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Before yesterdayPsychological Safety

Crisis-Ready Teams

27 August 2026 at 12:25

Crisis-Ready Teams

I’m by no means a serial corporate dinner attendee, but I do feel I’ve sat through my fair share of after-dinner leadership talks. The speakers are usually held up as shining examples of courage, resilience and leadership under pressure. Their stories have a reliable shape, generally including a man, a mountain and some frostbitten fingers – the typical hero’s journey. They run longer than scheduled. As my colleague put it the morning after one particularly arduous tale, by the end of the evening we felt we’d been up and down the mountain with him.

I don’t want to be too dismissive, because the power of storytelling is huge. Hearing stories of extreme peril offers an inspiring reminder that people can act well under extraordinary pressure and that teams can hold together when everything is falling apart. Stories like these, told well, are worth hearing. The problem is that these stories tend to gloss over the most helpful parts for anyone trying to build a team that will actually perform in a crisis. The mountain story always focuses on the leader’s heroism at the moment of peak drama, but the evidence about what makes a difference for teams in crisis points somewhere else entirely.

Mary J. Waller and Seth A. Kaplan’s Crisis-Ready Teams draws on ten studies, nine of which compare high and low performing teams under crisis conditions. What emerges from that body of research cuts against the mountain-summit view of crisis leadership: performance under pressure is shaped less by what happens at the peak than by what happens before it. 

annapurna sanctuary sunrise

Setting the tone

For teams that work together already, the patterns of behaviour that will matter in a crisis are built – or not – in ordinary working conditions. Whatever interaction patterns they settle into will be the ones they fall back on when things get hard; they are unlikely to change once pressure mounts. 

In contrast, in ‘swift-starting teams’ – groups brought together specifically to manage a crisis such as an accident response team – there are no established patterns to fall back on. These teams are usually composed of experts; highly trained people who may not know one another already, but must immediately “engage in the immediate interdependent performance of complex tasks.” What distinguishes the high performing from the low performing swift-starting teams turns out to be remarkably similar – it’s still about what happens first, but in this case that means how deliberately and effectively they set the tone for working well together in the very short opening phase of their teaming.

You can see this in a simulation study into medical teams that only met for a short period before a patient arrived for resuscitation. The teams with more balanced communication during that initial window went on to engage in higher levels of implicit coordination – the kind of fluid, almost wordless teamwork that looks, from the outside, like a well-oiled machine. However, teams where the lead physician dominated that early forming time by monologuing at their new teammates performed less well. A parallel finding in flight crew research found that greater reciprocity and stability in pre-flight conversations predicted higher performance in the air. The teams who hadn’t been able to have open and reciprocal communication from the start struggled to perform in their respective crisis contexts.

But what does ‘balanced’ communication mean? There is nuance here, and balance does not mean enforced equal airtime, where everyone must contribute the same number of words or talk for the exact same amount of time before the meeting can end. But it is about giving everyone a chance to speak and making sure everyone’s voice is heard. Connected to this, ‘reciprocity’, another early indicator of later performance, is about responsiveness – a pattern of exchange in which information offered is acknowledged and built on by other team members, rather than landing in silence or being cut across.

So establishing from the start how the team will work together matters. What we want to hear is a balance of voices with no single voice dominating, and people listening and responding to each other. 

The phases teams go through

Research into multidisciplinary crisis management teams found that they naturally move through three recognisable stages when they come together: 

  1. Structuring – clarifying roles, knowing who will do what
  2. Information sharing – finding out what each person knows about the situation, and what they can find out
  3. Decision making – deciding what to do with this information to try to solve the problem

Interestingly, high performing teams appeared slower at getting going, tending to spend longer in both structuring and information sharing phases. This, it turns out, is especially important when we bring together individuals from diverse professional backgrounds; they might individually come to quite different conclusions about similar information, so we actually need those interpretations to be spoken and shared so that other team members can “compare the voiced interpretations with their own understanding and, if needed, correct or add to this interpretation.” The outcome is a better overall understanding of the situation than any single team member could have reached by themselves.

Lower performing teams moved far quicker to decision making, but with little shared understanding to build on, their decision making was laboured and often inconclusive, a kind of meandering indecision. Because they’d never fully established how to best work together, they struggled to make good decisions as the situation unfolded.

A helpful way of thinking about it is that crisis-ready teams carry multiple shared mental models, including one that they’ve constructed together about how to best work together. They understand that a crisis is not a single moment requiring one quick response, but a sequence of phases, where their understanding of the situation and therefore the ‘best next thing’ to do will keep changing.  There is no space in this picture for a competing-for-the-right-answer dynamic, where team members vie for power, and there’s also no room for the unilateral hero, who pushes forward with a solution without discussing it with or listening to the rest of the team.

During the crisis

So the research is clear that adaptability is essential, and crisis-ready teams need to do far more than simply execute a plan. This requires an ability to let go of existing work structures and move into active, collective sensemaking – to co-construct a shared understanding of what is actually happening, rather than what was anticipated.

The pull in the opposite direction is threat-rigidity: the tendency, under pressure, to fall back on established patterns even when those patterns no longer fit. As Staw, Sandelands and Dutton (1981) found, under threat a team restricts the information it takes in, narrowing its attention to a few dominant cues, and it also constricts control, so that power and decision-making concentrate upwards to whoever sits highest in the hierarchy. This is unsurprisingly corrosive for psychological safety and can tip a team into solution fixation: it locks onto an early answer, and few voices are able to challenge it. Yet crisis situations keep moving, so a fixed answer defended by a single voice is unlikely to remain the best answer. The reflex to shift authority upwards and narrow who gets heard strikes just at the point that teams need to be able to gather wide input and have many eyes, minds and voices working together to come up with solutions. 

Adapting well starts with going out to meet the changing situation. In Waller’s (1999) aviation study, the difference that stood out during the crisis itself was that the high performing crews collected and moved information between each other earlier: they built a picture of the situation as it unfolded, passed it quickly to the people who needed it, and were faster to sort what mattered from what did not.

And this prioritisation of the information in the room is also key. In their own research, described in the book, Waller and Kaplan and their colleagues studied mine rescue teams and found that the faster-acting teams did two things more than the slower ones. They used more closed-loop communication, in which the sender speaks their message, the receiver reads it back and the sender confirms that they have it correct. While it might seem slow, this makes it clear to all what has been heard, not just what has been said. 

Related to this, the faster teams also used more explicit coordination, spelling guidance out in detail rather than leaving it to be inferred. This looks like it should contradict the earlier point about implicit coordination being the marker of a well-functioning team, but as Waller and Kaplan argue, implicit coordination only works when the whole team already shares the same picture. In a novel crisis situation, you cannot count on that, so the faster teams say the thing rather than assume it goes without saying and have to repair the misunderstanding later. This is low-context communication under pressure, the explicit, spelled-out kind I’ve written about before. The kind of explicit communication that already earns its place in ordinary work, for reasons of clarity, inclusion and psychological safety, matters even more in a crisis.

What the research actually shows

The after-dinner speaker is not wrong that crisis performance is visible in the moment, whether that’s up the mountain, in surgery or managing a critical incident. But we miss the most important part if we don’t pay more attention to what gets built before that. The team that moves fluidly through a crisis shares information, speaks up, listens, builds on each other’s ideas and adapts without freezing – and that team has been working on this since they first started working together. The mountain story locates the heroism in the ascent. Waller and Kaplan locate it in the preparation, the patterns, the reciprocity, the quality of the communication and the willingness to structure before acting. It’s less dramatic, perhaps, and not such a compelling story. But it is far more effective.

Further Reading

Reading the air: high and low context communication in teams

Déformation professionnelle 

Crisis-Ready Teams by Mary J. Waller and Seth A. Kaplan

Zijlstra, F. R. H., Waller, M., & Phillips, S. (2012). Setting the tone: early interaction patterns in swift starting teams as a predictor of effectiveness. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 21(5), 749-777. https://doi.org/10.1080/1359432X.2012.690399

Uitdewilligen S, Waller MJ. Information sharing and decision-making in multidisciplinary crisis management teams. J Organ Behav. 2018; 39: 731–748. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.2301

Staw, B. M., Sandelands, L. E., & Dutton, J. E. (1981). Threat Rigidity Effects in Organizational Behavior: A Multilevel Analysis. Administrative Science Quarterly, 26(4), 501–524. https://doi.org/10.2307/2392337

Waller, M. J. (1999). The timing of adaptive group responses to nonroutine events. Academy of Management Journal, 42(2), 127–137. https://doi.org/10.2307/257088

Su, L., Kaplan, S., Burd, R., Winslow, C., Hargrove, A., & Waller, M. (2017). Trauma resuscitation: can team behaviours in the prearrival period predict resuscitation performance?. BMJ simulation & technology enhanced learning, 3(3), 106–110. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmjstel-2016-000143

The post Crisis-Ready Teams appeared first on Psych Safety.

Accountability

29 May 2026 at 07:00

Accountability

Accountability, quite literally, is the ability to give an account: account-ability. An account is a narrative – the telling of an honest story about what happened, why we did what we did, what was known at the time and what wasn’t, told from our particular position, and situated within the context of what was actually happening. To be accountable is to have the ability to give an account. This isn’t a wordplay or a clever rhetorical manoeuvre. It’s the simple etymology of the word – accountability is meant to be about our capacity for honest explanation. To be accountable is not the same as to be punishable.

But accountability has been colonised by blame. In the world of work, almost without us noticing, the meaning of accountability has been displaced by its near-opposite. The tell is the phrase “Someone must be held accountable” (or something similar), and what that usually means in practice is that someone should suffer consequences. It’s rarely used to mean that someone should be given the conditions in which they can honestly explain what happened, but that someone should bear the cost of it happening. Accountability has turned into blame with better marketing.

Roberts (1991) formalised accountability as a relational tension between an account giver and a recipient, and that framing is important. Accountability requires at least two parties, someone willing to give an account and someone capable of receiving it; it’s relational and dynamic. Philip Tetlock’s work on accountability and cognition shows why the receiving end is so consequential. What he found was interesting but unsurprising: when people know who they’re accountable to and can anticipate what that audience wants, the account they give is shaped accordingly – designed to satisfy the audience rather than give the truest description of events as they actually happened. Every performance review, every post-incident investigation, every board report is subject to this dynamic. The account we receive is the account that the teller believed the audience wanted.

Accountability as a construct has been studied extensively across public administration (Bovens), organisational behaviour (Tetlock, Frink & Ferris), philosophy (O’Neill), and safety science (Dekker), and what strikes anyone who reads across these fields is how rarely any of them mean the same thing by it. The kaleidoscopic definitional confusion is part of the core problem with accountability. Even the classic RACI matrix (the popular tool that gives the appearance of clarity while achieving the texture of a spreadsheet) gets accountability wrong. Much of that confusion is semantic and probably unavoidable, but some of it has structural consequences. The most significant conflation is between accountability and responsibility. Ieraci (2007, via Parris, 2025) draws the distinction clearly: responsibility involves doing, accountability involves reporting. Responsibility is about the work itself, and accountability is about the account of the work. They overlap and interact, but they are not the same thing, and treating them as synonyms has problematic consequences. 

Misunderstanding Accountability

Accountability and responsibility have been used interchangeably for so long that even legislation gets it wrong. This isn’t just pedantry. The conflation matters because once accountability is understood to mean “being responsible for outcomes,” the logical next step is: if the outcome was bad, the accountable person is at fault. Consequence then follows automatically and the account (the narrative, the context, the conditions that were actually present) gets dismissed before it can be heard. And accountability for outcomes is, in any case, the wrong target. Outcomes are partly beyond any of our control. What we can reasonably ask people to account for is their reasoning, their decisions, and their actions, situated within their context. Not the outcome.

“People aren’t just people, they are people surrounded by circumstances.”

— Terry Pratchett

Karl Weick’s sensemaking work is useful here, and shows why this is even worse than it first appears. Accountability in organisations is almost always exercised retrospectively, after the outcome is already known, and hindsight does much of the work before the inquiry begins. The account becomes a post-hoc justification exercise rather than a genuine rendering – an attempt to prove innocence in a process that has already assumed guilt. Structural bias is at play, and the knowledge of the outcome contaminates the inquiry before it begins.

Parris’s example from maritime law shows both mechanisms operating at once. New Zealand’s Maritime Transport Act assigns responsibility to vessel Masters where it clearly means accountability in the liability sense, and the confusion has structural consequences for who gets blamed when things go wrong. The Master at the sharp end becomes legally exposed for outcomes shaped by systemic decisions made at the blunt end. The legislative conflation and the retrospective framing work together: context and conditions get set aside because the outcome is already known, and the law reaches for the nearest human rather than the most relevant cause.

“…they took the captain to court, even though there was not a thing I could have done to have stopped it, to have known about it, or anything… I was held accountable… But I wasn’t responsible.”
Parris, 2025 pp.35

And here’s the crux: responsibility is actually closer to what organisations think they mean by accountability. Responsibility is about roles, obligations, and the act of doing. We can assign responsibility, but we cannot assign accountability – an account is given, not extracted, and every organisational system built around ‘holding people accountable’ rests on a category error with real-world consequences. If accountability cannot be assigned, only taken, then the pressure organisations apply in its name does not produce genuine accounts. It only produces performances of them.

Accountability without context is blame

When we strip the account (the narrative, the context, the local rationality of the person who was there) and retain only the assignment of fault, we haven’t done accountability. We’ve dressed something much older and more primitive in accountability’s clothes.

Blametropism is the organisational tendency to orient toward fault, the way a plant orients toward light, regardless of whether finding fault serves any operational (rather than emotional) use. The organisational or political apparatus of accountability (the investigation, the finding, the consequence) is seldom deployed to truly understand what happened, but instead to locate where the fault should land. The true account is rarely sought; what’s more often sought is a name, a goat that we can expel from the village, laden with our sins. Accountability-as-blame is blametropism in its business suit. It gives the impression of rigour while reliably producing the outcomes of blame.

Marilyn Paul’s systems framing captures the consequences well: blame generates fear, fear generates cover-up, cover-up degrades information quality, degraded information produces more errors, more errors generate more blame. The feedback cycle is self-sustaining and self-defeating, and as reliable as it is depressing. An organisation that uses accountability as a pressure tool destroys its own capacity to learn what’s really happening inside it.

When people learn that giving an account: an honest one, with all its uncertainty and complexity and acknowledgement of error, leads to punishment, they naturally stop giving honest accounts. Instead they give performed accounts – narratives designed to survive scrutiny rather than enable learning.

And the demand for a single account is itself part of the problem. Real situations are experienced differently from different positions within a system. The account of the nurse who administered the wrong medicine, the ward manager who created the rota, the software developer who designed the drug cabinet interface, and the executive who approved the staffing budget are all partial, all genuine, and all necessary. Accountability-as-blame doesn’t just suppress honest accounts. It demands that a complex, plural reality be rendered as a single story with a single author. 

Take the cases of Hadiza Bawa-Garba and RaDonda Vaught: both clinicians who made errors in systemically compromised conditions, both of whom were honest about what happened, and both of whom were subsequently prosecuted. In both cases, the logic was that someone had to be held to account. Investigations were conducted, findings were made and severe consequences followed. What was not sought, in any meaningful sense, was a genuine account. Both clinicians were already carrying the burden of what happened before their prosecutions even began, and the prosecutions compounded an existing problem by converting private grief into public liability. The systemic conditions and the context behind the errors (staffing levels, equipment failures, normalised workarounds and more) were noted but set aside. The apparatus of “accountability” produced the outcome that blame always produces: a conclusion that foreclosed rather than opened inquiry. Our simulation of that day in Leicester in the Learning Lab lets a team see those systemic conditions from the inside.

The lesson that clinicians drew from both cases was not “be more careful.” It was “be less transparent.” That is what accountability without context reliably produces. Onora O’Neill saw the same mechanism from a different vantage point: systems designed to demonstrate transparency often produce performances of transparency rather than the thing itself. The safety audit, the Ofsted inspection and the compliance checklist all create the appearance of account-giving while systematically degrading the conditions in which genuine accounts are possible. The mechanism defeats its own purpose.

An organisation that punishes honest accounts will eventually receive only dishonest ones.

You can’t assign accountability, only take it

The moment an account is compelled, demanded, or extracted under threat of consequence, it ceases to be an account and becomes testimony. Modern societies do not treat confessions given under duress as genuine, and for good reason –  what is said under compulsion is shaped more by the compulsion than by the truth. The same mechanism operates inside organisations. Forced accountability produces self-protection, not transparency. A performance of accountability, not learning. It’s worth noting in this light that we tend to call the most common formal accountability mechanism in organisations an “annual performance review”.

“Currently fashionable methods of accountability damage rather than repair trust.”
– Onora O’Neill

A genuine account has to be a voluntary act. It requires the account-giver to be willing to be seen: to expose their reasoning, their uncertainty, their errors, and their context. That exposure carries real interpersonal and career risk, and where candour carries significant risk but little benefit, most of us will err on the side of caution and silence. This isn’t a character flaw, it’s a rational response to the environment, and changing that calculus is the only reliable route to better accounts.

The distance between the account an organisation says it wants and the account it actually rewards is navigated through social inference: reading the room, calibrating our degree of honesty to the audience, knowing instinctively how much truth is too much. It’s also a skill that is unevenly distributed in most organisations. For many neurodivergent people, candour is simply how to communicate, not a choice to be weighed against consequences. An organisation that performs a desire for honesty while punishing it in practice fails those workers and risks actively deceiving them.

Cultivating the conditions for honesty is considerably more difficult than demanding it, and considerably more effective. The phrase “holding people accountable” implies a power that organisations do not have. We cannot hold someone else accountable. We can only nurture the organisational substrate in which people are able and willing to give an honest account.

What real accountability looks like

Real accountability is dialogic rather than monologic. Roberts draws on Senge’s distinction between discussion and dialogue: discussion in this sense, is like a debate, with positions defended and a winner declared. Dialogue is different: meaning, nuance, context and information flow freely between parties, with the intention of surfacing something neither party could reach alone. Organisational accountability processes are almost universally structured as a defensive discussion – and a genuine account cannot be extracted through cross-examination. It can only emerge through a more open, reflective dialogue, which requires the account-giver to feel safe enough to think out loud, be uncertain, and say “I don’t know” without it becoming evidence against them. Both giving and receiving are equal components of accountability, and the receiving requires its own kind of discipline: the willingness to be changed by what we hear, rather than confirm what we already believed. Maybe the hardest part is the moment right after the event, when everyone is nervous and the pressure to find a name is enormous, and someone has to be the person who says: let’s slow down, let’s find out what actually happened.

Parris’s typology reinforces this binary. Backward/hierarchical accountability is structurally monologic: it already knows what it’s looking for. Forward/process accountability requires dialogue, because it’s genuinely interested in what the system contributed, which can only be discovered, rarely confirmed.

“But surely there have to be consequences sometimes?” Yes, but consequences and accountability are separate questions. We can impose consequences without ever actually receiving an honest account. And if negative consequences are attached to the account, we will never receive an honest one. Consequences cannot come first without contaminating everything that follows. The desire for consequence after failure is often a desire for justice, and that is a fundamental human impulse worth taking seriously. But retributive justice and learning are different projects, and the accountability mechanisms most organisations use are poorly designed for either.

The question after a failure, Dekker argues, is not just “who is accountable?” but (more importantly) “how do we learn?”, and answering the second question well requires the conditions that make genuine accounts possible. It follows that psychological safety and true accountability are mutually dependent. We cannot give a true account if we don’t feel safe, and accountability as punishment makes honesty unsafe. A genuine account shouldn’t feel like a confession. It should feel like a contribution to our collective understanding, and treating it as the former guarantees we will never receive it as the latter. Building the conditions in which genuine accounts are possible is what accountability, properly understood, actually requires.

Account-ability

In the vast majority of organisations, accountability is expected to flow upwards. The powerful receive accounts; whilst they are seldom required to honestly account for themselves to those ‘below’ them. And I’d argue that the most valuable accounts are actually those that flow sideways, worker to worker, where honesty isn’t calibrated to hierarchy.

We have collectively spent considerable energy perfecting the art of demanding honesty from the people for whom we have made honesty unsafe. “Accountability”, a word that belonged to everyone who needed to give an honest account, was appropriated by institutions that needed a more respectable name for blame. Blame is cognitively cheap, emotionally satisfying, and operationally useless. It produces a very clear answer to the question of what to do next, and it is almost always the wrong one.

However, blame is also often politically useful. Blame doesn’t just emotionally satisfy: it secures power. When the investigation concludes and the name is named, someone’s position is secured and someone else’s is eroded, or ended. The apparatus of “accountability” in this case is functioning exactly as designed, just for purposes that aren’t on the tin. 

This is why genuine accountability remains so rare. It asks the powerful to submit to the same conditions they currently use accountability to avoid: to give an honest account of themselves, to be uncertain in public, and to say “I don’t know” to the people they lead. In cultures where blame secures position, a genuine account risks it. The rarity of genuine accountability in organisations is its rational consequence.

Many organisations “hold people accountable” by imposing negative consequences for failure. The organisations that actually handle failure best are the ones that make it safe to give an honest account – they foster account-ability. They are not the same thing. They are, in fact, complete opposites.

References

Bovens, M. (2007) ‘Analysing and assessing accountability: a conceptual framework’, European Law Journal, 13(4), pp. 447–468.

Dekker, S.W.A. (2012) Just Culture: Balancing Safety and Accountability. Farnham: Ashgate. (See also: Dekker (2011) in the map)

Frink, D.D. and Ferris, G.R. (1998) ‘Accountability, impression management, and goal setting in the performance evaluation process’, Human Relations, 51(10), pp. 1259–1283.

Ieraci, S. (2007) ‘Responsibility versus accountability in a risk-averse culture’, Emergency Medicine Australasia, 19(1), pp. 63–64.

O’Neill, O. (2002) A Question of Trust. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. → Explore in map

Parris, R. (2025) Accountability: A Lived Experience. MSc thesis. Lund University. → Explore in map

Paul, M. (1997) ‘Moving from blame to accountability’, The Systems Thinker.

Roberts, J. (1991) ‘The possibilities of accountability’, Accounting, Organizations and Society, 16(4), pp. 355–368. → Explore in map

Roberts, J. (1996) ‘From discipline to dialogue: individualizing and socializing forms of accountability’, in Accountability: Power, Ethos and the Technologies of Managing, pp. 40–61.

Tetlock, P.E. (1985) ‘Accountability: the neglected social context of judgment and choice’, Research in Organizational Behavior, 7, pp. 297–332. → Explore in map

Weick, K.E. (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. (See also: Weick & Roberts (1993) and Weick (1993) Mann Gulch in the map)

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The “Utility” of Psychological Safety

20 March 2026 at 11:03

The Futility of Utility

If we want to make the argument for psychological safety in most organisations, we often need to speak the language of value. There is genuinely strong evidence that psychological safety is associated with better team performance, including decades of work linking psychological safety to reduced error rates in healthcare, aviation, and high-stakes industries. There are real, measurable outcomes of high psychological safety: better retention, more innovation, fewer incidents and faster learning.

And if we can’t make this case, we often won’t get in the room. Budgets are limited, and if we can’t demonstrate value, programmes don’t get funded – and psychological safety becomes a privilege of only exceptionally well resourced organisations rather than reaching the places that need it most.

I’ve made these arguments myself when pitching, justifying a budget line, or helping a client make the case internally. The evidence is real and it’s worth citing.

So the impulse to frame psychological safety in utilitarian terms: to ask what it’s for, what it produces, what return it delivers, is not cynical. It comes from a legitimate place.

But there’s a problem with it too.

What utilitarian logic actually does

Utilitarianism, in its classical form, aggregates welfare across a population and optimises for the greatest good for the greatest number of people. On the surface, this sounds fair: everyone counts, everyone’s interests are included in the calculation. But the utilitarian framework contains a structural flaw that philosophers have been wrestling with for centuries: the welfare of a minority can always be legitimately overridden if the aggregate calculation favours doing so. This isn’t a misapplication of utilitarianism. It’s how it works.

“A man’s virtue is tested by whether he treats those who are useful to him and those who are not useful to him in the same way.”
Simone Weil, The Need for Roots

When we ask whether psychological safety “delivers ROI”, we’re (whether we intend to or not) invoking this logic. We are setting up a calculation in which the value of each person’s ability to speak up is weighed against organisational cost. And once that calculation is running, its conclusions are unfortunately rather predictable.

Who loses?

Helping people speak up is not equally easy across a workforce. For some people – those who are already confident, possess more power, or who resemble the leadership – many of the conditions for speaking up exist more or less by default. Creating psychological safety for these people is low-cost, because the system was largely built around (or by) them.

For others, it’s much harder. Improving psychological safety for someone who is neurodivergent, for a person of colour in a predominantly white organisation, for a woman in a male-dominated team, for LGBTQ+ folks in more conservative cultures, for a manual worker in a professional environment, for people from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, or for anyone with a “marked identity” (something that marks them as different from the contextual norm), this work is often slower, more structural, more disruptive and challenging to existing habits and hierarchies. Essentially, in terms of resources, time and money, it may be genuinely more expensive.

A utilitarian approach can keep finding reasons why this particular work, for these particular people, is not quite “worth it”. Not because anyone is being deliberately cruel, but because the framework itself will keep producing that answer. The least safe people are often the most costly to serve, and in a cost-benefit world, cost wins.

And it’s worth noting that it always seems to be other people who are judged to be receiving “too much” psychological safety – as costing too much. The people (who are almost always people for whom speaking up is already safe) making that argument never seem to volunteer themselves for experiencing less psychological safety.

A different framework: capabilities and rights

The philosopher Amartya Sen argued in Development as Freedom, that human wellbeing cannot be captured by utility measures (such as GDP) alone. What matters is whether people have genuine capabilities (the real and practical freedoms to do and be). Martha Nussbaum extended this to describe central human capabilities that function as threshold conditions that must be met regardless of what an utilitarian argument might warrant. The key point is that these capabilities are not inputs to an equation. They are things that must be in place, for everyone.

I believe that the safety to speak up without fear of punishment or humiliation fits squarely within this framework. It is not (solely) a productivity lever. It is a basic condition of full participation in our own working lives. 

“Each person is an end, and none is merely a means to the ends of others.”
Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities

This is also what rights-based thinking has always understood. Rights function not as goods to be weighed against other goods, but as constraints on what we are permitted to do regardless of the cost / benefit calculation. We don’t ask whether freedom of speech delivers ROI. We don’t (or shouldn’t) evaluate the right to education, or to bodily autonomy, or to freedom of conscience in terms of economic return. We treat them as things that cannot be sacrificed even when the utilitarian maths might point that way. In the human rights sphere at least, the opposite way lies fascism.

Psychological safety belongs in this category of capabilities. Not as a productivity lever, but as a fundamental condition of dignity at work.

Noting the benefits is not the same as measuring utility

None of this means we should stop talking about what psychological safety produces. We should talk about it. Better innovation, improved quality, reduced harm, greater retention, stronger wellbeing are real and very important outcomes and they’re worth naming. 

But there is a difference between noting the benefits of something and making those benefits the justification for its existence. We note the benefits of free speech in that it produces better public discourse, more accurate information, and more accountable institutions, without treating those benefits as the reason we defend it. The defence comes from somewhere more foundational.

And I wonder if the same shift is needed for psychological safety. We can point to what it produces but we should not make production the point.

What this means in practice

Framing psychological safety as a right rather than a utility makes the practice of it more honest. It means we stop asking “what might it cost us to foster psychological safety” and start asking “who are we currently excluding, and what does that cost them?”

It means that the people for whom creating safety is hardest: the people with the least power, who are the least visible or represented, and with the least resemblance to whoever set the norms, are no longer at risk of being deprioritised when budgets get tight or attention moves on. And it means we can hold a clearer line when the utilitarian cost/benefit pressure mounts (as it always eventually does) and someone asks whether all of this is really “worth it.”

The answer is that it’s not a question of worth. It’s a question of what kind of organisation, and what kind of working life, we think people are entitled to. 

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Learning Teams

30 January 2026 at 11:57

Learning Teams

Often, when we’re trying to improve how work gets done, we start with principles. We agree what we believe in, or are working towards, at a high level, and then figure out how those ideas translate into day-to-day practice. This piece takes a different route.

Instead of beginning with abstract principles, I want to start with a concrete practice: Learning Teams, from the world of HOP (Human and Organisational Performance). Through the excellent work of Sam Goodman and others, Learning Teams have evolved into a reasonably well-defined way of bringing people together to learn from everyday work.

By looking closely at how Learning Teams are designed and facilitated, we can surface the deeper principles they rest on – principles that reach far beyond pure safety contexts, and have important things to say about learning, power and psychological safety at work.

Let’s dive in…

What Are Learning Teams?

Learning Teams are a way of creating space to learn from events at work, from work as it is done, not work as imagined or prescribed in tidy process maps or policies. They focus on real work – the complex, sometimes messy and often adaptive way that real work gets done, shaped as it is by context, constraints and trade-offs. 

The purpose of a Learning Team is to bring together the people who are closest to the work, those at the sharp end, to share their knowledge of how the work really happens, so that the organisation can learn.

Learning Teams can lead to many different outcomes, but there is only one true requirement: that we learn more about “normal work.” If a Learning Team helps an organisation better understand how work is actually done, then it has been a success. 

Events with Learning Potential

When we get stuck into the world of organisational learning, it quickly becomes clear that, in theory, we could learn from absolutely everything that happens at work – the good, the bad and the truly horrific. 

In practice though, running a Learning Team requires an investment of time, so it simply wouldn’t be possible to do one for everything that happens at work. So the question becomes, which events are most worth learning from?

Rather than automatically choosing the things that went most wrong or had the most severe impact, Learning Teams invites us to consider which events have the most learning potential (as does PSIRF). This might be a failure or breakdown, but it might also be something that went unexpectedly well, or a situation that could have gone wrong but didn’t, perhaps a “good catch”.

We’re often looking for “goldilocks” events that sit in the middle ground. Not so rare that they tell us very little about everyday work (a meteorite strike), but not so common that we’re already well aware of what’s happening. Not so severe that they automatically trigger a formal investigation, with all the emotional, regulatory or legal burden that can bring, but not so trivial that there’s nothing very interesting to explore.

This isn’t a precise science. We can never know in advance exactly what learning a conversation will surface. But when deciding whether an event is a good candidate for a Learning Team, it can be helpful to weigh up factors such as:

  • the effect on the team
  • scale and impact
  • frequency
  • how generalisable the learning might be
  • regulatory or legal implications
  • alignment with existing improvement work
the factors affecting the learning potential of an event

When we explore Learning Teams in our HOP workshops, this is often the point where people start to see themselves in it. The examples of what might trigger a Learning Team vary wildly, depending on the kind of work people do.

For some, it’s a spike in complaints after a shiny new IT system goes live. For others, it’s a team restructure that didn’t quite go as planned. And sometimes it’s something more positive – like a particular store or location suddenly outperforming the rest, leaving everyone asking, what on earth are they doing differently?

It doesn’t really matter whether these are successes or failures, as long as they spark some organisational curiosity. We can see all of these as opportunities to ask better questions about how work is really getting done, and what people are adapting to in order to make things work.

Roles in a Learning Team

Once we’ve chosen an event with learning potential, the next question is to decide who to include in the Learning Team.

the various roles of a HOP learning team - owner, facilitator, team members

There are a small number of distinct roles, each with a specific purpose:

Owner: The Owner is someone with enough organisational authority to get the Learning Team off the ground. They ensure the right people are invited, and they commit to championing any organisational actions that emerge afterwards. Crucially, the Owner opens the session, welcoming people and setting the intent, and then leaves. (We’ll explore why this matters shortly.)

Facilitator: Sometimes referred to as the Coach, they are there to facilitate the learning, not to be the technical expert. They don’t have detailed knowledge of the event being discussed, but they are skilled in holding the process. They set expectations, often through a social contract, keep the conversation on track, and help the group stay focused on learning. 

Scribe: The Scribe plays another essential, but often underestimated, role. Like the Facilitator, they are not someone with direct knowledge of the work being discussed. Their focus is on capturing the qualitative richness of the conversation as it unfolds. They manage the “wall of discovery”, where insights and learning are made visible to the group.

Team members: There may be two, three, or more team members in the Learning Team. These are the people closest to the work, who hold first-hand knowledge of how work is actually done at the sharp end and ideally, they were present during the event being discussed. Their primary role is to share that knowledge. They may identify improvements along the way, but that is not their main aim. 

Learning Teams may also include people who weren’t directly involved in the specific event, but who do similar work or interact with the same system. This broadens any learning beyond a single episode and helps surface patterns in normal work that might otherwise remain invisible.

Structure of a Learning Team

One of my favourite things about Learning Teams is their intentional structure. They are deliberately designed in two distinct parts, with a pause in the middle. 

Before the Learning Team itself, there is some preparation required: being clear about the focus of the learning, identifying who needs to be involved, and making the practical arrangements to bring people together. Then we have the meetings:

Meeting 1: Learning from the work
The first meeting typically lasts around 60–90 minutes – long enough to allow for depth, but not so long that we lose focus. If it feels like we need more time than this, it’s often a signal that the event we’ve chosen is too broad and needs narrowing.

The sole purpose of this meeting is to understand what happened, or what happens, in the flow of real work. This is not a space for jumping to solutions or improvements, however tempting that might be. The Facilitator’s role here is to protect that intent, and they may need to be quite firm about it! This is in deliberate contrast with many “traditional” investigations, which tend to focus on a single incident and work backwards to identify where things failed. Learning Teams spend proportionally more time understanding how work usually succeeds, what people were adapting to, and why actions made sense in their context at the time.

“Soak time”
Between the two meetings, it’s helpful to allow some “soak time” – often around a day. This pause gives people space to process and reflect on what emerged, and sometimes realise what was missing or left unsaid in the first conversation.

Photo by cottonbro studio

Meeting 2: Making sense and improvements
The second meeting brings the group back together. The Facilitator supports the group to recap what was learned in Meeting 1, invites them to add any new reflections, and only then opens up the conversation about possible improvements or changes. This meeting is usually a similar length to the first.

Outputs of Learning Teams

As already touched on, the only essential outcome of a learning team is an improved understanding of normal work.

Sometimes, depending on the event, this learning will naturally surface areas where things can be improved, and maybe even some ideas for improvement. But improvements are a possible by-product of Learning Teams, not their primary purpose.

A Learning Team that ends with richer insight, a more nuanced understanding of work, and perhaps the ability to ask better questions about how work happens, has still been successful – even if it doesn’t produce a tidy list of actions. 

Evidence supports this shift in emphasis. Interestingly, a comparative study in a large NHS hospital found that Learning Teams generated more actions overall, and a substantially higher proportion of system-focused improvements, than conventional root cause analyses, possibly because they explore work across multiple contexts rather than compressing learning into a small number of technical or individual “root causes”. 

Reducing Power Gradients

The success of a Learning Team hinges on psychological safety. Do the people in the team feel safe to be honest about what happened? If not, we’re unlikely to learn very much.

This sits at the heart of why the Owner of a Learning Team will usually step out after the introductions. The Owner is, by definition, someone with greater organisational authority – they have the clout to convene the Learning Team and the responsibility to act on what emerges afterwards. But their presence in the discussion itself can unintentionally introduce a power gradient that makes candour harder.

This isn’t because of bad intention, or a failure on their part to reduce the power gradient. It’s a very pragmatic recognition that hierarchy shapes behaviour. When someone with formal authority is in the room, people are more likely to soften their accounts, or steer away from what feels risky to say.

There’s also a more practical reason for the Owner leaving. The Owner typically doesn’t hold first-hand knowledge of the work at the sharp end; their role in the Learning Team is to enable learning and respond to it, not to be the source of it. By stepping out, the Owner helps create the conditions for more open, real conversations, where the people closest to the work can speak with fewer filters.

A different way of learning

In many organisations, when something happens that we want to learn from, we default to an investigation. A group is brought together, often with more senior people in the room, and the focus quickly turns to understanding what went wrong, often who did wrong, and what needs to change.

Learning Teams take a different approach.

Rather than being judged from on high, the people who do the work are treated as the ones who know most about it. Time is spent first on understanding what work looks like in practice, before determining whether anything needs to be fixed. We put a bit of space between learning and decision making. 

“I learned very early the difference between knowing the name of something and knowing something.”
― Richard P. Feynman

This doesn’t mean Learning Teams replace formal investigations altogether. Some events will always need a formal response. But if we’re serious about learning from everyday work, not just from catastrophic failures, then we need approaches that make it easier for people to speak honestly about how work actually gets done.

That, for me, is what Learning Teams really offer. They invite us to take a better stance, one that starts with curiosity, treats people at the sharp end as experts in the work, and accepts that understanding has to come before improvement.

Taking it further

Interested to learn more? Join our next HOP Fundamentals workshop, where we explore Learning Teams and much, much more. 

Further Reading

Work as Imagined vs Work as Done

The Sharp End and Blunt End of Education

Reducing Power Gradients

Just Culture

Robbins, T., Tipper, S., King, J., Ramachandran, S.K., Pandit, J.J. and Pandit, M., 2021. Evaluation of learning teams versus root cause analysis for incident investigation in a large United Kingdom National Health Service Hospital. Journal of Patient Safety, 17(8), pp.e1800-e1805.

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