “remote attestation.” That's when your device uses a sub-processor (sometimes called a “Technical Protection Module” or “TPM”) or a walled off part of its main processor (sometimes called a “secure enclave”) to produce a cryptographically signed description of your device and its configuration: which hardware, software, plug-ins, and settings you're running. 

Take away our ability to block obnoxious digital content and you guarantee that we will be flooded with it.

When you connect to a server, it demands that your device send this “attestation” before it handles your request. If your device won't provide this data, or if the server doesn't like (or recognize) your device and its details, it can refuse to deal with you. And because the attestation is prepared by a TPM or a secure enclave that you can't modify or override, you don't get to decide which facts about your device it's allowed to see. 

Practically speaking, this means that remote attestation lets a server refuse to deal with you until you turn off your ad-blocker and your tracker-blocker. It means that the server can discriminate against users who block auto-play sound and video, who block pop-ups, who put the tab in the background when it's playing a mandatory pre-roll ad. 

WEI was especially disturbing in light of Google's plan to kill ad-blockers and privacy blockers through updates to Chrome, an effort that continues to this day. 

These blockers are an important part of the dynamic between web publishers and their users. In the real world, when you get an offer, you can make a counter-offer. That's all an ad-blocker is: a way for users to respond to a server whose opening bid is, “How about you give me all your data and let me take over your computer in exchange for showing you this page?” with “How about 'Nah?'”

We didn't get rid of pop-up ads by making them illegal, or by boycotting advertisers who used them. We got rid of pop-up ads when web users installed pop-up blockers, which made pop-up ads pointless. Take away our ability to block obnoxious digital content and you guarantee that we will be flooded with it. 

These kinds of modifications aren't just used to block ads—they're also key to accessibility. People who have photosensitive epilepsy or suffer from low-contrast vision problems use add-ons to reformat pages so they can safely and legibly access them. 

WEI's creators said they were only trying to put the web on a level playing field with apps, which routinely disclose facts about your device to the companies whose servers you connect to, without asking you, and even if you don’t want them to. Apps are a source of bottomless enshittification, not least because (unlike the web), they enjoy special, dangerous legal protections that make it very legally risky to modify them. WEI wasn't an effort to level the playing field between apps and the web—it was a race to the bottom, an attempt to make the web as enshittification-friendly as apps. 

Public outrage to WEI killed the project, but Google's commitment to augmenting its illegal commercial lockdown efforts with technical lockdowns never ended. Now, Google has rolled out an experimental “reCAPTCHA Mobile Verification” that uses an app, your camera, and your device's TPM or secure enclave to produce an attestation about your Android device. 

This will make it much easier for the apps and other services you interact with to block your device if you run an Android alternative, or if you install a mod that overrides the actions of Google's stock Android. 

This is a terrible idea—it's every bit as bad as WEI was. In an age in which Big Tech is ever-more tied to authoritarian governments, redesigning our devices to tell strangers things we don't want them to know isn't just shortsighted, it's inexcusable. 

 

 

Enshittification Merch That Actually Fights Enshittification 

Enshittification isn't just a sweary word to describe the accelerating decay of the online platforms, apps, and services that we rely on.  

It's a framework for understanding the structural incentives that make tech companies enemies of their own users over time—the surveillance business model, the erosion of privacy, the monopoly power that eliminates alternatives, the regulatory capture that prevents accountability.  

SUPPORT EFF

GET LimITED EDITION MERCH + FIGHT ENSHITTIFICATION

These are some of EFF's core fights and have been for over 35 years. EFF sues. EFF advocates. EFF codes. And EFF wins. EFF is the most profound and powerful disenshittifying force on the planet Earth, and I’ve been proud to fight alongside them for nearly 25 of those years.  

One of the lessons you learn in battles with very long timelines against very powerful actors is that these battles are deeply serious, and because of that they must also be fun. “Enshittification” took off as a shorthand in part because of the minor license to vulgarity it confers. It's slightly crass for a reason: getting people to engage with the abstract issues of tech policy can be hard at the best of times. No one knows this better than my colleagues at EFF, who consistently surprise me with their ability to make complex, technical concepts concrete, memorable, and sometimes even joyful. 

Words matter, but so do visuals. For the cover of the U.S. edition of my book, Enshittification, designer Devin Washburn of No Ideas studio created an iconic variation of the "pile of poo" emoji, with angry eyebrows and a grawlix-scrawled censor bar over its mouth. It instantly became the symbol of enshittification I’d been looking for. 

A digital illustration of an angry poop emoji holding a black sign reading "&!#%", set against a blue and gray background tiled with oversized "& !#%" characters.

I liked it so much I ordered a couple hundred enamel pins and a couple thousand vinyl stickers and handed them out to people I met on my 33-city book tour. Even when giving them away, I was inundated with requests to buy more of them.  

I've since bought out Devin's rights to the image and released it under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license—free for anyone to use, remix, or build on, including commercially, with attribution. The high-resolution files are on Wikimedia Commons, Flickr, and the Internet Archive (including a PSD with an ink-density adjustment layer). It belongs to the commons now. 

But I made sure EFF had first crack at the design for their “official merch,” and they've done right by it. There are two items available now in the EFF shop, and all proceeds go directly to EFF's work defending digital rights. I’ve spent years admiring EFF’s merch and consistent, creative visual identity, so it fills me with pride to see this more-than-a-mere-poop-emoji in their shop.  

A recognizable visual shorthand is a genuine organizing tool. When someone sees the enshittification emoji, they know what the conversation is about. When you wear the pin or slap the sticker on your laptop, you're signaling that you understand what's happening to the internet, and that you know we can do better.  

You can get a $5 sticker:

An angry poop emoji sticker affixed to the coiled spring mechanism inside a vending machine. The sticker depicts a scowling poop emoji holding a black sign reading "&$!#%".

A hand with black nail polish and a gold ring holds an angry poop emoji sticker against a white door. The sticker shows a scowling poop emoji holding a black sign reading "&$!#%".

Or a $10 pin:

A close-up of an enamel pin on the lapel of a tan jacket. The pin depicts an angry poop emoji holding a black banner reading "&$!#%".

An enamel pin clipped to the nose bridge of black-framed sunglasses resting on a wooden surface. The pin depicts a scowling poop emoji holding a black banner reading "&$!#%". 

 Because the design is CC-licensed, you don't have to buy one. You can make your own merch, your own swag, your own illustrations. I made a lawn flag for my front garden.

A  small white garden flag on a metal stake, planted among cacti and succulents in a sunny yard. The flag depicts an angry poop emoji holding a sign reading "&$!#%". 

But if you do want to buy a sticker or pin, you can do so while supporting the most profound and powerful disenshittifying force on the planet Earth—the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

SUPPORT EFF

GET LimITED EDITION MERCH + FIGHT ENSHITTIFICATION

 

Digital Hopes, Real Power: From Connection to Collective Action

This is the fifth and final installment of a blog series reflecting on the global digital legacy of the 2011 Arab uprisings. You can read the rest of the series here.

If the Arab Spring was defined by optimism about what the internet could do, the years since have been marked by a more sober understanding of what it takes to defend it. 

Back in 2011, the term “digital rights” was still fairly new. While in the decades prior, open source and hacker communities—as well as a handful of organizations including EFF—had advocated for digital freedoms, it was through the merging of disparate communities from around the world in the 2000s that digital rights came to be more clearly understood as an extension of fundamental human rights.

In 2011, we observed that there were only a few organizations focused on digital rights in the region. Groups like Nawaat, which emerged from the Tunisian diaspora under the Ben Ali regime; the Arab Digital Expression Foundation, formed to promote the creative use of technology; and SMEX, which was initially created to teach journalists and others about social media but has grown to become a powerful force in the region, led the way. Since that time, dozens of organizations have emerged throughout the region to promote freedom of expression, innovation, privacy, and digital security.

Understanding how the digital rights movement evolved in the Middle East and North Africa requires a closer look at the communities that shaped it, and the organizations that are carrying on the fight today. Perspectives from people and organizations that were key to these efforts offer critical insight into how the movement has grown and what challenges lie ahead.

Reem Almasri, a senior researcher and digital sovereignty consultant, says that:

‘Digital rights’ emerged as a term around the Arab Spring, when the internet was still a fairly unregulated space, we were still trying to figure out the tech companies’ policies, and force governments to look at the internet as a fundamental right like water and electricity.

But then the need to converge digital rights to everyday rights—economic, political, social rights—and to connect it to geopolitics has started to be thought about, and to be in discussion as well. And to not look at digital rights as a separate field from everything else that’s affecting it, from the geopolitical context.

Mohamad Najem, who co-founded SMEX in 2008 and has led it to become the largest organization in the region, told me that, at the time, “Nobody gave [social media] a lot of attention in our region.” Their work was “a positive approach to social media, how we can democratize sharing information, how we can share more from civil society, change people’s minds, et cetera.”

“After that phase,” he continues, “we can think about 2012-2013—after the Arab Spring, as an organization we started looking at the infrastructure of the internet, and how freedom of expression and privacy are affected. That’s when we started looking more at what we call digital rights.”

Towards Tech Accountability

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, social media companies moved from a largely hands-off approach to governance toward more formalized—and often opaque—content moderation systems. Platforms expanded their trust and safety teams and began working more closely with civil society through trusted partnerships in the region and globally. But, Mohamad Najem says:

After the expansion of tech accountability itself and the adaptation of tech companies, we’ve noticed that it’s not taking us anywhere. Gradually we’ve come to a new phase where it feels like tech accountability is an economy by itself that is not leading to real results. So the next phase for us at least and maybe for others in global majority communities is how we can focus on digital public good, how we can push more governments, private and public institutions to adopt more open source software, to look at the ecosystem and understand the US threats happening now, et cetera.

Another group that has played a key role in the fight for digital rights and tech accountability in the region is 7amleh, a Palestinian organization that was founded in 2013. At the time, says Jalal Abukhater:

[I]t was unique and interesting in Palestinian society to have a human rights organization dedicated fully to the topic of digital rights, you know, human rights in a digital format. However, with the years, we saw various milestones, we saw progress of policy decisions and movements through the Israeli government to influence content moderation in Big Tech companies. We saw problems there as an organization.

7amleh took a leading stance in fighting to preserve the digital rights of Palestinians during a period where there was a very strong influence through the Israeli government. There was actually quite important reporting coming through 7amleh on the situation of online content moderation at a time when it wasn’t really a topic being discussed but it was very clearly a situation where there was major influence by government and political suppression happening as a result.

An Ever-Expanding Ecosystem

While in the early days, the digital rights movement attracted specialists, today, people from other fields have recognized how digital rights intersect with their work, and the digital rights community has embraced them.

Almasri says:

Because the digital rights movement has been decentralizing and has stopped being a speciality, it stopped being an exclusive thing for digital rights specialists, since of course the internet not only in the Arab region but all over the world has become a fundamental infrastructure for running any kind of sensitive operations, or operations in general…all types of organizations, and companies, and initiatives are thinking about their digital security, about how internet laws are affecting the use of the internet, or putting them at risk, and how surveillance technologies are affecting their operations.

Abukhater credits the collaborative work that emerged within the region over the years in building the movement’s strength:

[Today], civil society and digital civil society have many forums, many coalitions and networks, but it’s always important to remember that this is work that builds over many years of experience, and relationships, and networks—that it’s different parties coming to support each other at different phases to ensure that this kind of work succeeds and that this ecosystem is sustained globally with support from partner organizations which were very crucial in ensuring that this ecosystem is sustained, especially in Palestine.

Growing Collaborations

Conferences like Bread and Net, first held in Beirut in 2018, and the Palestine Digital Activism Forum (PDAF), first held in Ramallah in 2017, bring activists, academics, journalists, and other practitioners together to network and learn about each other’s work. The pandemic, conflict, and other barriers haven’t stopped either conference from carrying on: PDAF has become an annual virtual event that draws big-name speakers, while Bread & Net has spaced out its meetings but continues to draw bigger crowds each time. 

Almasri credits these meetings with expanding the movement beyond the traditional techies and activists who first got involved. “You see a wide spectrum of different fields. You see artists, archivists, journalists joining these conversations, which is definitely on the brighter side of things when it comes to this field, or this scene.”

She also credits the emergence of alliances such as the Middle East Alliance for Digital Rights (MADR, of which EFF is a member), founded in 2020 by individuals and organizations who had been working together for many years to formalize those collaborations.

“Other than the collaborations at the advocacy level, [MADR] creates a sort of pressure point on Big Tech, on content moderation policies, allows for certain coordination at the level of the UN, et cetera, which I see as really positive because it brings some of the redundant efforts together and helps decide on priorities.”

Looking Forward

In thinking about the future of the movement, Almasri and Najem agree that digital rights are no longer a niche. In Najem’s words, “It’s about everything else…it’s about everything.” 

Almasri adds:

[W]hen it comes to priorities, things that this scene has been working on, I feel that October 7 [2023] was a big turning point in the way that digital rights activists, researchers, and academics—this field—is looking at digital rights in general. Of course, there is the major question of the need to revise tactics to fight Israel’s tech-enabled genocide that is also empowered by the global economy, big tech, and governments of the world?  What alliances should we start building on a regional and global level?

She sees ‘digital sovereignty,’ the ability of people and communities to choose, control, and use technology that serves their needs and values, as one of the next big topics for the movement to tackle, as debates over who owns and hosts our data have sharpened amid revelations that U.S. companies have played a role in regional conflicts.

There have been pockets of debates on how to achieve digital sovereignty, especially from human rights organizations documenting war crimes … There’s an awareness of how the dependence on US-based providers, cloud storage, even hosting infrastructure is a risk, especially after how using these services has been weaponized against the digital existence of certain organizations in the region that have been deplatformed or had their content removed on platforms like Meta and YouTube because their content doesn’t align with the foreign policy of the United States…so it raises a big question about how we look at digital independence, what is the spectrum of independence that civil society in the region can achieve, and in relation to what’s available as well.

Almasri also points to the role of researchers in the region:

There has been a lot more research on the political economy of surveillance technologies, so not only looking at how governments are using them, but their supply chain, who’s investing in these technologies, and how geopolitical networks empowered their proliferation in the hands of governments.

This is where studies looking at the political economy of AI and the military become important, trying to understand how this field of weapons, the military, and AI grew together as part of this global capitalist system rather than looking at these technologies in silos, that is. Looking at the proliferation of these technologies from a geopolitical point of view, looking at the bigger ecosystem rather than zooming in to the specifics of it. I think this has been a big development in the way that we look at digital rights, and the way that digital rights have been converged and integrated into the geopolitical scene.

As the global digital rights community continues to expand, it’s clear that the questions at its core are no longer just about access or expression, but about power—who holds it, how it is exercised, and who is left out of its protections. What began as a fight to keep the internet open has become a broader effort to reimagine it—an effort that is grappling with questions of infrastructure, ownership, and the global inequalities embedded in both.

And yet, despite the scale of these challenges, the movement’s strength lies in the solidarity, the ecosystems, and the networks it has spent more than a decade building. From the early days of the blogging and techie communities to the increasingly powerful digital rights community, advocates in the region have gone up against dictators, endured war and repression, yet remain determined to push forward.

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